Re: [icann-eu] Where are the ALM-Directors?

[Marc Schneiders <marc@schneiders.org>]

On Thu, 22 Feb 2001, at 03:48 [=GMT+0100], Griffini Giorgio wrote:

> You [= me] wrote:
> 
> > So, all you can come up with to defend a *public* whois, is to fight
> > cybersquatting? Insufficient to my mind. Cybersquatters are
> > selling domains, not hiding them. You will find them anyway. They
> > cannot sell, if they hide. And even if you will not always get them
> > fast, I would find it insufficient ground to sacrifice the privacy of
> > all registrants of domain names. I cannot see, why this is such a
> > special case, that normal privacy rights, which we accept, no demand,
> > in all other areas, have to be given up for whois.
> 
> Maybe I was wrong in explaining my position.. I do not support a fully public
> whois policy. I do support a whois policy that it is enough public to give a 
> sure way to reach a domain name registrant but enough 'confidential'  to 
> keep sensitive data not exposed (and where what is 'sensitive data' is left on 
> registrant choice) 

Could you say what this means practically? "Not fully public, enough
public" sounds vague to me.

> > Of course, when there is a court order, the registrar should assist in
> > tracking the owner of a domain. That should be enough for defending
> > trademark rights. Why should they be surrounded with special legal
> > privileges of easy persecution that victims of bodily harm, e.g., are
> > denied? 
> > 

> Apart that 'easy reachability' does not mean directly 'easy
> persecution' 

Conceded. But it does help to persecute a villain if you can catch
him.

> I think that, when possibile, we should prevent
> rather than cure later. Talking about domain names, cybersquatting
> actions are by far the biggest problem because it is spread across
> several different unrelated parties with implicit difficulties in
> fighting against such actions for these reasons while instead, for
> example, a bad action on domain names made by a registry or a ISP
> it is easier to fight due to direct identification of
> responsabilities.  

I am sorry, but I think I do not get this. "Cybersquatting ... spread
accross different unrelated parties"? Could you help me, e.g. by
giving an example?

> About your concern in estabilishing different
> special privileges / tools for fighting abuse I'm not sure what
> you exactly mean because in your model you seems to say, giving an
> example about protections from personal injury, that there should
> be no differences independing on context where such misures are
> being applied. Just to tell, we do not see metal detectors in
> every public place while in airports or banks we see them ... so I
> think I've not really got your point...(A limit of mine... I
> admit..)

You are right. We do not want camera's everywhere, but find them
acceptable in certain places where risks are great. I do not
see, why domain names qualify here. The number of cybersquatting cases
is fairly limited moreover. It is, in my view, also a matter of
balance. The % of "bad actions" of the total number of domains
registered is so small, that I find the massive sacrifice of privacy
not acceptable.

I am not against whois, I find it very useful. Neither do I mind that
my own details are in there. But we should have the freedom to opt in
or out.

Marc Schneiders