[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
Re: [FYI] (Fwd) Some extracts from ENFOPOL 98
- To: firstname.lastname@example.org
- Subject: Re: [FYI] (Fwd) Some extracts from ENFOPOL 98
- From: email@example.com (Lutz Donnerhacke)
- Date: 15 Mar 1999 11:12:23 GMT
- Comment: This message comes from the debate mailing list.
- Newsgroups: iks.lists.fitug
- Organization: IKS GmbH Jena
- References: <m10MSjO-0003EgC@fwd04.btx.dtag.de>
- Sender: firstname.lastname@example.org
* Axel H. Horns quote:
>enforcement agencies will specify how it wishes to achieve this
>result; either through the provision of cryptographic key material and
>all necessary information to decrypt the data or exceptionally by
>provision of the data as plaintext.
>Access to the decrypted message
>must be available for those encryption systems that allow for both
>national and international operation.
National ist neu.
>The handover of cryptographic key material should be immediate. The
>computational and operational process a law enforcement authority
>needs to undertake to decrypt the data, including any reconstruction
>or rebuilding of keys, should involve minimal time and resources to
>ensure an efficient, economic and timely operation.
ROT13 für die Wirtschaft.
>Law enforcement agencies require a real-time, full-time monitoring
>capability for the interception of telecommunications. Call
>associated data should also be provided in real-time. If call
>associated data cannot be made available in real time, law enforcement
>agencies require the data to be available as soon as possible upon
Zitiert aus TkÜV der letzten Jahre.