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[FYI] MS to force IT-security censorship



http://www.theregister.co.uk/content/4/22614.html

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MS to force IT-security censorship  

By Thomas C Greene in Washington  

Posted: 02/11/2001 at 04:43 GMT  

We all know how Microsoft likes to bully its many 'partners', so it 
comes as no surprise that the Beast has decided to apply its 
partnership muscle to silence the software and network security 
research community.   

The company is currently shopping a 'security partnership agreement', 
which would open up reams of MS vulnerability data to those firms 
which capitulate to its censorship demands while leaving all others 
out in the cold, The Register has learned.   

Terms of the partnership agreement include provisions which would 
enjoin partners from releasing 'detailed' vulnerability data over a 
'blackout' period. Our information is in conflict here; we've heard 
that the blackout could be 45 days, a la CERT, or as long as six 
months, or indefinitely, until a fix is developed.   

It's likely that several drafts of the agreement are in circulation, 
and this uncertainty indicates the minimum and maximum periods 
currently under consideration.   

The word 'detailed' is still being debated, we gather. But we can 
guess that the sanitized reports MS itself likes to publish to 
accompany its patches would provide the model. Full disclosure would 
be enjoined until the Beast manages to issue a fix; and it appears 
that the agreement would give the company as long as it likes to 
develop one. Its security partners would be expected to keep silent, 
or issue a well-scrubbed, sanitized advisory in the mean time.   

Just as we saw MS pressuring its partners to rat on system builders 
who request quotes on OS-less 'naked' boxes with a bribery scheme, we 
can expect similar shenanigans to ferret out rogue security vendors 
which dare defy the Redmond Censors and actually offer their 
customers useful information.  

Redmond's goal is to ensure forcibly that exploit code doesn't fall 
into the hands of the blackhat development community before they've 
got a fix, but it also means that security vendors won't be able to 
give their customers the means to develop a workaround or a fix to an 
existing vulnerability until Redmond gets off its ass and solves the 
problem.  

The problem here is obvious: if millions of systems are vulnerable to 
attack, it's pure head-in-the-sand gambling to hope that none of them 
will be exploited during the time it takes Redmond to sort it all 
out.  

Frankly, if I were paying good money for security services, I'd feel 
cheated if my vendor withheld data which I might be able to use to 
protect myself from attack. I wouldn't consider that a service worth 
paying for. I would do business with security vendors who wouldn't 
withhold crucial information from me on Microsoft's behest.  

Worse, we have here a recipe for establishing a monopoly on 
vulnerability data like the little cabal of greedy insiders who run 
the anti-virus industry, and who control access to information with a 
stranglehold which protects nothing so much as their revenue stream.  

Spin Session It's likely that MS will announce this appalling scheme 
formally during its Trusted Computing Forum in Mountain View, 
California on 6, 7 and 8 November.  

The forum "will bring together leaders of the online community to 
address some of the most pressing privacy and security issues we face 
today," the company says.  

And of course, it's all part of Microsoft's touching tradition of 
selfless public service: "The need for a forum such as this is 
greater than ever. The tragic events of September 11, 2001 have made 
an undeniable impact on the industry and the world with regards to 
privacy and security concerns," we're told.  

And who's been invited to speak? Richard Clarke, Presidential Advisor 
for Cyber Security; Brian Arbogast, Vice President of Microsoft's 
.NET Core Platform Services; Craig Mundie, MS Chief Technology 
Officer; Mozelle Thompson, Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission; 
Stewart Baker, Partner, Steptoe and Johnson & former General Counsel, 
National Security Agency; Jerry Berman, Executive Director, Center 
for Democracy and Technology; Rebecca Cohn, member of the California 
State Assembly; Lt. Lenley Duncan, Commander California Highway 
Patrol Network Management Section; and Barry Steinhardt, Associate 
Director of the ACLU.  

Rather a significant stacking of collaborators over skeptics, we must 
observe.  

If anyone mistook MS Security Manager Scott Culp's recent essay 
denouncing full-disclosure proponents as 'information anarchists' for 
some simple, earnest opinion piece, they can dispense with that 
illusion.  

The essay was a mere shot across the bow in preparation for the real 
assault, which we predict will ultimately include some RIAA-like 
lobbying consortium to enforce Redmond's will upon the security 
community.  

Unless, of course, the security research community has the spine to 
defy the Beast, an outcome we'd like to see, but which we wouldn't 
bet good money on. Though if anyone wants to step up and prove us 
wrong, we'll be the first to applaud. ®  

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