On Tue, 2003-04-08 at 04:10, J-F C. (Jefsey) Morfin wrote: > > > > The key sequence is very simple. There is absolutely no need for anything > > > complex (I can used MD5 but no one would be able to check I did not > > cheat). > > > Also the sequence is pretty long and could be folded by the email > > > responses. Would simply send > > > > > > "@" as a voting ligne flag > > > 0000 4 digit voter number > > > 4 letters voter checker made of a simple computation on the mail name. > > > (let say the 1st, the 3rd , the 6th and the 9th letter each plus four > > > values modulo 26) > > > the nr of the characters and the four values for the vote notbeing > > disclosed. > > > >I am a tad concerned about this. Once I get my ballot, I will easily be > >able to determine the sequence and could theoretically replicate it for > >others and spoof their votes. > > No. > I bet you well never be able to tell me what is the sequence I used > to build "zldt' from sawters@luy.info and please tell me the one for > jefsey@club-internet.fr. May be you could if you known a large nr > of checkers, but you will only know yours. > I suppose you forgot to consider the additional string sequence. Just clarify, do you mean: 1) @ xxxx yyyy Where: xxxx = a unique, randomly assigned number yyyy = obfuscated mail digits Or: 2) @ zzzz Where: zzzz = obfuscated mail digits Sorry if this seems redundant, but I want to make sure I understand you. [1] is acceptable to me, [2] is not. > >What I supposed you were doing was: > > > >1) generating a random, secret key which the watchdogs have > >2) encrypting the mailname (or parts of it) using AES, 3DES, or similar > >3) calculating the md5sum of the result and using that as the identifier > > > >With that methodology, you can generate a static linked executable for > >each watchdog, but also release the source code without fear of giving > >away your obscurity mechanism. > > Sure, but: > > 1. I have no time to develop that. If you can? I could, but not in C. Perl runs everywhere, though Crypt::Rijndael might not. > 2. The documentation of the system will call for a lot of disputes Nah. Maybe in C, but this process is maybe 200-300 lines of Perl and using some relatively standard modules/libraries. Of course, I can't make a staticly compiled version of the Perl code that will run everywhere. > 3. the size of the key will be large and the problem we have is that > bnallot does not come folded before the result, or the result will be on > another line, so we need the ID,Question,choice response to be less than 30 > chars. The key is distributed shortly before ballots are sent out. The smallest blocksize for AES is 128 bit -> 16 bytes -> 22 base64 chars. Besides, you will probably have to do line folding anyway. You could always put an ending character after the response/answer. --start ballot-- Question 00: Please answer us this very long question on the line below. It is pertinent that you think about this very important issue. @MDEyMzQ1Njc4OUFCQ0RFRg 00 [ ] Yes % Question 01: The following candidates are running for panel. Please ensure that you rank no more than 5 candidates. @MDEyMzQ1Njc4OUFCQ0RFRg 01 [ ] Myea Theau Tovau Vodauualskthay Tmua % @MDEyMzQ1Njc4OUFCQ0RFRg 01 [ ] Bob Smith % @MDEyMzQ1Njc4OUFCQ0RFRg 01 [ ] Gérard Dupont % @MDEyMzQ1Njc4OUFCQ0RFRg 01 [ ] Gandalf the Grey % @MDEyMzQ1Njc4OUFCQ0RFRg 01 [ ] Slartibartfast, Maker of Fjords % @MDEyMzQ1Njc4OUFCQ0RFRg 01 [ ] Ooops I did it again % Question 02: Hey Papa Smurf, how many smurfs does it take to run a smurfing panel? @MDEyMzQ1Njc4OUFCQ0RFRg 02 [ ] 5 smurf % @MDEyMzQ1Njc4OUFCQ0RFRg 02 [ ] 7 smurfs % @MDEyMzQ1Njc4OUFCQ0RFRg 02 [ ] 11 smurfs % ---end ballot--
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