RE: PR und Patent um "Polymorphe Verschlüsselung

[Andreas Jellinghaus <aj@dungeon.inka.de>]

Still sending snake oil to this list? Aren't you getting tired.

> 1.) 1 out of 4 base ciphers has been cracked. If there is an equal
> probability for all base ciphers to be cracked one fine day, then the
> probability for that event to take place is 4 times higher for a "cipher
> of ciphers". In order to crack the full cipher, all 4 base ciphers
> rather than one must be cracked.

if 1/4 of your secrets are revealed, the damage is nearly as
high as if all your secrets are revealed. and that happening
is four times as likely with your system. that is bad.

[old enigma stories]
i can invent submarine stories too. if the position of a submarine
is known on every fourth hour of the day, that's enough to sink
it. but no speculation will ever change the past, and discussion
what would have happened if is mostly useless.

> Practical 256 bit Polymorphic Ciphers can have a set with
> as many as 1.1E77 base ciphers.

so you need to defend 1.1e77 places against attacks rather
than a single one (where you could easily move to a different
place, if you suspect a problem). wow, thats a great
security strategy.


now, in your letter you admit, not a single crypto expert
has a positive statement about your software. 

bank people are not crypto experts. you can't even name those
people, nor point to an online document with their statement,
nor can I research what these people published.

but your letter is very funny. "what if the proposed
cypher is (as) secure ...". You are not even sure your
cypher is secure, but you want other people to use it?
ROTFL.

also the idea that many ciphers are more difficult to break
is hilarious. don't you even read news papers? some cypher
where broken without anyone having any information on
the cypher, but simply because they where completely insecure.

also where would you find 128 different cyphers? writing
a list of all ciphers I could probably trust I could never
ever find that much, not even half of that. so you plan
to use insecure ciphers? wow, great plan.

> we would kindly ask you to sign an NDA.

wow. security by keeping the details unknown. 

thanks bernd, you made my day (or rather: night).
never had so much fun reading an email for a long
time. any chance you will be at the chaos camp
in berlin starting thursday? I'll buy you a beer!

Regards, Andreas


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