New Freeh (FBI) statement on encryption

[Rigo Wenning <wenning2@rz.uni-sb.de>]

FYI

Ein neues Statement von Louis Freeh, dem Chef des FBI 
zu GAK.

Seine Absichten spricht er offen aus:
>This is why the encryption issue is one of the
>most important issues confronting law enforcement and potentially has
>catastrophic implications for our ability to combat every threat to
>national security that I am about to address in my statement here
>today.

Er stellt dann die übliche Forderung nach GAK, umrahmt mit 
den üblichen Horrorvorstellungen aus dem Kriminalitätsszenario. 
Er verschweigt, wie üblich, die "anderen" Methoden der 
Informationsgewinnung (Stichwort: Lieferwagen oder seit 
noka rudi: der Aktenkoffer zum Abfangen der Abstrahlung)

Es geht nicht um konkrete Kriminalitätsbekämpfung. Es geht einfach 
um den massenhaften Zugriff auf Inhalts - und Verkehrsdaten. 
Das ist der Unterschied. Das erwähnt Louis Freeh nee.

Rigo



>Date: Mon, 2 Feb 1998 17:33:38 GMT0BST
>From: "Yaman Akdeniz" <lawya@lucs-01.novell.leeds.ac.uk>
>Subject: New Freeh (FBI) statement on encryption
>To: gilc-plan@privacy.org
>Reply-To: gilc-plan@gilc.org
>
>Threats to U.S. National Security
>http://www.fbi.gov/congress/threats/threats.htm
>Statement for the  record Louis J. Freeh, Director Federal Bureau of
>Investigation  before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 
>Washington, D.C. January 28,  1998 
>
>Good Morning Mr. Chairman, Vice Chairman Kerrey and Members of the
>Committee. I welcome this opportunity to be part of this distinguished
>panel to discuss threats to U.S. national security. 
>
>The overriding concern now facing law enforcement is how rapidly the
>threats from terrorists and criminals are changing, particularly in
>terms of technology, and the resulting challenge to law enforcement's
>ability to keep pace with those who wish to do harm to our nation and
>our nation's citizens. This is why the encryption issue is one of the
>most important issues confronting law enforcement and potentially has
>catastrophic implications for our ability to combat every threat to
>national security that I am about to address in my statement here
>today. Law enforcement remains in unanimous agreement that the
>widespread use of robust non-recovery encryption ultimately will
>devastate our ability to fight crime and terrorism. Uncrackable
>encryption is now and will continue, with ever increasing regularity,
>allow drug lords, terrorists and even violent gangs to communicate
>about their criminal intentions with impunity and to maintain
>electronically stored evidence of their crimes impervious to lawful
>search and seizure. Other than some type of key-recoverable system,
>there is currently no viable technical solution to this problem for
>law enforcement. 
>
>This is not a problem that will begin sometime in the future with
>theoretical implications. In many important investigations effective
>law enforcement is being frustrated by criminals and terrorists using
>non-recoverable encryption. For example: 
>
>     Convicted spy Aldrich Ames was told by his Soviet handlers to
>     encrypt computer file information that was to be passed to them.
>     Ramzi Yousef and other international terrorists were plotting to
>     blow up 11 U.S.-owned commercial airliners in the far east.
>     Yousef's laptop computer, which was seized in Manila, contained
>     encrypted files concerning this terrorist plot. A major
>     international drug trafficking subject recently used a telephone
>     encryption device to frustrate court-approved electronic
>     surveillance. 
>
>Requests for cryptographic support pertaining to electronic
>surveillance interceptions from FBI field offices and other law
>enforcement agencies have steadily risen over the past several years.
>>From 1995 to 1996, there was a two-fold increase (from 5 to 12) in the
>number of instances where the FBI's court-authorized electronic
>efforts were frustrated by the criminal's use of encryption that did
>not allow for law enforcement access. 
>
>Over the last two years, the FBI has also seen the number of
>computer-related cases utilizing encryption and/or password protection
>increase from two (2) percent to seven (7) percent, to include the use
>of 56 bit Data Encryption Standard (DES) and 128 bit "Pretty Good
>Privacy" (PGP) encryption. 
>
>It is for this reason that the law enforcement community is urgently
>calling for our Nation's policy makers to adopt a balanced public
>policy on encryption. In our view, any legislative approach to the
>encryption issue that does not achieve such a balanced approach
>seriously jeopardizes the utility of some of our most important and
>effective investigative techniques upon which law enforcement must
>depend to ensure public safety and to maintain national security. 
>
>Several bills have been introduced in this Congress that address
>certain aspects of the encryption issue. Unfortunately, most of these
>legislative proposals would largely remove existing export controls on
>encryption products, and would promote the widespread availability and
>use of uncrackable encryption products regardless of the impact on
>public safety and national security. 
>
>It is important to note that S.909, the "Secure Public Networks Act,"
>introduced by Senators Kerrey, McCain, and Hollings, comes close to
>addressing law enforcement's public safety needs in the area of
>encryption. However, law enforcement believes that the bill does not
>contain sufficient legislative assurances to adequately address law
>enforcement's public safety needs regarding the use and availability
>of encryption products and service within the United States. 
>
>Conversely, the substitute bill adopted by the House Permanent Select
>Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) on September 11, 1997 during their
>mark-up of H.R. 695 does effectively address all of law enforcement's
>public safety and national security concerns regarding encryption
>products and services manufactured for use in the United States or
>imported into the United States. The HPSCI substitute bill would
>require all such encryption products and services to contain features
>that would allow for the immediate access by law enforcement to the
>"plaintext" of encrypted criminal-related communications or
>electronically stored data pursuant to a court order. 
>
>We are now at an historic crossroad on this issue. If public policy
>makers act wisely, the safety of all Americans will be enhanced for
>decades to come. But if narrow interests prevail, law enforcement will
>be unable to provide the level of protection that people in a
>democracy properly expect and deserve. I do not believe it is too late
>to deal effectively with this issue and would encourage the Committee
>to look closely at the action taken by the HPSCI in their efforts to
>adopt a balanced encryption policy. 
>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>Yaman Akdeniz <lawya@leeds.ac.uk>
>Cyber-Rights & Cyber-Liberties (UK) at:
>http://www.leeds.ac.uk/law/pgs/yaman/yaman.htm
>
>Read CR&CL (UK) Report, 'Who Watches the Watchmen'
>http://www.leeds.ac.uk/law/pgs/yaman/watchmen.htm
>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>
>
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