FITUG e.V.
Förderverein Informationstechnik und Gesellschaft
FITUG e.V.Förderverein Informationstechnik und Gesellschaft |
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------- Forwarded message follows ------- Date sent: Thu, 31 May 2001 09:17:42 -0400 To: politech@politechbot.com From: Declan McCullagh <declan@well.com> Subject: FC: Marc Rotenberg replies to Stu Baker on Echelon, advises hearings Send reply to: declan@well.com
********* In response to: http://www.politechbot.com/p-02080.html Background: http://www.mccullagh.org/cgi-bin/politech.cgi?name=echelon *********
Date: Wed, 30 May 2001 13:49:43 -0400 To: declan@well.com From: Marc Rotenberg <rotenberg@epic.org>
To put this debate in some perspective, it is important to understand that the Echelon inquiry of the European Parliament began with a very real concern about US economic espionage based on the loss of certain commercial contracts and prior experience with electronic surveillance of European trade officials.
But that is not where the report ends up. The final report makes clear that electronic surveillance raises far-reaching issues concerning the rights of citizens and the need for government accountability. It cites international human rights instruments, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It urges adoption of better techniques, such as encryption, to safeguard private communications. It draws attention to growing concerns about surveillance by EU countries. It is the most far-reaching report to date on the extent of electronic surveillance by government.
I think Jim Bamford describes the problem well in his recent book _Body of Secrets_ when he says:
The issue for Europe is not whether UKUSA's Echelon system is stealing trade secrets from foreign businesses and passing them on to competitors; it is not. The real issue is far more important: it is whether Echelon is doing away with individual privacy -- a basic human right.
Bamford concludes:
Unchecked, UKUSA's worldwide eavesdropping network could become a sort of cyber secret police, without courts, juries, or the right to a defense.
His words are eerily reminiscent of the warning from Senator Frank Church almost thirty years ago that if the NSA were ever allowed to use its powers domestically, "No American would have any privacy left. . . . There would be no place to hide."
In many respects, the Report of the European Parliament on Echelon is similar to the Church Committee report and fulfills one of the key tasks of public officials -- to hold government accountable for its actions.
Patriotism, it would seem to me, now requires the US Congress to begin the investigation that is has too long delayed into the growing surveillance capabilities of the US intelligence agencies.
Marc Rotenberg EPIC
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Date: Wed, 30 May 2001 15:20:09 -0700 To: declan@well.com From: John Young <jya@pipeline.com> Subject: Re: FC: Stu Baker replies to Echelon post, defends U.S. intel agencies In-Reply-To: <5.0.2.1.0.20010530131834.0299aec0@mail.well.com>
Stewart Baker makes a surprising statement:
>To do corporate espionage, there would have to be an intimate relationship >between intelligence agencies and the US corporate sector, a relationship of >a kind that has never existed in our country.
No US intelligence agency operates without close, usually long-term, relationships with its corporate suppliers for a very wide range of products and services. There also exchange personnel for particular tasks. They attend conferences and continuing eduction programs together. They share experiences in foreign countries. Ex-members of intel agencies work for corporations, set up corporations, and some thereafter return to the agencies, and then back to corporations. They mutually teach and recruit and give references. They spin in concert, they sometimes disagree and make up. They belong to intelligence alumini organizations and go on retreats and travel to foreign forums to backslap and enjoy the benefits of hawking sometimes stale information as if pure gold.
The only thing that distinguishes US intelligence beneficiaries from their foreign competitors is the faint difference in moxie, in protestations of innocence, in swearing others do what we do not, never did, never will. That story changes to be sure when a bestseller is written to beat the homeland competition. What spies and their groupies do to stigmatize renegades is wondrous. The less these spokespeople know about the true innards of intelligence the louder they advertize hire me.
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Date: Wed, 30 May 2001 14:18:26 -0400 To: declan@well.com From: e cummings <bernies@netaxs.com> Subject: Re: FC: Stu Baker replies to Echelon post, defends U.S. intel agencies Cc: SBaker@steptoe.com In-Reply-To: <5.0.2.1.0.20010530131834.0299aec0@mail.well.com>
At 01:23 PM 5/30/01 -0400, SBaker@steptoe.com wrote: ...
To do corporate espionage, there would have to be an intimate relationship between intelligence agencies and the US corporate sector, a relationship of a kind that has never existed in our country. ...
stewart baker's assumption is false. u.s. intelligence agencies routinely work with high-level u.s corporate officials to "employ" undercover operatives in target countries. during the covert operation (which in many cases lasts for years) the u.s. intelligence agency operative functions as a normal u.s corporate employee abroad, and is paid soley by the selected u.s. corporation to avoid any potential exposure. the operative's intelligence duties are done 'on the side' without further financial compensation.
this was personally explained to me by tony mendez while i visited his home last fall. tony is a former high-ranking CIA intelligence officer. his recently published book, "The Master of Disguise - My Secret Life in the CIA" is worth reading: http://www.themasterofdisguise.com/
it is hardly a stretch to assume that u.s. intelligence agencies would, in turn, informally return the favors of u.s corporations (via the same secure channels they were initially transacted through) by occasionally passing on economic intelligence information of value to the u.s. corporation that provided that agency with assistance.
-bernieS "CALEA's first Casualty"
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From: jonathan.winkler@yale.edu Received: from pantheon-po04.its.yale.edu (0@pantheon-po04.its.yale.edu [130.132.143.35]) by smtp.well.com (8.8.5/8.8.4) with ESMTP id MAA03857 for <declan@well.com>; Wed, 30 May 2001 12:17:11 -0700 (PDT) Received: from esquiline (esquiline.its.yale.edu [130.132.50.21]) by pantheon-po04.its.yale.edu (8.8.8/8.8.8) with SMTP id PAA23519; Wed, 30 May 2001 15:17:02 -0400 (EDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Date: Wed, 30 May 2001 15:17:01 -0500 Message-Id: <991250221.webexpressdV3.1.f@mail.yale.edu> To: "Ian BROWN" <I.Brown@cs.ucl.ac.uk>, <declan@well.com> Subject: Re: Re: FC: More on Echelon, intercepts, and a quick history lesson X-UIDL: acba714051081ea978a6a4e35463eeff
Declan and Ian,
At first I thought my note came across as a bit naive, but now I believe I'll stand by it, with clarification. The United States certainly gathers intelligence on foreign commercial activities all the time from a variety of sources, and most of these certainly are passed on to U.S. firms where appropriate. Part of the U.S. diplomatic effort abroad has always been assisting U.S. firms doing business overseas.
However, I haven't seen much evidence to distinguish between commercial intelligence gathered by U.S. diplomats or the CIA and that obtained specifically through signals intelligence (the Echelon system). My question would have to stand: is there evidence, anecdotal or otherwise, that would suggest the capture of sensitive commercial information through the Echelon system that could not have been obtained in another manner? The European complaint seems to be against the Echelon system, and its potential use for industrial espionage, not against industrial espionage per se. The distinction isn't clear.
The materials contained in the links sent by Ian are a case in point. The documents on Indonesia identify that CIA people sat on a committee to discuss encouraging trade with that country, but does not indicate how signals intelligence specifically is brought in to help US firms. Doing so, given the volume of traffic on the cables and the satellites, would be a serious drain on the NSA's resources: how would they prioritize US businesses over other more pressing militaryor diplomatic matters?
As for the historical example, I've turned up evidence that some in the State Department believed the British cable companies were themselves turning over copies of traffic to other British companies, and that the British government was out of the loop on the matter.
Thanks,
Jonathan _____________
Ian replied: The procedures for deidentifying and routing intelligence to commercial
companies seem to be substantially in place...
Declan replied: >I respectfully disagree with Jonathan's position, at least as I understand >it. Much has changed since the early 1900s, and the executive branch now is >entirely capable of picking corporate favorites in the marketplace... > >I admit that the NSA has a far greater interest in keeping its sources
>secret than the White House does in rewarding donors. And I have not seen >reliable evidence showing Echelon intercepts are used in this manner.
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Date: Wed, 30 May 2001 16:17:20 -0400 To: declan@well.com From: Ed Stone <estone@synernet.com> Subject: Re: FC: Stu Baker replies to Echelon post, defends U.S. intel agencies
>From: "Baker, Stewart" <SBaker@steptoe.com> >To: "'declan@well.com'" <declan@well.com> ><snip> >The people who choose careers >in national security do it mainly for reasons of patriotism, and >certainly not so they can be part of a patronage machine.
They do however take orders and are allowed only piecemeal views into the meaning and use of their secretly gathered and secrety utilized harvest. Compartmentalization, multi-billion dollar budgets, staffs in the thousands and secrecy protected by threat of imprisionment are a sufficient combination to permit, if not encourage, misdeed of this near absolute information power. Two or three staff members among the White House National Security Advisor's staff (remember "plumbers"? Ollie North?) operating "independently" (if caught) would be a sufficient core to have a conversation with a Commerce Department undersecretary of political origins. Alternatively we can believe that our intelligence services would out of principle not deploy information regarding our largest exporter (aviation/aerospace) getting its head handed to it by foreign competitors.
> Such a use of intelligence >would be reported quickly to Congressional oversight bodies that have >often been in the hands of the opposition party.
But foxes being foxes, neither the red nor gray foxes confuse themselves with the chickens.
>To do corporate espionage, there would have to be an intimate >relationship between intelligence agencies and the US corporate >sector, a relationship of a kind that has never existed in our >country.
The Glomar Explorer was built on open bids? You can provide certification of Ron Brown's conversations related to NIST leakage of interest to commercial entities? An NSA General has no list of former DOD undersecretaries now scattered in the Fortune 100? Our intelligence services have neither experience nor capability in conveying information (or explosives) with adequate cutouts and plausible deniability? We now know from Mr. Bamford's book that the Joint Chiefs in the 60's looked favorably on an intel proposal to kill Americans on US streets so it could be blamed on Cuba as pretext for invasion, but we are to believe they draw the line at commercial espionage that would benefit the US?
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Date: Wed, 30 May 2001 13:04:45 -0700 From: "James J. Lippard" <lippard@discord.org> To: Declan McCullagh <declan@well.com> Subject: Re: FC: Stu Baker replies to Echelon post, defends U.S. intel agencies
> From: "Baker, Stewart" <SBaker@steptoe.com> > To: "'declan@well.com'" <declan@well.com> > cc: "Albertazzie, Sally" <SAlbertazzie@steptoe.com> > Subject: RE: More on Echelon, intercepts, and a quick history lesson > Date: Wed, 30 May 2001 12:10:43 -0400 > > Declan, > > Jonathan is right, your rant notwithstanding. The people who choose careers > in national security do it mainly for reasons of patriotism, and certainly > not so they can be part of a patronage machine. Such a use of intelligence > would be reported quickly to Congressional oversight bodies that have often > been in the hands of the opposition party. > > To do corporate espionage, there would have to be an intimate relationship > between intelligence agencies and the US corporate sector, a relationship of > a kind that has never existed in our country. Since such relationships do
See Laton McCartney, _Friends in High Places: The Bechtel Story_, 1988, Simon & Schuster.