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Bessen & Maskin antworten auf Aharonian



---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Sat, 3 Feb 2001 22:29:00 +0100 (CET)
From: PILCH Hartmut <phm@a2e.de>
To: swpat@ffii.org
Subject: Bessen & Maskin antworten auf Aharonian

Greg Aharonian hat kuerzlich in Patnews die MIT-Studie ueber sequentielle
Innovation

	http://www.researchoninnovation.org/patents.pdf

kritisiert und als "voellig untauglich als Basis fuer politische
Entscheidungen" angegriffen.  Ihm ging besonders auf die Nerven, dass
"einige Leute in Europa" Softwarepatente als den Inbegriff des Boesen
saehen und sich bei ihrer Argumentation auf diese Studie stuetzten.

Mit Greg Aharonian haben Bernard Lang, Ramon Garcia Fernandez, ich und
andere auf patents@aful.org monatelange Debatten gefuehrt, die recht
unerfreulich verliefen, weil er nichts dazulernte.  Sein Standpunkt
lautet, vereinfacht gesagt,

(1) Softwarepatente sind genauso schlecht wie alle anderen Patente.
(2) Eine Abgrenzung zwischen Swpat und anderen Patenten ist unmoeglich.
(3) Wenn es nur mehr Leute wie Aharonian gaebe, die vorbekannte Technik
    ausfindig machen koennen, waeren Softwarepatente ertraeglich.

Wir hielten dem entgegen:

(1) Wenn Swpat schlecht sind, reicht das als Grund, um sie nicht zu
    wollen.  Wir verbieten niemandem, auch noch andere Gebiete aus dem
    Patentwesen herauszuschneiden.  Aber das ist nicht unser Fachgebiet.
(2) Die Abgrenzung ist auch nicht schwieriger als viele andere
    in der Juristerei gaengige Abgrenzungen.  Unserer Meinung nach ist sie
    sogar recht einfach, und in Europa gibt es dazu eine hochentwickelte
    Rechtsdogmatik, die noch immer rechtsgueltig ist und nur wieder belebt
    werden muss.
(3) Neben der Schwierigkeit, vorbekannte Technik zu finden, gibt es noch
    u.a. das Problem der Trivialitaet, welches im Rahmen des Patentsystems
    nicht geloest werden kann, wie wir auch von Steve Probert (Vizepraes.
    d. Britischen Patentamtes) erklaert bekamen, s.

		http://swpat.ffii.org/stidi/frili/

Bei den Teilnehmern des Forums patents@aful.org verfestigte sich im Laufe
der Zeit den Eindruck, dass es Aharonian ebenso an gutem Willen mangelt
wie den meisten Patentanwaelten, mit denen wir diskutiert haben.  Hinzu
kommt eine in Amerika weit verbreitete Abneigung gegen philosophische
Abstraktion und selektive Begriffsstutzigkeit auf diesem Gebiet.  Ihn
interessiert offenbar vor allem die Moeglichkeit, in Europa Kunden fuer
sein Swpat-Recherche-Geschaeft zu gewinnen.  Patnews dient hierbei als
Marketing-Konzept.  Der Verteiler hat mittlerweile 4000 Abonnenten.
Allerdings hat die europaeische Debatte Aharonian in eine Rolle getrieben,
die viele von uns nicht erwartet haetten.  Er sieht in Europa eine Gefahr
fuer sein Geschaeft und attackiert jetzt bei jeder Gelegenheit die
Kritiker der europaeischen Patentlobby.  Das begann im letzten Herbst, als
er das patentkritische Gutachten der amerikanischen Regierung "Digital
Dilemma" ebenso wie einige Aeusserungen von Lawrence Lessig herablassend
madig machte ("Lessig got it all wrong").

Ich bin gespannt, ob Aharonian jetzt die Antwort von Bessen auf seinem
Verteiler veroeffentlichen wird und ob er sich weiterer Polemik enthalten
kann.  Sonst muessen wir uns noch mehr damit beeilen, eine Alternative zu
Aharonians Postille zu schaffen.

---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Sat, 3 Feb 2001 07:36:57 -0500
From: Jim Bessen <jbessen@researchoninnovation.org>
To: patents@liberte.aful.org
Subject: [Patents] Bessen & Maskin reply on software patent paper


----- Original Message -----
From: Jim Bessen
To: Gregory Aharonian
Cc: Eric Maskin
Sent: Saturday, February 03, 2001 7:28 AM
Subject: reply on software patent paper


Greg,

Thanks for your comments on our Working Paper, "Sequential Innovation, Patents and Imitation." (We are currently revising the January 2000 draft.) However, our intent appears to have been miscommunicated, so below are some brief clarifying comments we hope you will publish:

1. Simplistic Models

We could not agree with you more that patent policy should not be based on overly simple economic models. But please don't blame us for this unfortunate development.

Fact is, for nearly 20 years U.S. patent policy has been guided by an overly simple model that Todd Dickinson and most patent attorneys recite with little provocation. It goes like this: "Without patents, competition from imitators deprives innovators of profits on their innovations. Therefore, they will not invest sufficient R&D. Patents provide innovators with monopoly rents (licensing fees and extra profits from monopoly prices). These rents encourage R&D. Stronger patents mean more R&D which means more innovation. Stronger patents are always better." This simple argument appears to be behind the subject matter extension of patents and the lowering of the non-obviousness standards. It has also been used to argue for the extension of the patent term.

This common argument is what we call the "static model." We show that with just a few slightly more realistic assumptions (sequential innovation, alternative technologies), the conclusions of the model are turned upside down. In a more dynamic world, stronger patents may actually reduce innovation. Our point is not that patents are necessarily and always bad, but that policy should be careful and balanced.

Indeed, prior to the 1980s, both economic theory and legal theory took a balanced view, recognizing both benefits and costs to patents and calling for limits on patent protection. Our paper argues for a return to this perspective.

2. Empirical evidence on software

We do NOT argue that the explosion in software patents has stifled innovation in software generally. We would hardly argue that the software industry as a whole has become less innovative.

Instead, our review of empirical evidence has a much more limited aim: to determine whether or not those companies that have gotten large numbers of software patents have been induced to invest more in R&D, as the simple model implies they should.

Economists understand very well the costs of monopoly rights. Patent monopolies mean consumers pay higher prices either to a monopolist or in the form of licensing fees that are passed on. (Also, consumer choice may be limited.) These costs can be thought of as a social subsidy to patentholders. As your data make clear, a small number of large companies (mainly hardware companies) have been spending millions of dollars to build large portfolios of software patents. They hope to cash in on these government-sponsored subsidies that are potentially worth many many billions over the next 20 years.

Prudent policy makers should examine whether society receives commensurate benefit for these large subsidies. The static model provides the main justification for them: they supposedly encourage higher R&D spending. But we looked at the actual R&D spending (relative to sales) of those companies building large software patent portfolios. These companies did not increase their R&D to sales ratios.

This suggests that: a.) the simple static model does not accurately describe the effect of patents and b.) society may be getting a raw deal. Indeed, in a slightly more complex world than the static model, companies might obtain patents mainly to extract royalties from other firms (shocking, but true!).

3. Europe

Although some Europeans are opposed to software patents of any kind, much of what we hear is really a much more balanced view. Many people suggest that software should have patent protection in Europe, but perhaps with some limitations, e.g. a term shorter than 20 years, or limits on the prohibition against private use of patented ideas (like "fair use" in copyright). These suggestions provide a refreshing and balanced alternative to the "stronger is better" reflex one encounters in the U.S.

Most refreshing is that Europe is having a public discussion of this important policy issue at all, even if it does mean that some incorrect views get expressed. It is easy for us to forget that the current U.S. arrangement was largely the result of court decisions that were handed down with little discussion and no public review.

It is hard to predict the impact of the large number of software patents issued. Perhaps in the future, software startups will have to pay an "IBM tax" and a "Hitachi tax" and a "Xerox tax" etc. to avoid litigation. Perhaps also contingency-fee lawyers will become more active in this field, raising the level of uncertainty. These could be significant liabilities to the U.S. software industry. Many Europeans recognize that they may gain some competitive advantage with a more balanced policy.

Jim Bessen and Eric Maskin