[FYI] (Fwd) Jan 1996 US analysis of key escrow

["Axel H Horns" <horns@ipjur.com>]

------- Forwarded message follows -------
Date sent:      	Sat, 24 Nov 2001 16:47:04 +0000
To:             	UKcrypto@chiark.greenend.org.uk
From:           	Richard Clayton <richard@highwayman.com>
Subject:        	Jan 1996 US analysis of key escrow
Send reply to:  	ukcrypto@chiark.greenend.org.uk

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Some documents from the mid 90s on US encryption policy (those were
the days of key escrow) have recently been made available under their
FOI act (contrast that with Caspar Bowden's 1998-1999 inability to get
anything out of the DTI except for an anodyne summary).

There is a "news" article (the tone is somewhat partisan, hence the
quotes) describing the contents of many different documents here:

http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2001/11/15/173810.shtml

and a photocopy of an 8 page memo summarising the situation (some
parts have been redacted) here:

http://www.softwar.net/escrow.html

Anyway, from the memo that is available, the section on the UK will be
of particular interest to this list:

     Key allies (Britain, Germany and France) are concerned that U.S.
     products, with keys escrowed only in the U.S., may start to
     infiltrate European markets. Currently, weak commercial
     encryption in general use allows national SIGINT organizations to
     handle their functions without many problems. Police experience
     abroad varies, but generally the U.S. is already seeing a level
     of encryption by criminals and terrorists not yet encountered
     abroad.

I'm not currently able to locate any other documents from this
collection on the web, but I did find this from May 1996 (headlined
'Administration admits crypto policy impossible to enforce')

http://www.softwar.net/doccia.html

and they also have a Nov 1993 document "IMPACTS OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS
AND ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGY ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLIGENCE
COLLECTION: ASSESSMENT, OPTIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS" ... the
redactions in this might intrigue :)

http://www.softwar.net/impact.html

- -- 
richard                                   Richard Clayton

They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary
safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.         Benjamin Franklin

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