[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

[FYI] (Fwd) FC: More on Frank Sudia's proposal to revive encryption




------- Forwarded message follows -------
Date sent:      	Thu, 20 Sep 2001 00:50:52 -0400
To:             	politech@politechbot.com
From:           	Declan McCullagh <declan@well.com>
Subject:        	FC: More on Frank Sudia's proposal to revive encryption key escrow
Copies to:      	cme@acm.org, fsudia@home.com, frank@sudialab.com
Send reply to:  	declan@well.com

Previous message:

"Frank Sudia's proposal: Let's revive encryption key escrow"
http://www.politechbot.com/p-02519.html

***********

Date: Mon, 17 Sep 2001 19:42:07 -0700
To: declan@well.com
From: Carl Ellison <cme@acm.org>
Subject: Re: FC: Frank Sudia's proposal: Let's revive encryption key
   escrow
Cc: politech@politechbot.com, fsudia@home.com, frank@sudialab.com
In-Reply-To: <5.0.2.1.0.20010916185550.01ff22c0@mail.well.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

At 07:04 PM 9/16/2001 -0400, Declan McCullagh wrote:
 >Frank Sudia's bio says that he is a programmer, a lawyer, a public
 >policy  analyst, and a co-founder of the CertCo encryption company,
 >formerly part  of Bankers Trust. He is also the creator of the
 >"Bankers Trust Corporate  Key Escrow System." > >His paper (see the
 link below)  is a suggestion for a route for >Congress to  take if
 they "decided to require all encryption systems >to be readable by 
 authorized legal authorities."

Declan:

 The idea of amending the 4th Amendment is laughable.  Is this a
satire?

Frank:

 if you want to be taken seriously, you need to address the fact that
no one has any control over cryptographic technology.  There is no way
to mandate the use of GAK.  There is no way to detect deviations from
GAK.  The discussions in your paper are all irrelevant, in the face of
that one fact.

 We are not dealing with a technology that is under the control of the
US Congress.  The original GAK proponents once claimed that, but it is
not true.

 Ubiquitous non-GAK cryptography is one of those things that is a side
effect of the confluence of:

1.	cheap, ubiquitous, high power computing
2.	freedom of speech
3.	programming languages

 Which of those three would you eliminate in order to make it
possible for some governmental entity to exercise control over the
kind of cryptography that is available in the world?

  - Carl

P.S.  Don't tell me about your qualifications as a designer of Key
Escrow systems without looking first at the list of inventors on the
Key Escrow patents by Trusted Information Systems.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: PGP 6.5.8

iQA/AwUBO6a0fnPxfjyW5ytxEQLXoQCgyN5b2KtondMrC4NI9dih/9ZureUAn0ii
bqQYsgYc1la5KXmOJqejTosl
=OHNG
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


+------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Carl M. Ellison         cme@acm.org     http://world.std.com/~cme | |
   PGP: 08FF BA05 599B 49D2  23C6 6FFD 36BA D342                 |
+--Officer, officer, arrest that man. He's whistling a dirty song.-+

***********

Date: Sun, 16 Sep 2001 16:58:12 -0700
To: declan@well.com, politech@politechbot.com
From: Lizard <lizard@mrlizard.com>
Subject: Re: FC: Frank Sudia's proposal: Let's revive encryption key
   escrow
Cc: fsudia@home.com, frank@sudialab.com
In-Reply-To: <5.0.2.1.0.20010916185550.01ff22c0@mail.well.com>

Gods, this guy has crawled right out of the pages of "Atlas Shrugged"
-- the government seizing patents in the name of 'the public good'?
Sheesh. Shall we be seeing an "Equalization of Opportunity Act" next?

There is no act of government which can guarantee safety -- but many
acts can guarantee tyranny. Liberty for security is a fool's bargain.
You get neither.

***********

Date: Sun, 16 Sep 2001 20:01:01 -0400
From: Nat <nathaniel.echols@yale.edu>
To: Declan McCullagh <declan@well.com>
cc: politech@politechbot.com
Subject: Re: FC: Frank Sudia's proposal: Let's revive encryption key
escrow In-Reply-To: <5.0.2.1.0.20010916185550.01ff22c0@mail.well.com>

Not exactly related to this post, but gov't. vs encryption in general:
I was attempting to explain to a non-technical (but very intelligent)
classmate why legal restrictions on encryption and
no-authorization-required snooping into computers and private
communications was so much more worrying than other losses of freedom
we're bound to suffer.

I'm happy to go through a strip-search at the airport if it allows me
to use public transportation (which is really what commercial airlines
are- just operated by private entities), or to deal with restrictions
on firearm use.  These are intended to prevent immediate harm to
others, and are directed towards dangerous *actions* alone. 
Cryptography, on the other hand, cannot be used to kill.  I'd imagine
few people want a truly unregulated Internet- lack of restrictions on,
say, computer hacking, harassment through email, or DoS attacks would
be awful.  These are still cases of individuals directly causing
damage to others- here, by destruction of data and/or property.

Governments are only as good as the people in them.  When the power of
individual bureaucrats becomes too large, it is abused.  If we submit
to government monitoring of communications, we're at the mercy of the
folks reading our email.  We allow armed government officials to
patrol our streets and search our bags, but this is always done in
public.  How can we tell who reads our data, and when, and how they
use it?  What's to prevent a malicious official like the one who
installed monitoring software on judges' machines from seeing
everything we do- and using it for decidedly illegal purposes?

My friend says "well, I don't have anything to hide."  Not from the
government itself, perhaps, but who knows what underpaid spook might
see value in his electronic communications.  My father works with
federal officials, some good, some bad, in scientific research, and
he's seen people who should know better using emails they weren't
supposed to see for personal advantage.  His philosophy has always
been "Never, ever assume anything you send won't come back to bite you
in the ass", but no one should have to worry about *everything* they
send being read by someone or something else.

A writer with more coherence and legal training than I needs to come
up with a comprehensive argument for why public *should* care about
this issue, regardless of whether they have anything to hide.

-Nat

***********

From: "Dale Robertson" <dalerobertson@hotmail.com>
To: declan@well.com, frank@sudialab.com
Cc: dalerobertson@hotmail.com
Subject: Re: FC: Frank Sudia's proposal: Let's revive encryption key
escrow Date: Mon, 17 Sep 2001 07:35:15

Declan:

Frank Sudia
www.SudiaLab.com
frank@sudialab.com

Frank:

Well, I suppose that in addition to a government back door to
encryption, we should also allow (ie: acquiesce) the government to
open our sealed envelopes which have otherwise been properly posted?

And, while we are at it, I suppose that we ought to do away with the
1st and 4th ammendments to the Constitution for the United States.

No, really, I don't think that any of the foregoing is a very bright
idea. It is in point of fact the path by which tyrants of all color
and all time have achieved their totalitarian goals.

Personally, I want no part of it and will defend with determination
the principles and practice of that collection of rights guaranteed
under our constitution.

If it is security you wish, then I suggest that you petition your
government to have you locked up for in that state and under those
conditions you will find a nearly perfect "security".

Thanks anyway.

Dale Robertson
dalerobertson@hotmail.com

***********




----------------------------------------------------------------------
--- POLITECH -- Declan McCullagh's politics and technology mailing
list You may redistribute this message freely if you include this
notice. Declan McCullagh's photographs are at
http://www.mccullagh.org/ To subscribe to Politech:
http://www.politechbot.com/info/subscribe.html This message is
archived at http://www.politechbot.com/
----------------------------------------------------------------------
---

------- End of forwarded message -------