Re: verdeckte PR : archive retrieval: docu/b-m-eu.text

[Rigo Wenning <wenning2@rz.uni-sb.de>]

At 09:50 29.07.97 +0200, Theodor.SCHLICKMANN@BXL.DG13.cec.be wrote:
>> File docu/b-m-eu.text is currently not available.
>> N.B. Filenames are case sensitive!
>> 
>
>Kann mir jemand freundlicherweise das Dokument schicken.
>
Hier isses...

Rigo

----------------beginn docu/b-m-eu.text--------------------
>LEAKED DOCUMENT ON EUROPABIO PR STRATEGY
>
>EUROPEAN BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY LOBBY HIRES 
>AGGRESSIVE CRISIS MANAGEMENT SPECIALISTS
>
>
>ENGINEERING ACCEPTANCE, FORCEFEEDING EUROPE
>  by RTS
>
>Europe's most powerful biotechnology industry has contracted the 
>government and public affairs PR agency, Burson Marsteller, to manage the 
>crisis that the biotech market is facing as a result of the 
>widespread resistance to genetic engineering and its products in this 
>part of the world. While little known to the public, Burson Marsteller has 
>developed a notorious reputation as high level political cover-up
>specialists. It has worked along side oppressive regimes in Argentina,
Nigeria, 
>South Korea and has provided the PR strategy for such controversies as the
BSE 
>crisis in the UK, the Exxon-Valdez oilspill and the Bhopal tragedy. 
>
>EuropaBio's move to contract a PR agency specialising in high-level 
>political cover-ups is a strong indication of the fact that EuropaBio is
>intent on covering up, indeed smothering the issues at the heart of the
genetic
>engineering debate - risks to the environment, human health and corporate
>control over the world's genetic resources.
>
>In the PR strategy proposal from January (leaked to Greenpeace), 
>Burson Marsteller outlines a scheme aimed at weathering the storm of protest
>in Europe. The document is important for a number of reasons:
>
>* it shows which strategies of resistance to genetic engineering are 
>making industry vulnerable. These areas are calously referred to as the 
>"killing fields" - and encompass the environmental and human health 
>aspects as well as the profit motive. B-M warns EuropaBio to stay off these
>fields, and instead to let the policymakers represent industry interests.
>
>* it outlines the strategy for engineering public acceptance of genetic
>engineering and its products - primarily by feeding the public with narrow 
>"consumer" benefits  "with symbols eliciting hope, satisfaction, caring and 
>self-esteem".
>
>* it outlines the strategy with retailers - crafting the appearance 
>of retailer choice - whereby retailers are "seen to be" making a free choice
>to deal in GMOs it outlines media management strategy, both at the time of
>the June congress (just finished today) as well as the long-term media 
>programme. 
>
>1. the active discouragement of live media at the congress due to "the risks 
>associated with the presence of live TV crews looking for conflict" (i.e.,
>debate raised on the issues that concern the public)
>
>2. the feeding of carefully styled information to the press, especially to
>local radio so that "we control the choice of commentators discussing the
>local story and the relevance of the Congress to it". In this way, the 
>information media is reduced to yet another form of marketing, rather than a 
>forum for serious discussion of the central issues regarding the
applications 
>of genetic engineering and the huge impact such a radical technology has in 
>shaping the future of society and social relations. 
>
>CLEARLY, the barrage of advertising assailing the public today indicates
>that this programme has already been activated by EuropaBio members. Public 
>information on how to interpret the aggressive ideology concealed beneath
the 
>"symbols eliciting hope, satisfaction, caring and  self-esteem" has become
more 
>urgent.
>
>The files to follow in subsequent mails are
>
>1. the leaked document: Communications programme for EuropaBio, 
>January 1997.
>
>2. an article by Carmello Ruiz on the trackrecord of Burson Marsteller
>
>The leaked document which is Burson Marsteller's PR strategy proposal 
>to EuropaBio is an 18 page document, so you will receive it in 2 
>separate parts. Part one starting below.
>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>
>COMMUNICATIONS PROGRAMMES FOR  EUROPABIO
>January 1997
>Prepared by Burston Marsteller
>Government and Public Affairs
>
>1. INTRODUCTION
> Contents of this proposal
>
>1.  	Burston Marsteller Government and Public Affairs Europe submit
>this proposal in response to a threefold request from EUROPABIO for:
>
> 1) 	A communications strategy and programme responding to the urgent 
>  circumstances now confronting agri-food bioindustries in Europe;
>
> 2)	A communications programme for the first European Bioindustry
> 			Congress for late June in Amsterdam; 
>
> 3) 	A long-term communications strategy and programme.
>
>2. 	Proposals are made for each of these specific requests (including
>very preliminary fee estimates for the first two). But it is
>self-evident that each of these initiatives must complement and
>contribute to the other two. Moreover, each will (we assume) involve
>many of the same individuals operating through EuropaBio at both the
>strategy level and the operational level. We therefore preface our
>specific proposals with a discussion of the common strategic principal
>which we believe should apply to all three.
>
> Burston Marsteller and Bioindustry issues
>
>3. 	The Burston Marsteller Government & Public Affairs practice is a
>single worldwide team of public affairs specialists (not a network of
>all-purpose national PR subsidiaries). In Europe, we cover the
>institutions of the European Union (via Robinson Linton Associates, a
>fully integrated member of the team), all 15 member states of the
>European Union, Norway and Switzerland, a growing number of Central
>and Eastern European countries, and a growing number of CIS countries.
>No other government & public affairs communications group is
>constituted as a single, borderless business entity across Europe, and
>none has B-M's reach and depth.
>
>4.	Within the practice, there functions a dedicated "bio-issues
>network", linking together all team members with experience and
>involvement in these issues. leadership responsibility for the network
>rests with Jean-Christophe Alquier in Paris, In Europe, this
>experience and involvement is particularly developed at the EU level
>(Robinson Linton Associates), as well as Germany, France, Denmark, the
>U.K. and Belgium. On-going client relationships attached to one or
>more of these (and several other) offices include a number of
>EuropaBio members.
>
>5. 	In addition to our Public Affairs Practice, Burston-Marsteller has
>a number of other fully constituted practices functioning on the same
>single team basis around the world. Notable among these in the
>EuropaBio context is our Health Care practice, which is the
>acknowledged communications services leader for these sectors in
>Europe and worldwide. Client relationships likewise exist with certain
>EuropaBio members through this sister practice, and B-M service teams
>routinely include individuals from both practices.
>
> The basis for this proposal
>
>6. 	This proposal draws primarily on the cumulative experience of the
>B-M Public Affairs practice, and more particularly on that of our
>"bio-issues network", as well as on relevant experience from our
>Health Care colleagues.
>
>7. 	We also note that B-M colleagues in Brussels have been associated
>with EUFIC (The European Food Information Council) since its
>inception, a grouping which includes a number of EuropaBio members and
>which continues to devote part of its efforts to biotechnology issues
>in the food industry. This experience also underlies these proposals.
>
>8. Finally by way of introduction, we note that some of the key
>judgments shaping these proposals are based on very recent
>professional research into public attitudes in Europe toward
>biotechnology in general and biotechnology in the food chain in
>particular. We have been accorded access to the results of this work
>and permission to make generic reference to it in this proposal, but
>are not yet in a position to cite it specifically. Despite this
>limitation we stress here the enormous value for our own further
>understanding and insight of having seen it.
>
>Indeed, we cannot over-emphasize the vital role such research plays in
>conceiving and executing any effective public communications effort.
>Flying without its literally flying blind. Moreover, progress in
>changing public attitudes can only be measured objectively against an
>initial baseline - and such measurements are the only reliable
>criteria for judging success.
>
>Just as no successful company guesses what consumers think of its
>products, so no serious politician today operates without on-going
>research - and no effective advocacy group does either. But allocation
>of the necessary resources to attitude research remains the exception
>rather than the rule in industry's public affairs campaigning. This
>means, quite simply, that adversaries and politicians always have a
>good idea of what the public really thinks, but industry often
>doesn't. (We return to this issue in our long-term strategy proposal.)
>
>II. COMMON PRINCIPLES
> A different approach
>
>9. 	EuropaBio's antecedent organizations (SAGB and ESNBA) have over
>the past several years firmly established themselves as the primary
>representatives of European bioindustrial interests within the
>political and regulatory structures of Europe. Europabio now assumes
>this indispensible direct role in the policy-making process. But it
>has become self-evident that this role is no longer in itself
>sufficient to ensure the supportive environment Europe's bioindustries
>need to achieve global competitiveness through the new
>biotechnologies. A sustained communications strategy and programme
>able to generate favourable perceptions and opinions beyond the policy
>world is now essential.
>
>10. We emphasise this point because it leads to the following key
>observation; success in this new effort will require a much different
>approach from the one typically used by EuropaBio in its
>communications to the policy world. In our experience, the key t
>success will be the speed to which EuropaBio members actually embrace
>the need for a different approach and then follow through on it.
>
>11.	The fundamental difference itself is, moreover, straightforward :
>in order to effect the desired changes in public perceptions and
>attitudes, the bioindustries must stop trying to be their own
>advocates. That approach often works in the policy world. It quite
>demonstrably hasn't worked and won't work in the sphere of public
>perceptions.
>
> Basic strategy disciplines
>
>12. 	We believe the four basic strategic disciplines must shape any
>EuropaBio communications initiative.
>
> + 	Stay off the killing fields
> + 	Create positive perceptions
> + 	Fight fire with fire
> + 	Create service-based media relations
>
>13.	Stay off the killing field : Public issues of environmental and
>human health risk are communications killing fields for bioindustries
>in Europe. As a general rule, the industry cannot be expected to
>prevail in public opposition to adversarial voices on these issues. Al
>the research evidence confirms that the perception of the profit
>motive fatally undermines industry's credibility on these questions.
>(This said, the evidence also shows that some companies are perceived
>as more "ethical", and therefore as somewhat more credible than
>others. But this perception typically attaches to brands, meaning
>either to specific consumer products or to retail brands, an important
>insight which adversaries well understand and to which we return in
>our agri-food sector proposal).
>
>The difficulty of course is that today adversarial voices largely
>dominate in the public debate and, unsurprisingly, always chose these
>very killing fields, because they do enjoy high public credibility and
>because they know that direct industry rebuttal usually feeds the
>story instead of killing it. Therefore, a basic discipline of
>EuropaBio's communications strategy must be to stay off these killing
>fields - no matter how provocative the invitation to enter u[on them
>may be.
>
>14. 	This is by no means to say, however, that this ground can be left
>undefended. Deep-seated perceptions of the risk will kill any product.
>But the industry must accept that it is for those charged with the
>public trust in this area - politicians and regulators - to assure the
>public that bio-industry products are safe. (This leads to a very
>specific problem for bioindustries in Europe today: the evidence
>clearly shows that Europeans do not trust their regulators in
>bio-product sectors. This is different from the U.S., where the EPA
>and FDA do enjoy widespread public confidence (which does not,
>however, extend to Europe). We return to this issue as well in the
>proposals which follow.)
>
>15.	Create positive perceptions : It no doubt seems banal to assert
>that until strong positive public perceptions of bio-products are
>created in Europe, there will be no effective counterweight to the
>negative perceptions generated by adversaries on their chosen killing
>fields. It may seem doubly banal to add that positive perceptions
>derive from perceived benefits.  Nevertheless, all successful public
>affairs communications is predicated on these two apparent
>self-evidences. Understanding the words isn't difficult. Obtaining
>objective insight into what they really mean for a given group or
>individual or group, and then having the discipline, organisation and
>determination to really apply them - that is what makes the
>difference.
>
> Fight fire with fire : 
>
>16. 	Stories - not issues : for EuropaBio to make the transition from
>effective policy interlocutor to effective public communicator, it is
>essential to shift from issues-based communications to stories-based
>communications. There are no issues-oriented media with any broad
>appeal, and the selling of complex issues coverage is a difficult task
>in any event because it contains little or no news value. Good
>stories, on the other hand, go around the world in minutes. That's the
>way adversaries play. That's the way industry must play.
>
>17. 	Products - not technologies : stories must, moreover, focus
>largely on the products of the new technologies, because they are the
>only way most people connect (directly or indirectly)to the benefits
>of the technology. (To recall : when SAGB published its communication
>on the environmental benefits of biotechnologies a few years ago, the
>biggest media up-take was on the specific product examples - and among
>them the most interest was generated by ... household detergents !)
>
>18. 	Beneficiaries - not benefits : product stories (as well as other
>sorts of stories) must focus on benefits, but these benefits must be
>personified. People stories are always the most compelling (recall the
>presence in Brussels during the Parliamentary vote on biotech patents
>of the fellow who claims to have had his genes ripped off without his
>permission.)
>
>19. 	Symbols - not logic : symbols are central to politics because
>they connect to emotions, not logic. Adversaries of biotechnology are
>highly skilled in the cultivation of symbols eliciting instant
>emotions of fear, rage and resentment. Bioindustries need to respond
>in similar terms - with symbols eliciting hope, satisfaction, caring
>and self-esteem.
>
> Create service-based media relations
>
>20. 	Most reporters and editors do not have a personal agenda when it
>comes to coverage of biotechnology and bioindustries. Rather, as with
>any other beat, they are preoccupied with producing salable material
>under extreme deadline pressure. Deadlines dominate journalism, and
>largely shape what is reported.
>
>21. 	EuropaBio must turn itself into the journalist's best and most
>reliable continuing source of biotechnology/bioindustries inspiration
>and information - the first-stop help-desk where they get not industry
>propaganda but practical, editor-pleasing, deadline-beating connect to
>interesting stories and personalities - even adversarial - relevant to
>their readerships.
>
>III. A EUROPABIO COMMUNICATIONS CAMPAIGN FOR THE AGRI-FOOD SECTOR
>
>
> Urgency
>
>22. 	A well-orchestrated effort to change current perceptions of
>agri-food biotechnology in Europe is urgent. there is no point in
>gradually ramping up a longer-term EuropaBio communications programme
>only to find that in this key sector public attitudes, public policies
>and commercial practices have hardened beyond recall.
>
>23. 	Adversaries remain determined, and their two-fold strategy
>remains clear : to split the food industry and to balkanise the single
>market. 1997 will be a critical year, particularly because entry into
>force of the EU Novel Foods Regulation will precipitate a new and
>potentially divisive political debate over safety and transparency, as
>could the European Commission's review of Directive 90/220/EEC. At the
>same time, supplies of certified non-GMO soya will become difficult to
>obtain. It may also be anticipated that over the next 12 months the
>first genetically modified crop varieties destined for the food chain
>will become available for planting in Europe. That could offer new
>opportunities for adversaries to stage media events.
>
> A front-loaded campaign
>
>24. In view of these circumstances, we proposed an intensive,
>front-loaded campaign to begin as soon as practically possible and to
>run up through and slightly beyond the June Congress.
>
>25. 	At that point, progress can be reviewed through analysis of media
>coverage over the period, and also the EuropaBio public attitude
>survey proposed as part of a longer term communications programme.
>
>
> Strategic framework / current perceptions and attitudes
>
>26. 	Our proposed agri-food campaign strategy is conceived around the
>vertical industrial and commercial chain : (starting at the "bottom")
>technology innovators-proprietors / seed companies / farmers /
>commodity brokers / food companies / retail sector. it is further
>predicated on the following assessment of current public perceptions
>and attitudes (based on our own experience and the available research)
>:
>
> a. 	Within the chain, consumer "trust" attaches (if it attaches at
> all ) to product brands and retail brands; therefore, the top two
> sectors of the chain are the two most effective direct channels of
> communications with the consumer.
>
> b. 	In contrast, research reveals no public awareness or knowledge at
> all of the companies at the bottom of the chain (Monsanto, Ciba,
> Sandoz, PGS, etc.) - except what adversaries have been able to put
> into the public consciousness in recent months, all of which is
> intended to engender fear and distrust.
>
> c. 	Food itself is a powerful vector if cultural - and even political
> - values virtually everywhere in Europe. but these values dffer from
> country to country. And in many parts of Europe there also exists a
> strong corresponding emotional attachment to idealised images of
> rural society, farming and the countryside.
>
> d. 	There is virtually no understanding of the real purposes of the
> genetic modifications to the first crops now entering the European
> market. The general perception is that it has to do with increased
> profits for industry and maybe also farmers, but that it is a
> perversion of nature motivated by greed at the bottom of the chain.
>
> e. 	At the same, there are very strong public perceptions of risk to
> human health attached to the idea of genetically modified food -
> heightened in certain countries by the living memory of current
> trauma of specific food-related crises (e.g., BSE; salmonella in
> Scotland; cooking-oil in Spain).
>
> f.	Moreover, and to a surprising degree, the current climate of
> public suspicion and resentment surrounding the arrival on the
> European market of gnetically modified soya and maize is shown by
> research to be rooted in the perception that dangerous, unnatural
> ingredients are being forced into tradtional European food by the
> American chemical industry for reasons of pure profit, against the
> will of European consumers, and over the objections of at least part
> of the European retailing and food sectors. This reflects, of course,
> the drumbeat of adversarial media campaigning, exploiting certain
> objective facts of the situation.
>
>27.	The cumulative effect of these perceptions and attitudes has been
>to create a perfect incubator for public outrage and resentment over
>the introduction of genetically modified food (the actual strength of
>which, however, varies across Europe). The available evidence likewise
>supports the classic theory that these emotions are ultimately rooted
>in a sense of powerlessness in the face of what are perceived to be
>malevolent (and foreign) forces threatening facets of life held dear.1
>
>28. 	The bottom-line consequence of this is a (literal) chain-reaction
>in many parts of Europe from the farming sector on up the chain 
>embracing the new technoloy is seen to be risky (and being the first
>to embrace is seen to be especially risky), while being seen to refuse
>it looks a tempting marketing strategy (clean vs. dirty)
>
> Strategic recommendations
>
>29. 	Based upon this assessment of the perceptions and attitudfes with
>which the agri-food interests in EuropaBio must contend, we make the
>following strategic recommendations for the conduct of the proposed
>front-loaded media campaign.
>
> a. 	Companies in the food sector must be perceived by the public to
> have their own independent view, voice and scope of action on the
> introduction of genetically modified ingredients or organisms into
> their product ranges. They must be seen to have a choice, they must
> be seen to control that choice, and they must be seen to have made a
> choice.
>
> b.	Food companies must also be seen to ensure that this power to
> chose is passed on to the consumer. This means "transparency" -
> product information made available to the consumer in some form. (We
> note that EuropaBio's public statement following ratification by the
> European Parliament of the EU Novel Foods concilitation tetx leads
> very much in this direction.) This in itself can largely defuse the
> sense of powerlessness which in large measure feeds the current
> climate of resentment and rejection.
>
> c.	Retailers must also be seen to occupy a similar position of
> independence vis a vis the rest of the chain - including former
> manufacturers, and must likewise adopt policies of transparency
> enabling consumer choise (i.e., empowerment). (Nobody instinctively
> understands this better than retailers themselves, which explains
> their recent public positioning on these issues.)
>
> d. 	By the same token, the supply-side sectors farther down the chain
> must not themselves be heard to speak on behalf of the food and
> retail sectoprs, nor behave in any way which is seen to deny those
> sectors either their own independence of action or their ability to
> communicate with their customers.
>
>(This is the great public perceptions pitfall in the "bottom-up"
>argument that separation is impossible. That argument is seen as a
>direct chalennges to the power and independence of retailers and food
>companies. Nobody believes that retailers and the food companies
>cannot force separation if they collectively decide to. That
>perception places those sectors in an invidious position with their
>customers and with adversaries are attmetping to split those sectors,
>and it works.)
>
>e. 	Rather, the task of the sectors at the bottom of the chain is to
>help make it possible for both the food and retail sectors to explain
>their up-take of GM foods in a way which at least does not violate the
>values of their customers, and at best responds positively to them. If
>that condition is met, and provided also that the products are both
>safe and seen to be safe, the great majority of consumers will have no
>further cause for outrage, and no reason to reject these products.
>
>f. 	As noted, where safety is concerned there is no substitute for
>credible public regulatorsd. It thus must become a strategic objective
>of this campaign to help build that credibility. And because the
>greatets consumer credibility within the industrial chain is carried
>by the branded sectors at the top, endorsements of the regulator's
>intergrity, competence and reliabilityshould come only from them. The
>effectiveness of such endorsements will be further enhanced to the
>extent that they are also seen to be coming from parties who are not
>dependent on the regulator's decision - i.e., who have the power of
>choice over the take-up of the product (assuming of course they do).
>
>Regulatory endorsements from the bottom of the chain, on the other
>hand, are to be avoided because they contribute to the
>credibility-killing perception that those with the greates
>self-interest control the regulators.
>
>g. What only the lower sectors in the chain can do - and now must
>urgently do - is educate the public on why these food crops are being
>modified in the first place. Indeed there is a great and bitter irony
>in the current situation in Europe : the products now causing the
>greatest furor were born from efforts to relieve environmental
>pressures brought on the farming sector by the very same militant
>organisations who today condemn them.
>
>h. 	That adversaries have had considerable success in this bizarre
>form of infanticide is a largely a failure of public perceptions
>management in Europe at the bottom of the chain. In fact, recent
>reserach shows that Europeans are generally receptive when told that
>these new varieties can help reduce the use of agricultural chemicals.
>But most either simply have not understood that this is their primary
>technical and economic purpose at the level of the farm, or simply do
>not believe it when told (interpreting this message as nothing more
>than self-interested propaganda).
>
>i.	We therefore conclude that for this category of products (whihc
>includes virtually all those in the first wave of 90/220/EEC
>authorisations and is the real seat of the fire) it is both absolutely
>vital and perfectly achievable to position them in European public
>perceptions as environmentally superior to standard crop varieties and
>therefore desirable.
>
> j.	We are perfectly aware that adversaries have tried to discredit
> this positioning. But we can see absolutely no down-side risk in
> taking on the environmental lobby on this, its own turf. After all,
> if these new varieties do not prove to have chemical displacing
> benefits they will fail in the market anyway. So either they perform
> as advertised and the environmental case becomes inconrtovertible, or
> they don't perform, disappear from the market, and the case is
> closed.
>
> k.	Assuming this positioning were achieved (and that perceptions of
> risk are attenuated) it should then be perfectly possible for food
> companies and retailers to embrace these environmentally-superior
> ingredients - just as they do other inputs which respond to this
> demonstrated consumer value. Indeed, rather than behaving as though
> they have something to hide, why would they not actually want to tell
> the consumer they are using them?
>
>l. 	We would even go so far as to consider whether retailers and food
>companies should not announce immediately that this basic
>environmental criterion will (or has) largely dictated their policy
>toward the use of ingredients from this class (once certified safe by
>the competent authorities). Up-take by the branded sectors might then
>vcome to be seen for what it actually will be - an ethical response to
>a real environmental problem about which consumers genuinely care. At
>that point, use of htese ingredients would no longer threaten consumer
>confidence in thgeir brands, and the labelling issue would become
>entirely moot.
>
>m. 	We note in passing recent evidence showing that Europeans are less
>responsive to the argument that these new agricultural technologies
>will help feed the underfed and the generations yet unborn in other
>parts of the world. In our developed societies characterised by excess
>and surfeit, this benefit is not valued as highly as the environmental
>benefit, and we would not make it a focus of the agri-food media
>campaign.
>
>n.	Beyond the modified commodity crops now scrutiny, there  are of
>course other categories of genetically modified food products either
>already in European markets of headed for them. This will also need to
>be considered for treatm,ent in the media campaign. But each will need
>to be considered on its own merits, because their consumer benefits
>will vary, and the appeal of those benefits may well vary across
>Europe.
>
>o.	Finally, we also strongly recommend strategic campaign focus by the
>bottom of the chain on carefully selected economic/benefits stories
>specific to their sectors. These may well need to play more locally
>across Europe, becaue that is where the greatest interest will almost
>always lie. But they can be used to great effect to build pockets of
>strong support. (To cite one extreme analogy, consider the political
>support generated by the tabacco industry in the U.S. in certain
>southern states.)
>
>
>30. In summary then, we recommend :
>
>Top of the chain (food and retail) : Independent from suppliers (and
>     each other)
>     Separation (choice) seen to be an option
>     Support/endorse regulators
>
>Bottom of the chain:			
>     Do not speak for the top of the chain
>     Defer to regulators
>     Do not be seen to fight separation
>     Concentrate region-wide on environmental 				
>			benefits
>     Concentrate locally on economic benefits
>
>
> Implementation
>
>31. 	Focus of EuropaBio effort : the most urgent (and resource
>intensive) task in our view is to organise the bottom-of-chain media
>campaigns on environmental and economic benefits. Top-of-chain
>communications may require less direct EuropaBio effort and
>involvement 9althoug we stress their importance for the full
>strategy).
>
>32. 	Pan European strategy & individual Member State implementation :
>The bottom-of-chain campaign needs to be conceived and planned in a
>regional framework, but actual media campaigns (for both environmental
>and economic benefits) will need to be tailored and conducted in
>target countries. This "localisation" of the stories is crucial not
>only to actually connect to consumers but also to overcome the
>perception that US interests have co-opted an unwilling Europe. The
>environmental and economic benefits need to be interpreted and
>portrayed through story-telling in the national mand local context,
>taking into account the cultural, historical and economic
>characteristics which determine public perceptions on the agri-food
>issue at those levels.
>
>33. 	(For example, in Spain, the issue of water pollution is one of
>very few environmental issues of concern to the majority of Spaniards.
>Sensitivity on this issue is due in particular to historical water
>shortages. Media campaigning in Spain on the desireability of crop
>varieties requiring fewer pesticides can be effectively positioned to
>exploit this perceived vulnerability. However, such a specific
>positioning would be less relevant in Ireland, a country with an
>abundant water supply.)
>
>34.	We see the following countries as first priority:
>
> * France
> * Germany
> * Italy
> * Spain
> * U.K.
> * Belgium
> * The Netherlands
> * Ireland
> * Denmark
>
> Second priority include:
>
> * Austria
> * Finland
> * Sweden
> * Portugal
> * Greece
> * Norway
> * Switzerland
>
>35.	We propose that the campaign in the U.K. and Ireland be run three
>to four weeks ahead of implementation in other countries, in order to
>ensure that lessons learned can be applied elsewhere.
>
>
> Start-up and operational approach
>
>36. 	using the Burston-Marstellere bio-issues network, we need to
>review the medoia coverage at regional and target-country level over
>the last eighteen months - essentially to pinpoint key media outlets
>and individuals. We will also need to review previous communications
>efforts made by EuropaBio, SAGB, ESBNA, and individual members, and
>individual members, in addressing public concern over agri-food
>biotechnology.
>
>37. 	We will also need to review with EuropaBio task force members the
>list of forthcoming new agri-food sector applications, and to map them
>for their potential interest profile by country and for Europe. (For
>example, a genetically engineered Mediterranean crop would be dealt
>with differently from a northern european cereal.)
>
>38. 	Story opportunities can then be slected and developed for both
>region-wide and local placement (keeping in mind that basic principles
>for generating news value and managing media relations). This will
>involve particularly indentifying both bio-industry and third party
>spokespeople willing and able to contribute to the story.
>
>39. 	Effort will then shift to actual media placement for potential
>story. The mix will typically include a selection from trade press,
>and local, regional and national media, including print, radio and
>television.
>
> A campaign plan
>
>40. 	Hereunder we present a draft campaign plan to show how it would
>run in practice :
>
>Weeks 1-2	* Review of current jounralistic opinion in all markets
>                   * Compile list of applications due into market place in
>the next 3
>   	    years
>                   * Correlate with regions of use
>Weeks 2-4	 * Prompt media use ion trade press of relevant sector
>                    * Prepare economic and environment case
>                    * Tailor case to specific regions of use providing local
>news
>   	     hooks and personal story
>Weeks 4-8	 * Place story with local/regional radio and press
>                    * Collate coverage in a package to demonstrate "growing
>   	     interest around the country"
>                    * Present national journalists with evidence of interest
>and fresh 			'national' story * Introduce
>                       link to international congress 
>                    * Maintain 'firefighting' capacity for instant response
>to critical 			stories in all markets
>Weeks 8-12 * Stories now have life of own requiring managment rather
>                      than prompting
>                   * Integrate with preparations for congress
>             * Prepare schedule of all journalists providing postive coverage
>   	  weeks 1-12 * Correlate speakers/experts at congress with
>   coverage * Prepare new follow-up story linking local story to
>   	   international congress
>Weeks 12-16  * Seek local/regional coverage that has "taken off" on
>   issue and convert into national story
>   * Take national stories with cross border application and use in
>   other markets, having modified in the light of experience 
>         * Ramp up reference to congress
>Weeks 16-20   * Sell in congress to media
>                        * 'Teaser' release to all radio, TV stations in
Europe
>                        * Follow press release with sample local stories and
>description
>   	        of remote facilities to conduct interviews with key congress 
>experts
>Weeks 20-22  * Arrange radio interview schedule
>                       * Prepare standard TV shots of congress venue and key
>speakers 
>                          for distribution to TV channels for 'cut in' with
>local story
>                       * Seek plots in 'specialist' programmes (farmers
>programs,
>   	       science reviews, business news etc)
>CONGRESS
>
>
>Weeks 23-28  * Manage congress follow-up
>                       * Provide guests from congress to prompt follow up
>stories in
>                          national, regional media * respond where
>appropriate to critical
>                          coverage
>                      * press release an "astonishing response to congress"
>including 
>                         tailored quotes eg., "Congress indicates huge
economic
>                         growth potential of * Biotech in our area says
Mayor"
>Weeks 28-30 * Collate total coverage for assessment
>                      * Prepare draft plan for next six months with EuropaBio
>
> Fee structure and estimate
>
>41. 	Fees for the time if B-M professionals would need to cover
>involvement at the EuropaBio task force level and at the level of
>individual country campaigns. Fee estimates cover the time involved in
>the preparation, implementation and review of the agreed media
>strategy and all necessary expenses, including travel.
>
>42. 	Actual fees will depend largely on the number of the countries
>targeted, as wel as the extent of the role of B-M core team
>professionals would be expected to play at EuropaBio level and
>in-country.
>
>43. 	For fee estimation purposes, countries being targeted in the
>campaign are divided into two levels; factors used to determine fee
>level are market size, influence of media at both national and
>international level and importance of market to success or failure of
>bitoechnology in the agri-food business. We see the breakdown as
>follows:
>
>Central Co-ordinating budget		$400 000
>
>Category A			$150 000 per country
>UK/France/Germany/Italy
>
>Category B				$80 000 per country
>Spain/Ireland/Belgium/Netherlands/Portugal/Greece/Switzerland/Sweden/D
>enmark/ Finland/Austria
>
>A COMMUNICATIONS INITIATIVE FOR THE JUNE CONGRESS
>
> Objective
>
>44. 	The practical objective of this initiative should be media
>coverage of positive bioindustry stories before, during and after the
>Congress, but not media attendance at or coverage of the Congress per
>se. 
>
>45. In particular, EUROPABIO must at all costs avoid creating a
>media-centred event which will automatically draw protesting
>environmental groups to the Amsterdam venue. the result of that would
>surely be considerable media coverage - but inevitably focussing on
>the conflict surrounding biotechnology (the killing field). EuropaBio
>will have set the table and Greenpeace will have eaten the lunch.
>
>46. Moreover, assembling a large body of non-local media in Amsterdam
>would entail logistical difficulties of no small scale, as well as
>considerable added time and cost, with no guarantee of success.
>
> Practical approach
>
>47. 	Keeping in mind the common principles outlined in section II, our
>practical recommendation is based on three factors :
>
> + 	Media attendance in Amsterdam is not necessary for coverage (and
> as pointed out is dangerous and costly)
>
> + 	There is little pan-European media. Virtually all key targets (for
> any EuropaBio communications initiative) will be national (although
> we would seek coverage in the FT, Economist, Sky Television, CNN,
> etc.), because national media are by far the most effective vehicle
> for EuropaBio originated stories.
>
> + 	In the full B-m scenario, the agri-food campaign would already be
> up and running.
>
>48.	Therefore :
>
> + 	Media coverage should not be about the congress per se. Rather,
> preliminary work would focus on identifying bio-product and
> bio-industry stories of national and local interest for target member
> states, which also connect to one or more themes of the Congress -
> which will be virtually any story selected.
>
> + 	Agri-food stories would presumably already be up and running by
> June. Additional Conference-specific, story-based, communications
> effort would then focus on the other EuropaBio sectors (health care,
> industrial processing, environmental remediation), and also on key
> horizontal issues (entrepreneurism, capital markets, global
> competition, job creation and job market, educational opportunities,
> BT & IT)
>
> We foresee the need to develop a (vertical) x (horizontal) x
> (location) story matrix in order to make certain that the proper
> balance is struck in the selection of those selected for placement.
> And as in the agri-food campaign all stories will need to be
> thoroughly vetted for their accuracy and vulnerability to hostile
> reaction.)
>
> + 	Stories would then be moved directly in-country to national and
> local media with, however, arrangements being made for added
> commentary on them by appropriate spokespeople from the congress,
> using "down the lone" interview techniques concentrated on national
> radio and TV. In this way, multiple member state coverage from the
> Congress can be ensured without actually assembling a large media
> presence in Amsterdam.
>
>49. We believe the primary target media should be radio, for three
>reasons :
>
>+ 	The environment movement deliberately does not target the radio
>+ because it is difficult to attract attention i.e., demonstrations
>+ rarely get covered by the radio because they can't film them.
>+ Additionally, the radio, by its very nature, is verbal and this
>+ usually means considerably more cerebral than TV. the "packages"
>+ given to any particular issue are much longer. Sometimes by a
>+ multiple of 5 or 6 times. Which is precisely what we need. 
>
>+ 	There are far more listening hours than viewing hours right the way
>+ across Europe. This often comes as a great surprise to people but it
>+ is fact true. In other words we will get much broader coverage by
>+ concentrating on radio than by concentrating on TV.
>
>+ 	Although we do not want to concentrate media interest on the
>+ Congress itself, the Congress creates an excellent news hook for the
>+ stories we really want running "back home". Furthermore it should be
>+ perfectly possible and manageable to schedule interviews with people
>+ attending the congress with radio stations all over Europe, This has
>+ three advantages : (1) the congress is referred to in all of the
>+ stories that play (2) we control the choice of commentators
>+ discussing the local story and the relevance of the Congress to it
>+ (3) the Congress link emphasises the European dimension of the local
>+ story and allows us to introduce the broader competitive issues in
>+ all of those interviews.
>
>50. 	A similar approach can be taken for TV, relying on the daily feed
>to national networks of standard footage from the Congress, shot by
>us, to supplement related national interest stories already placed to
>run that evening or the following morning. Again this should generate
>considerable simultaneous coverage across Europe, but without the
>risks associated with the presence of live TV crews looking for
>conflict.
>
>51. Finally, print media can be dealt with in a similar fashion
>(including down the line interviews), but we would not place strategic
>emphasis on recruiting their interest. A basic information kit can be
>distributed ahead of the event. Those who respond with interest can
>then be serviced.
>
>
> Fee structure and estimate
>
>52.	It is difficult at this point to judge the degree of
>overlap/synergy in a scenario where the agri-food campaign and the
>Congress campaign run together through July (and where both involve
>Burson-Marsteller). Nevertheless, at this stage we offer the following
>estimate for the Congress approach described above, as a stand-alone.
>
>Central coordinating budget		$100 000
>Category A countries			$40 000
>Category B countries			$20 000
>
>53.	The lower estimates for the Congress results from the differing
>intensity of the two initiatives : Congress work targets a period of
>media coverage of roughly a week, with preliminary work building
>toward that objective; the 6-month agri-food campaign seeks to
>catalyse rapid and sustained communication over a large portion of
>Europe over several months.
>
>
>V. A LONG-TERM EUROPABIO COMMUNICATIONS PROGRAMME
>
>
> Relationship between the three proposed initiatives
>
>54. 	Assuming both the rapid start-up of the agri-food campaign
>proposed in Section III and implementation of the Congress-linked
>initiative proposed in Section IV, and further assuming that each is
>predicated on the common principles laid out in Section I, the two
>shorter term initiatives should lay a strong operational and
>experimental foundation for building a sustained, long-term
>communications programme.
>
>55. 	We therefore strongly recommend that the twin initiatives leading
>up to and through Congress be considered together also as "Phase I" of
>the longer term programme. (The two running together may in any event
>be anticipated to consume all available resources through until the
>end of July 1997.)
>
> Core components of long-term capability
>
>56. 	This being in our view the sensible way to view the immediate
>future, the important question for the longer-term is what the core
>components of EuropaBio's longer-term communications capability should
>be. Moreover, despite the fact that we are now thinking about the
>longer term, some consensus on the answer to this question from the
>outset of the two shorter-term start-up initiatives will help channel
>those "Phase I" efforts muxh more deliberately toward laying the
>longer-term foundations. In short, we need to know where we intend to
>go from the beginning.
>
>57.	B-M have deep and wide relevant experience in the creation of
>sustained industry-initiated Europe-wide public affairs communications
>programmes. The first lesson we recommend to EuropaBio is simply that
>success requires significant commitment. The costs of true campaigning
>look high, but the magnitude of the potential payoffs are a multiple
>of the investment. In one highly relevant case from our experience,
>the public and market perceptions of the environmental liabilities of
>a particular prodct - fanned by concerted Greenpeace campaigning - had
>put it on a death-watch list in Europe. A three-year campaign funded
>by an alliance of competitors and upstream suppliers turned that
>perception around, to the point where today the product is widely seen
>as part of the environmental solution.
>
>58.	Beyond commitment, we strongly recommend the development of the
>following core components:
>
>a.	A fully-functioning communications strategy group within EuropaBio,
>and the operational resources necessary to go from strategy to
>effective action.
>
>b. 	A hub-and-spoke network built around the strategy group and funded
>centrally but with the authority to allocate its resources to national
>level as a function of central strategy and decision-making.
>
>c.	Internally "neutral" operational leaders/spokespeople for the
>organisation both at the hub and in-country. At the EuropaBio hub,
>this role is by definition filled by the Secretary General.
>In-country, the assignment of this role may be less obvious (although
>National Association heads may be the obvious choice where present).
>This role can be effectively filled by the outside partner agency, as
>B-M has done in many different campaigns.
>
>d. 	An institutionalised public attitudes research programme, to run
>at standard intervals.
>
>e.	A well-organised media service centre, ideally able to connect and
>communicate at national level on the basis of assets and tools run at
>the hub. The hub operation can be in-sourced or out-sourced
>(irrespective of where it is physically established).
>
>f.	The hub operation will normally oversee the development and
>day-to-day running of whatever common information and media-relations
>tools are created. these may include : periodical publications of
>EuropaBio; a EuropaBio website ; a Bio-industries database ; creation
>and dissemination of EuropaBio press communications ; central
>management of media contact lists ; periodic (ideally daily) media
>monitoring (perhaps off the back of members' existing capabilities ' a
>number of different models for this capability can be looked at).
>
> The B-M role
>
>59. 	The primary value of B-M over the longer term will be at the
>level of the central strategy group. the basic nature of the
>responsibility of this group will be ehat we at B-M call "perceptions
>management". This needs to be seen as a senior management discipline
>just like marketing management or financial management. And just as
>marketing managers typically partner with advertising firms, or
>financial managers with particular financial service providers, so
>perceptions managers benefit from the skills and experience available
>through sustained management with Burson-Marsteller.
>
>60. 	Beyond the core relationship at the strategy and planning level,
>the assignment of any specific tasks to B-M professionals (or other
>third party suppliers) would depend entirely on the work to be done
>and agreement that B-M are the best choice for doing it.
>
>
>
>NOTES:
>1. (For a compelling view on the socio-pathology of public outrage, we
>recommend the work of Peter Sandman, the world's leading academic
>authority on its causes and how to deal with it. Peter also
>consultants public and private entities confronted with such
>difficulties, and was notably involved in the defusion of the Brent
>Spar crisis. Members of the B-M team have on occasion collaborated
>with him.)
>