Förderverein Informationstechnik und Gesellschaft
------- Forwarded message follows ------- Date sent: Sat, 24 Nov 2001 16:47:04 +0000 To: UKcrypto@chiark.greenend.org.uk From: Richard Clayton <firstname.lastname@example.org> Subject: Jan 1996 US analysis of key escrow Send reply to: email@example.com
Some documents from the mid 90s on US encryption policy (those were the days of key escrow) have recently been made available under their FOI act (contrast that with Caspar Bowden's 1998-1999 inability to get anything out of the DTI except for an anodyne summary).
There is a "news" article (the tone is somewhat partisan, hence the quotes) describing the contents of many different documents here:
and a photocopy of an 8 page memo summarising the situation (some parts have been redacted) here:
Anyway, from the memo that is available, the section on the UK will be of particular interest to this list:
Key allies (Britain, Germany and France) are concerned that U.S. products, with keys escrowed only in the U.S., may start to infiltrate European markets. Currently, weak commercial encryption in general use allows national SIGINT organizations to handle their functions without many problems. Police experience abroad varies, but generally the U.S. is already seeing a level of encryption by criminals and terrorists not yet encountered abroad.
I'm not currently able to locate any other documents from this collection on the web, but I did find this from May 1996 (headlined 'Administration admits crypto policy impossible to enforce')
and they also have a Nov 1993 document "IMPACTS OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGY ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION: ASSESSMENT, OPTIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS" ... the redactions in this might intrigue :)