FITUG e.V.
Förderverein Informationstechnik und Gesellschaft
FITUG e.V.Förderverein Informationstechnik und Gesellschaft |
|
------- Forwarded message follows ------- Date sent: Fri, 22 Jun 2001 10:15:57 -0500 To: cryptography@wasabisystems.com From: Don Davis <dtd@world.std.com> Subject: crypto flaw in secure mail standards
All current secure-mail standards specify, as their "high- security" option, a weak use of the public-key sign and encrypt operations. On Thursday the 28th of this month, I'll present my findings and my proposed repairs of the protocols, at the Usenix Technical Conference here in Boston: http://www.usenix.org/events/usenix01/usenix01.pdf
Citation: Don Davis, "Defective Sign & Encrypt in S/MIME, PKCS#7, MOSS, PEM, PGP, and XML." To appear in Proc. Usenix Tech. Conf. 2001, Boston. June 25-30, 2001.
A short summary: All current secure-mail standards have a significant cryptographic flaw. There are several standard ways to send and read secure e-mail. The most well-known secure mail systems are PGP and S/MIME. All current public- key-based secure-mail standards have this flaw. Here are some examples of the flaw in action:
Suppose Alice and Bob are business partners, and are setting up a deal together. Suppose Alice decides to call off the deal, so she sends Bob a secure-mail message: "The deal is off." Then Bob can get even with Alice:
* Bob waits until Alice has a new deal in the works with Charlle; * Bob can abuse the secure e-mail protocol to re-encrypt and resend Alice's message to Charlie; * When Charlie receives Alice's message, he'll believe that the mail-security features guarantee that Alice sent the message to Charlie. * Charlie abandons his deal with Alice.
Suppose instead that Alice & Bob are coworkers. Alice uses secure e-mail to send Bob her sensitive company-internal sales plan. Bob decides to get his rival Alice fired:
* Bob abuses the secure e-mail protocol to re-encrypt and resend Alice's sales-plan, with her digital signature, to a rival company's salesman Charlie. * Charlie brags openly about getting the sales plan from Alice. When he's accused in court of stealing the plan, Charlie presents Alice's secure e-mail as evidence of his innocence.
Surprisingly, standards-compliant secure-mail clients will not detect these attacks.
---------------------------------------------------------- Abstract Simple Sign & Encrypt, by itself, is not very secure. Cryptographers know this well, but application programmers and standards authors still tend to put too much trust in simple Sign-and-Encrypt. In fact, every secure e-mail protocol, old and new, has codified naïve Sign & Encrypt as acceptable security practice. S/MIME, PKCS#7, PGP, OpenPGP, PEM, and MOSS all suffer from this flaw. Similarly, the secure document protocols PKCS#7, XML- Signature, and XML-Encryption suffer from the same flaw. Naïve Sign & Encrypt appears only in file-security and mail-security applications, but this narrow scope is becoming more important to the rapidly-growing class of commercial users. With file- and mail-encryption seeing widespread use, and with flawed encryption in play, we can expect widespread exposures.
In this paper, we analyze the naïve Sign & Encrypt flaw, we review the defective sign/encrypt standards, and we describe a comprehensive set of simple repairs. The various repairs all have a common feature: when signing and encryption are combined, the inner crypto layer must somehow depend on the outer layer, so as to reveal any tampering with the outer layer.
----------------------------
Once I've presented the paper, I'll make this link live: http://world.std.com/~dtd/sign_encrypt/sign_encrypt7.ps
- don davis, boston http://world.std.com/~dtd
-
--------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo@wasabisystems.com ------- End of forwarded message -------