[FYI] CA: Crypto: "Committee Observations and Recommendations"

[Horns@t-online.de (Axel H. Horns)]

http://www.parl.gc.ca/36/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/secu-e/rep-e/r
epsecintjan99part3-e.htm

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Encryption

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Committee Observations and Recommendations

It is clear to the Committee that there is no perfect solution to
balance the spectrum of interests that revolve around cryptography.
Any attempt to develop a cryptography policy that balances law
enforcement and security intelligence interests on one hand with
commercial, economic development and privacy or confidentiality
interests on the other hand presents a conundrum to policy-makers.

It is beyond the Committee's mandate and competence to suggest which
approach to a cryptography policy is best. From testimony before the
Committee it is clear, however, that the police and security
intelligence agencies much prefer a mandatory key escrow system in
order to maintain their current position. It was equally clear from
the evidence that a mandatory key escrow system is not likely to be
adopted given all of the competing interests and issues. Therefore,
the Committee urges the police and other agencies to actively
investigate and explore other methods and techniques to address this
very serious obstacle to intelligence-gathering and that government
also consider other approaches, some of which the Committee
understands are being considered by other countries.

Whatever the solution, the organizations within the security
intelligence sector, namely the Canadian Security Intelligence Service
and the Communications Security Establishment, will require additional
resources to acquire the technology and to do the work necessary to
maintain their current level of access to electronic communications
and stored data. Even if a mandatory key access system were
instituted, additional resources would be required, albeit of a
smaller magnitude. The Committee was relieved to hear that, in the
case of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and the
Communications Security Establishment, the incremental expenditures
required for each would be in the "tens of millions" range annually,
rather than the "hundreds of millions" range, or even higher. The
Committee urges Industry Canada to include estimates of incremental
costs for the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and the
Communications Security Establishment in whatever policy proposals it
makes to Cabinet.

The Committee also endorses recommendations to amend the Criminal Code
to provide lawful access to encryption keys by law enforcement and
security intelligence organizations and to criminalize encryption when
used in the commission of a crime. The Committee also urges the law
enforcement and security intelligence communities to consult with
developers and suppliers of cryptography technology and with carriers
and service providers so that each side may better understand the
requirements and objectives of the other and, hopefully, arrive at
mutually-agreed solutions.

Even should the encryption conundrum be effectively addressed from a
security intelligence perspective, encryption is only one of a panoply
of technological advances likely to affect, or having the potential to
affect, the security intelligence community. Technology will continue
to evolve and the security intelligence community will be on a
technology treadmill in order just to keep up.

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