Re: [icann-eu] Re: [ICANN-EU] ccTLDs to ask for BoD seats?

[Jefsey Morfin <jefsey@wanadoo.fr>]

Dear T (?),
Your remarks are of real interest as everyone ask himself a lot this
questions. My position is of an internet entrepreneur wanting to
protect his interests on this network. So every comment is welcome
in trying to guess the future and to possibly share into its formation.

At 00:58 24/11/00, you wrote:
>jefsey@wanadoo.fr (Thu 11/23/00 at 10:38 PM +0100):
>
> > IMHO the priority should be to work on the stability of the net
> > both technically and politically: through a shared responsibility
> > of the root servers and in a better representation of the TLDs.
> > This may result in a redistribution of the SOs and of their
> > Directors: it does not concerns the @large. But as @large
> > our demands is for a better stability and a better acceptation
> > of new services and concepts.
>
>jefsey, a few thoughts--
>
>the ALM and the ccTLDs are both partially formed bodies, although
>partially formed in different ways. the ALM is entirely dependent
>on ICANN, and in the second berkman session in MDR we saw a taste
>of things to come when mclaughlin described the self-organization
>effort as an attempted 'hijack.'

Yeap. Andrew has been very poor here.

- one, Andrew is not that good: proof he still owes me a beer for what
   he wrote to me an evening he was probably exhausted some moths ago.
   I may revise my position afterward ;-)

- two. You have to understand the situation first. Here you had Andy
   with no decision taken yet about the @large (his fluctuating responses
   are the proof). Staff had spend their time and efforts on their inadequate
   TLD policy (which paid their yearly salaries, true). But they had not
   time to think about the @large, had not yet met the @large Directors.
   The Chair was to change, and the @large Sunday meeting had been
   so-so as you say yourself.

The problem is simple. Either the @large are the Andrews's data base,
they keep them on the disk and call on them two years from now.
Then they want them to be as silent as possible: Mr. Katoh has been
elected by 6 Japanese regiments passing the Chinese army, like a bicycle
passing a car in the traffic. A Chinese delegate of some importance (ie.
able to get a few 100.000ths of votes) challenged Mr. Katoh in front of me
about the next time. In this case better to have people relaxing and
forgetting about @large a while.

Or the @larges become something by their own. And then they must be
the market, with millions of people involved and voting according to their
economical weight, so the network stability is protected and everyone
wants to reduce the digital divide.

And here in the middle you have Andrew with people asking him to
be something by their single own (ie. asking for the privilege of voting)
but not giving any warranty about their duties (ie to represent the market,
to be millions in developed countries and to fight the digital divide),
and naming that democracy!

Tough for him to handle! Eventually he did a good job of his joke!

>the ccTLDs are far more advanced,
>obviously, but still dependent on ICANN insofar as the form of the
>group's constitution depends on the flexibility of ICANN to nego-
>tiate an acceptable structure. in both cases, i'm skeptical that
>ICANN will bend and adapt in constructive ways. so i think it may
>be premature to say that a redistribution of SO directors doesn't
>involve the ALM: i have no doubt whatsoever that any redistribu-
>tion of boardmembers will be constructed as a zero-sum game that
>pits the CCs against the ALM, because the existing SOs will view
>any shifts in the board structure as a zero-sum prospect: if the
>CCs or the ALM gain, it will be at their expense.

I think that any revision of the ICANN will be more drastic and will
acknowledge the relative lack of importance of the DN, the real initerest
of protocol numbers, the huge interest of the IP addressing plan and
the necessity of the DNS management.

Would I be the DoC (which will approve any change since they still
are in charge) I would say 1 for the Protocol, 3 for IP addresses,
2 for the DNs and 3 for the DNS. The DNS being the ccTLD (2) and
the gTLD(1). Obviously we can dream: but if you do not speak up your
dreams they have no chance to become reality.

The reason why is that you have four forces:

1. users (the market)
2. ICANN as a secretariat for consensus
3. government
4. operations (support organisations)
5. the owner: on Internet (content mutual transfer) owner is also the
    user (this is why the Minitel never took off out of France: in giving
    away Minitels, France Telecom had made people the owners)

Government are supervising through the GAC, like the German
Emperor controlling the Pope Election. ICANN has the power of the
Staff. In a market driven society nothing will stand if the market and
the owner do not have at least 49%. The rest to the operators.

This may never happen, but IMHO the ICANN will have though time
if doing it another way.

That is, it may turn out that a temporary solution could be the blessed
(for the credibility of the ICANN) departure of the squattering fours and
their seats to be taken by ccTLDs. But this should only be a transition:
otherwise we would head towards new problems. May be less visible
but more insidious.

>that assumes that the CCs work 'within' the ICANN process. but the
>most constructive possibility that came out of MDR, it seems to me,
>was the possibility that the CCs might work *outside* the ICANN
>process.

I do not call that constructive. Except as a "nuclear weapon" as
Peter de Blanc said. ie something you may use but you do not want to
use.

You are right the alt.root is the MDR winner, but at the same time the
loser:

- everyone now knows that there may be millions of TLDs (one the
   Directors told it to the GAC)
- everyone now knows that there is no technical problem in having
   alt.roots

But at the same time:

- some investigated cc.roots are not alt.roots (China wants a
   monopoly on Chinese IDNs or a Chinese root): this is not the alt.root
   idea.

- the ideal consensus is more realisticly an "augmented.root" including
   today's a-root and the alt.roots TLDs under an enlarged RSSAC to
   ccTLD, gTLD and some alt.root (I personally talk about extended.root
   as this unnecessary TLD delaying has also delayed new concepts and
   services at DNS level).

IMHO the ICANN is necessary. It can either be the ICANN of today
or a new association of the TLDs (cc/gTLDs). A part from being
installed in NY at the UN, what would be the difference except a lot
of wasted time, efforts and money?

>i don't necessarily want to see that as an end in itself,
>but it's the first viable threat to ICANN's growing hegemony. that
>hegemony stems almost entirely from pseudo-control of the root. the
>threat that *the* root might become *a* root, one among more than
>one, is about the only thing that might force ICANN to negotiate in
>good faith.

True. This is the advantage of the "nuclear weapon". Now ccTLDs
do not fear talking equal with the DoC. But since it is exactly what
the DoC wants, this is good news. The ccTLDs want one clear and
unique contract and their legitimacy to come from their LIC not
from IANA. ICANN wants subsidies to do its job. There would be
less disputes about the job definition and budget is the ccTLDs
were better integrated in the ICANN and active in the RSSAC.

>its treatment of the ALM is a long study, very clearly
>imo, in negotiating in *bad* faith. and insofar as the dominant
>participants in any ALM self-organization process remain those who
>negotiated the 'cairo compromise,' the interim spokespersons for
>the ALM have little or no incentive to acknowledge that fact, or to
>acknowledge their own strategic failures. in effect, they will likely
>continue to run in circles at ICANN's bidding.

True. This is why the @large movement must be created and be
based upon real incentives for the people. Andy M M, thinks about
a DNS review as a challenge to the technies. He also talks about
the copyrights distribution which is a society problem involving
Internet which affects everyone. My self I think about the LICs
motivation all over the world and about a North/South plan against
the  Digital Divide (I have initiated a project named "Digital Continuity"
[old PC refurbished to schools, developping LICs, training exchange
programs, e-commerce mutual assistance, etc... ) which seems to
get some favorable response from many, but I would need a
secretariat for that, so I look for  the money). There are other projects,
but necessarily the @large must be by millions sometime or they will
stay in Andrew's database and in the staff's study.

>but i'd like to ask you a question about what you mean by 'the sta-
>bility of the net both technically and politically.' within that
>analytical framework of the 'technical' and the 'political,' what
>would you say the new gTLDs are, or how would you speak about them?

Let me tell you something. I plan launching hundredth of TLDs,
in an ICANN partly acceptable way. Obviously any would-be TLD
has the same fear as ccTLDs. It does not want to pay $ 50.000
when other do not pay anything and it wants to be sure it is on the
root. But it is ready to pay its fair due against what it needs: the
technical stability of the network. When I call someone on the
phone I do not care who is operating it or how, I just want it the
phone to work. And I pay my bill for that.

Now, if the bill is wroing, if the stability of the network is endangered
by the stability of the operator, I wish that operator to become stable.
Change its Director, correct its staff, etc.. Today the Internet still
belongs to a few: CoD, Dr. J. Robert Beyster, etc.. : theses people,
their disputes and conflicts of interest are a single point of failure.
I am interested reducing that single point of failure.

Today the ICANN is seen as the root, and possibly the DNs. The
main point are the IP addressing and every new issue which will
affect the entire net: the telephone and the TV convergence first,
and many others... This is not "governance" but the dute of e person
we call in French "gouvertante", you might translate in this case as
the "network keeper". This has to be properly done.

I will give you a test: as long as we say "the ICANN does" instead
of "on the Internet or at the ICANN we do" we will have neither
politically nor technically stabilized the Internet.

Jefsey