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[FYI] (Fwd) FC: ICANN CEO proposes radical changes, more government involvement
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- Subject: [FYI] (Fwd) FC: ICANN CEO proposes radical changes, more government involvement
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- Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2002 10:14:24 +0100
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------- Forwarded message follows -------
Date sent: Mon, 25 Feb 2002 03:01:04 -0500
From: Declan McCullagh <declan@well.com>
To: politech@politechbot.com
Subject: FC: ICANN CEO proposes radical changes, more government involvement
Send reply to: declan@well.com
This is a complicated proposal and will take the community a while to
digest. But some portions stand out, like having one-third of the 15
board members selected by national governments. So much for ICANN's
veneer of independence.
Threads from icannwatch:
http://www.icannwatch.org/article.php?sid=563&mode=thread&order=0
http://www.icannwatch.org/article.php?sid=564&mode=thread&order=0
-Declan
--
http://www.icann.org/announcements/announcement-24feb02.htm
24 February 2002
___________________________________________________________________
___
ICANN President Recommends a Roadmap for Reform
Marina del Rey, California USA (24 February 2002) At the ICANN
Board of Directors retreat held over the weekend of 23 February,
President
Stuart Lynn proposed a sweeping series of structural reforms for
ICANN. These reforms, designed to lead ICANN towards attainment of
its
core mission, were carefully discussed by the Board. Board
directors
encouraged Lynn to post the proposed reforms for public review
and
comment.
"The current structure of ICANN was widely recognized as an
experiment
when created three years ago," noted Board Chairman Vint Cerf.
"The rapid expansion of and increasing global dependence on the
Internet have made it clear that a new structure is essential if
ICANN is to
fulfill its mission."
ICANN was formed three years ago as an entirely private global
organization designed to assume responsibility for the DNS root
from the United States government and to coordinate technical
policy for
the Internet's naming and address allocation systems. In the new
proposals, the basic mission remains intact. What changes is the
means
of achieving that mission.
"What has become clear to me and others is that a purely private
organization will not work," said Lynn. "The Internet has become
too important to national economic and social progress.
Governments, as
the representatives of their populations, must participate more
directly in ICANN's debates and policymaking functions. We must
find
the right form of global public-private partnership - one that
combines the agility and strength of a private organization with
the
authority of governments to represent the public interest."
Noting that current organizational inertia and obsession with
process
over substance has impeded agility, Lynn laid out a roadmap
designed
to instill confidence in key stakeholders and to ensure that ICANN
can
be more effective. This roadmap entails restructuring the Board
of
Directors into a Board of Trustees composed in part of trustees
nominated by those governments who participate in the ICANN
process;
in part by the chairs of proposed new "policy councils" that
would
replace the existing supporting organizations and that would
provide
expert advice; and in part by trustees proposed by a
broadly-based
nominating committee and appointed by the Board itself.
The roadmap is designed to bring all critical stakeholders to the
table, something that has been difficult to achieve with the
present structure and has slowed ICANN's progress and its ability
to fulfill its responsibilities. It is also designed to establish
a broad-based
funding mechanism sufficient to support the critical mission of
ICANN.
"We need to build a stronger organization, supported by our key
stakeholders, led by the best team that can be assembled, and
properly funded," Lynn told the Board at its retreat. "We must be
structured to
function effectively in this fast-paced global Internet
environment" "A key requirement is to keep the best of the present
ICANN," added Cerf, "in ensuring transparency, openness, and
participation, while
creating an ICANN that can act responsibly and quickly. That will
mean
rejecting practices that have emphasized process over
achievement.
Above all, ICANN must be - and be seen to be - effective and
supportive of technical innovation and of a reliable Internet."
A paper written by Lynn that explains the reasons for change and
the
roadmap for reform is posted on the ICANN web site.
---
http://www.icann.org/general/lynn-reform-proposal-24feb02.htm
President's Report: ICANN - The Case for Reform
24 February 2002
___________________________________________________________________
___
To the Internet Community:
I have now been President of ICANN for just about a year. During
that
time, I have talked to more people than I can count about ICANN,
its
accomplishments and its deficiencies, and its future. I have also
had
the obligation to oversee the actual day-to-day operations of
ICANN,
and to make the hard decisions about what to do and how to do it in
an
environment of an incomplete structure and inadequate funding. I
now
feel comfortable enough with my state of knowledge that I want to
share my views with the Board and the community. Attached to this
note is a copy of the report I presented to the ICANN Board of
Directors at
its retreat in Washington, D.C. on February 23-24, 2002.
ICANN's assigned mission - to create an effective private sector
policy development process capable of administrative and policy
management of the Internet's naming and address allocation systems
-
was incredibly ambitious. Nothing like this had ever been done
before. ICANN was to serve as an alternative to the traditional,
pre-Internet
model of a multinational governmental treaty organization. The
hope
was that a private-sector body would be like the Internet itself:
more
efficient - more nimble - more able to react promptly to a
rapidly
changing environment and, at the same time, more open to
meaningful
participation by more stakeholders, developing policies through
bottom-up consensus. It was also expected that such an entity could
be
established, and become functional, faster than a multinational
governmental body.
It is now more than three years since the creation of ICANN, and
there
are some real accomplishments: the introduction of a competitive
registrar market, the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy, the
creation of seven new global Top Level Domains. But despite this
progress, all
the original expectations of ICANN have not been realized. ICANN
is
still not fully organized, and it is certainly not yet capable of
shouldering the entire responsibility of global DNS management
and
coordination. ICANN has also not shown that it can be effective,
nimble, and quick to react to problems. ICANN is overburdened
with
process, and at the same time underfunded and understaffed. For
these and other more fundamental reasons, ICANN in its current form
has not
become the effective steward of the global Internet's naming and
address allocation systems as conceived by its founders. Perhaps
even more importantly, the passage of time has not increased the
confidence
that it can meet its original expectations and hopes.
I have come to the conclusion that the original concept of a
purely
private sector body, based on consensus and consent, has been shown
to
be impractical. The fact that many of those critical to global
coordination are still not willing to participate fully and
effectively in the ICANN process is strong evidence of this fact.
But I also am convinced that, for a resource as changeable and
dynamic as the Internet, a traditional governmental approach as an
alternative to
ICANN remains a bad idea. The Internet needs effective,
lightweight,
and sensible global coordination in a few limited areas, allowing
ample room for the innovation and change that makes this unique
resource so useful and valuable.
ICANN Needs Significant Structural Reform
I have concluded that ICANN needs reform: deep, meaningful,
structural
reform, based on a clearheaded understanding of the successes and
failures of the last three years. If ICANN is to succeed, this
reform
must replace ICANN's unstable institutional foundations with an
effective public-private partnership, rooted in the private sector
but
with the active backing and participation of national
governments.
In short, ICANN is at a crossroads. The process of relocating
functions from the US Government to ICANN is stalled. For a variety
of reasons described in this document, I believe that ICANN's
ability to make further progress is blocked by its structural
weaknesses. To put
it bluntly: On its present course, ICANN cannot accomplish its
assigned mission. A new path - a new and reformed structure - is
required.
It is reasonable in this context to wonder whether we would be
better
off replacing ICANN with something entirely different. I do not
believe that there are any better alternatives than a reformed
ICANN. If the ICANN experiment of private-sector self-management
cannot work,
the default alternative will certainly be some form of
multinational governmental organization. In my view, this remains
an unattractive
option, for all the same reasons that were so forcefully advanced
three years ago. The United Nations, the World Trade Organization,
and
the International Telecommunications Union are all complex and
sometimes effective organizations within their respective realms;
however, each model has deep and evident shortcomings which in
the
Internet environment would render it a worse alternative than a
reformed ICANN.
A Reformed ICANN Can Be Successful
Based on the experience of the last three years and my own focus
on
ICANN over the last year, I am convinced that a reformed ICANN can
be
successful - if we re-focus on our core mission, reform our
institutional foundations to fit that mission, and eliminate the
distractions of peripheral issues and agendas.
To be clear: ICANN's mission is effective management and
coordination
of those few, higher-level elements of the Internet's naming and
address allocation systems that require or benefit from global
management and coordination, while abstaining from actions that
might
interfere with the creativity and innovation that has made the
Internet such a dynamic resource. ICANN's mission is stewardship
and
operational stability, not the defense of its existence or the
preservation of the status quo.
Having said that, it is essential to state unambiguously what
falls outside of ICANN's scope. The core ICANN mission includes no
mandate
to innovate new institutions of global democracy, nor to achieve
mathematically equal representation of all affected individuals
and
organizations, nor to regulated content, nor to solve the problems
of
the digital divide, nor to embody some idealized (and
never-before-realized) model of process or procedure. However
important those ideals may be, they are for other, better-suited
organizations to address. Unfortunately, we have allowed the
advocates for these and other non-core objectives to divert ICANN
from what must be its tight focus on its core mission. These
diversions have been and will continue to be a significant
impediment to accomplishing ICANN's
core mission, unless we undertake a powerful reform of ICANN's
structure and operations, and a committed refocus on its limited
but
important mission.
Core Values Should Be Preserved
Central to the ICANN experiment - and integral to its successes
thus
far - have been core values of openness and broad participation.
I believe strongly in those values, and aim to strengthen them in
a
reformed ICANN. ICANN can and should do much better in achieving
transparency, enabling meaningful participation, and reaching out
to
involve the global diversity of the Internet.
A New Public-Private Partnership Is Necessary
I am now convinced that the original desire to avoid a totally
governmental takeover of the IANA functions led to an overreaction
- the choice of a totally private model. With three years'
experience,
it is clear that model is simply not workable. It is not workable
because it leaves ICANN isolated from the real-world institutions
-
governments - whose backing and support are essential for any
effective global coordinating body to accomplish its assigned
tasks.
ICANN currently has an advisory committee to channel governmental
input, but that mechanism has not effectively integrated the views
or
the influence of governments; we must find a better way.
Though many in the traditional Internet community react strongly
against the very mention of governments, it is simply unrealistic
to believe that global coordination of the DNS can succeed without
more active involvement of governments. Indeed, it has been for
decades a
bedrock principle of the Internet that technical managers should
stick
to what they know and do best, and leave to other organizations
what they in turn do best. Governments play a unique role in
representing
the broad public interests of their populations. So far, ICANN's
existing structures have not engaged the attention, commitment,
and
support of governments to the necessary degree.
What is needed at this stage if ICANN is to carry out its mission
is
neither a totally private nor a totally governmental solution,
but
rather a well-balanced public-private partnership. Stable
functioning
of the Internet's naming and address allocation systems is too
important to national economies and other national goals for
governments to be left on the sidelines. Experience has shown that
the
influence, authority, and close cooperation of governments is
essential to accomplish ICANN's mission. Because of the
significant
advantages represented by a strong private-sector organization,
however, we should seek a robust and effective middle ground -
the
right public-private partnership - that will incorporate the best
of
both extreme options.
The attached Report lays out in more detail the reasons why ICANN
cannot achieve its mission on its present course, and why deep
reform is necessary. It further makes a series of proposals for
reform that,
I believe, will allow ICANN and the Internet community to
accomplish
its original mission. In summary, those proposals include:
A. Reformation of the ICANN Board
1. 15 member Board of Trustees
a) 10 At Large Trustees
(1) Five nominated by governments and confirmed by Board of
Trustees
(2) Five nominated by open Nominating Committee process and
confirmed by Board of Trustees
b) Five Ex Officio Trustees
(1) Chairs (or designees) of three Policy Councils and Technical
Advisory Committee (see below)
(2) CEO
2. Designee of Internet Architecture Board and Chair of
Governmental Advisory Committee serve as non-voting liaisons to
Board of Trustees
B. Reform of the ICANN Policy Development Structure and Process
1. Three Policy Councils Providing Advice to Board of Trustees
a) Address and Numbering Policy Council
b) Generic TLD Names Policy Council
c) Geographic TLD Names Policy Council
d) Managed by Steering Committees composed of about half ex
officio representatives of categories of relevant entities
(registries, registrars, etc.) and half of persons nominated by
Nominating Committee and confirmed by Board of Trustees
e) Nominating Committee composed of non-voting Chair (selected by
CEO after wide consultation), three members of Board of Trustees
whose terms are not expiring, and four other persons appointed by
Board of Trustees after consultation with and suggestions from
community.
2. Two Standing Advisory Committees
a) Technical Advisory Committee
(1) Composed of ex officio members (designee of IAB, RIRs, root
name server operators and name registries/registrars) and three
other persons nominated by Nominating Committee and confirmed by
Board of Trustees
b) Governmental Advisory Committee
3. Two Additional Standing Committees
a) Security Committee (appointed by Board of Trustees)
b) Root Server System Operations Committee (root server operators
and other invited persons by the Committee)
4. Participation in Councils by Self-Organized Forums
(Individuals and/or Entities with Common Interests), including
potentially an At Large organization for individuals
C. Transparency and Accountability
1. Ombudsman
a) Person of unassailable credentials responsible for managing
public comment and other public participation
b) Responsible for receiving and processing petitions for
reconsideration, and other complaints and disputes; access to all
necessary information to evaluate same
c) Responsible for making recommendations to Board of Trustees
with respect to complaints and disputes, and requests for
reconsideration; all such recommendations to be published on
ICANN website.
d) Provided with support staff and other resources necessary to
carry out responsibilities effectively
2. Manager of Public Participation
a) Responsible for managing the public comment and participation
process for ICANN on all substantive matters. Will solicit,
receive and report to the Board on all public input on matters
put out for public comment.
b) Responsible for managing all ICANN public forums, public
e-mail list, etc. Provided necessary electronic access to
publicize findings and recommendations, all of which will be
available to the public.
c) Provided with support staff and other resources necessary to
carry out responsibilities effectively
D. Funding
1. Funding (for staff, general operations and additional
requirements including root server operator compensation) must be
significantly increased, and sources of funding broadened
2. Funding to come from both governmental and private
participants
3. Funding to include both contributions for core functions and
fees for services
I offer this analysis and these recommendations with the hope of
stimulating public discussion and debate. As explained in more
detail in the attached report, I believe that ICANN must undergo
significant
reform if it is to be successful in its mission, and that this
must
happen quickly. I look forward to your comments and suggestions.
M. Stuart Lynn
___________________________________________________________________
___
President's Report: ICANN - The Case for Reform
23 February 2002
INTRODUCTION
ICANN is a bold experiment in the management of a unique global
resource. Through sensible management of the DNS, the goal is to
help
maintain the Internet as a stable and effective mechanism for
global commerce, communication, education, medicine and beyond.
Because it
was designed as a purely private sector body, and as such has no
coercive tools or legislative powers, ICANN was to execute this
mission solely through the voluntary development of consensus
policies
and the creation of bilateral agreements with relevant
stakeholders.
Notwithstanding the obvious challenges inherent in this approach,
the
hope was that ICANN could accomplish the necessary coordination
and
management tasks more quickly and more efficiently than the only
apparent alternative - a multinational governmental body of some
kind.
We now have three years of experience in attempting to foster a
transition from control by a single government over a somewhat
informal system to a more formal system of global private sector
coordination. This effort aims to bring together governments,
Internet pioneers, the technical Internet community, infrastructure
operators, and business and social organizations from around the
world - all in a
single entity, born in controversy and with no guaranteed source
of
funding. Moreover, ICANN was expected to begin to function even as
it
struggled to organize and secure funding. Many of the hoped-for
participants were deeply suspicious of other important
stakeholders,
thus making a fully cooperative effort difficult. And all this
was
happening in the middle of an incredibly rapid expansion of the
Internet from a largely scientific and research medium to a
critical
global communications medium integral to the commercial and
social
lives of hundreds of millions of the world's inhabitants.
Many people, institutions, and governments have worked very hard
to
make ICANN succeed, and there have been some real
accomplishments.
Several private businesses stepped up to loan ICANN absolutely
critical start-up funding (those loans have now all been repaid).
ICANN developed and launched a system of competitive registrars,
implemented a Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy to deal
efficiently with domain name disputes, and introduced seven new
global TLDs. On
the operational side, ICANN has performed the IANA address
allocation
and protocol numbering functions efficiently, and taken over the
direct operation of one of the DNS root name servers.
In addition, a number of governments have provided critical
support.
The United States Government assisted ICANN in obtaining
contracts
with NSI/VeriSign, a critical stakeholder as the operator of the
.com, .net and .org registries. The Australian government played a
key role in providing funding to staff and support to the
Governmental Advisory
Committee, and in helping to move its ccTLD administration into
the
very first contractual arrangement with ICANN. The governments of
Japan, Canada and others (including the European Commission) have
also
played key roles, and a number of governments have helped to host
ICANN meetings.
Despite all this, a candid assessment of ICANN's performance to
date
would have to conclude that it has fallen short of hopes and
expectations. Despite a remarkably open policy process, needed
participation has been lacking. Key participants that are essential
if
ICANN is to carry out its mission of global coordination -
particularly most of the root name server operators, the address
registries, and the majority of ccTLD registries - have not yet
entered into agreements with ICANN (although we may be close to
an agreement with the address registries and certain of the root
name
server operators). ICANN has struggled from the beginning with
inadequate funding derived from too narrow a base. And it has
been
burdened - overburdened in my view - with too much focus on
process
and representation, and not enough focus on achieving its core
mission. Even the global business community, which has now come
to
depend on the continued stability of the Internet for a large
portion
of their operations, has not - with some notable and stalwart
exceptions - broadly participated in the ICANN process. I believe
this
is in major part because ICANN is viewed by many key stakeholders
as
more of a debating society than as an effective operational body.
Thus, ICANN as it now stands is, at best, an incomplete experiment.
In
fact, it is clear to me that, without the steady and committed
participation of all the major operational bodies of the Internet
-
including essentially all registries and registrars, significant
ISPs
and backbone providers, and the major users of the Internet - in
the
development of necessary policies, coupled with an agreement to
abide by those policies once developed, this particular private
sector model
will not be able to fulfill its mission.
In particular, ICANN has gone about as far as it can go without
significant additional participation and backing from national
governments. Absent a substantial increase in the efforts of
governments to support and encourage the continued development of
the
private sector approach, I do not believe that ICANN will be able
to complete the transition from US Government control to global
private sector management of the DNS and related functions of the
Internet.
For the reasons set forth below, I believe that there is little
time
to make the necessary reforms. We must act now, or the ICANN
experiment will soon come to a grinding halt.
WHY THE CURRENT COURSE WON'T WORK
ICANN's major problems can be broadly categorized into three
categories: too little participation by critical stakeholders
(across
the full range of infrastructure operators, major users and
national
governments); too much focus on process; and too little funding
to
provide quality services.
1. Too Little Participation by Critical Entities. The essential
participants in an effective ICANN are, in no particular order:
(a)
the various infrastructure providers of the Internet, broadly
defined; (b) major users; (c) the relevant technical community and
(d) national
governments;
There are many others interested in DNS management, including at
least some portion of the broader Internet community, and it is
important to ensure that all those with legitimate interest in
ICANN have input to its processes and its decisions. But it is
these participants that are
absolutely essential for ICANN to carry out global management and
coordination effectively. And their participation must be more
than
token. They must be actively involved; those that are part of the
name and address operating infrastructure must be willing to agree
to abide
by the results of the ICANN policymaking process; and they must
fund
the process at levels adequate for ICANN to function effectively.
It is worth describing in some detail why certain of these
participants are essential.
ccTLDs: An ICANN process without the full participation of the
243 ccTLDs cannot accomplish its core objectives of privatization
and internationalization. More specifically, ICANN would be
unable to deliver on two of its core assigned responsibilities:
(i) assuring
global DNS interoperability and stability; and (ii) delegating -
through a framework of responsible agreements - non-technical
policy
matters to politically accountable local organizations, wherever
feasible. Each of these objectives is embedded in the White Paper,
and
each has defined the ICANN internationalization efforts to date.
Let
me elaborate on each.
First, global interoperability and stability. Without stable,
formal
relationships with the ccTLDs, the ICANN process would not be able
to assure the preservation of interoperability with the vast
majority of
the entries in the DNS root zone file. While the majority of
ccTLDs
act responsibly, without binding and enforceable assurances that
appropriate policies and standards will be followed there is no
global
guarantee that applicable standards will be maintained by all, at
least no guarantee that would be credible to most major
stakeholders.
From the perspective of global interoperability, then, it is
simply unthinkable that a large fraction of the TLDs in the root
zone file should be permitted to operate independently of the
global community
and of policies established by the global community. In each case,
it is essential that these critical entities formally agree not to
break the DNS, and to abide by standard global operational
practices arrived
at through the ICANN process.
Second, delegation of non-technical policy issues to local
communities. A second key objective that could not be achieved
without
formal ccTLD agreements is the distribution (delegation) of
politicized policy questions to locally accountable entities such
as
governments, or local self-regulatory organizations (such as
Canada's CIRA for the .ca TLD or auDA in Australia), as provided
for in the GAC Principles. By backing the GAC Principles for ccTLD
management, the US
and other governments have given strong support to the
proposition
that the global Internet community (through the ICANN process)
maintains a responsibility for the formulation of global name and
address policies (those affecting global interoperability and
stability), while locally accountable institutions assume
responsibilities for all other policy areas (including pricing,
registration policies, dispute resolution, etc.).
For ICANN to limit itself to its global coordination function, it
must
extricate itself from highly politicized local policy matters
that
arise most prevalently with ccTLDs. In nearly all redelegation
cases,
disputes over the administration of a local ccTLD turn on the
determination of the will of the local Internet community -
which,
together with technical competence, constitute the criteria by
which
redelegation decisions are to be made, according to longstanding
IANA policy. Consistent with the core ICANN mission, those
responsibilities
can only be devolved to local Internet communities if there are
available meaningful and accountable alternatives to ICANN. For
these alternatives to qualify as fully accountable necessarily
requires some
involvement and supervision by the local government or of a
publicly
accountable body that is recognized by the government.
Without formal agreements, the global Internet community, working
through ICANN, has today only one tool - albeit an impractical one
-
to ensure compliance with global policies by those (almost all)
ccTLD administrators that do not have a binding agreement with
ICANN: ICANN could, in theory, recommend that a particular ccTLD be
redelegated to
a cooperating administrator, and if the US Government accepted
that
recommendation, non-cooperating ccTLD administrators would be
replaced. But this course of action runs counter to the basic
ICANN
mission, since it could be very disruptive, at least in the short
term. What would solve the problem in many jurisdictions would be
for
national governments to use their good offices to assure the
cooperation of their ccTLD administrators. As we have seen with
Australia and Japan, national governments can take actions to
create
the proper environment for appropriate ICANN/ccTLD agreements.
Without
similar actions by other governments, for the most part this
problem will not be solved. Thus, an ICANN with more active
encouragement by
national governments (as originally conceived) would be more likely
to
achieve the necessary agreements with ccTLDs that are critical to
a
successful ICANN.
Root Name Server Operators: The root name server operators are a
different story. These are not funded by ICANN but today are
supported
by the public-minded generosity of their sponsoring institutions
and by the personal commitments of the individuals involved. Three
root
name servers are operated by US Government agencies; several more
are
operated at US locations, most by government contractors of
various sorts (such as VeriSign). Three are outside the US, one
each in the
UK, Sweden and Japan. Today, the 13 root name server operators are
the
critical source of the single stable and authoritative root.
It is essential that the root name server operators be full and
complete participants in the ICANN process. That logically
requires stable and appropriate agreements between ICANN and the
institutions and individuals that operate the root name servers.
After more than two years of discussions, we have reached a
general consensus among
the various root name server operators and ICANN on a form of MOU.
But
the progress has been agonizingly slow.
Why? First, organizational inertia doubtless accounts for part of
the inability to conclude agreements. The root name server
operators with
whom ICANN works are highly skilled technologists and network
operations experts. They have voluntarily devoted countless hours
to the Internet with little or no reward other than the
satisfaction of
their achievements. However, very often they are not the decision
makers within their organizations who can commit to external
agreements. Although the operators themselves may be comfortable
with the MOUs, some of the decision makers may just be coming aware
of what
their organizations are being asked to agree to.
Second, some organizations that sponsor a root name server
operator
have little motivation to sign formal agreements, even in the form
of the MOU that is now contemplated. What do they gain in return,
except perhaps unwanted visibility and the attendant possibility of
nuisance
litigation? They receive no funding for their efforts, so why
should
they take on any contractual commitments, however loose?
Nevertheless,
we have, I believe, reached consensus with the root name server
operators that MOUs will increase the perception - and perception
ultimately becomes reality - of stability of this critical
resource. There now appears to be an understanding that these
agreements are a
necessary component of ICANN's progress towards a more formalized
structure for administration of the name and address system.
Of course, there is still an issue about what kind of agreements
are
appropriate. What we have been working on is an agreement that
merely
documents the existing situation. Over the longer run, however,
more formal documents will be needed, given the critical nature of
these
components of the DNS. In addition, we must move to a system where
the
root server operators are compensated for their critical
services.
Thus, for a fully effective ICANN, capable of accomplishing its
mission, we will ultimately need a more definitive and binding set
of
arrangements with the current and any future root name server
operators, and that will require significantly greater funding than
is
presently available to ICANN.
Address Registries: The address registries are similar to the
ccTLDs
in the sense that there is only a small, but important, element
of
global coordination required in this area. Most address policy
decisions can be made at the regional (RIR) level, but ultimately
there is a small aspect of absolutely necessary global
coordination.
We are close to agreements with the RIRs, but those agreements
(which
have been heavily negotiated over the last two years) are
arguably
incomplete in two respects: (a) they allow the address registries
to
opt out of ICANN policies with which they do not agree, by taking
the
ultimate step of terminating the agreements, and (b) they include
special limitations on the proportion of ICANN's funding
requirements that the address registries will provide under those
agreements. While
these are not fatal flaws by any means, given the cooperative
nature
of the RIRs - and are not the most critical issue facing ICANN -
they
are another illustration of the difficulty in gaining the
necessary voluntary and complete cooperation of all the critical
participants
needed for ICANN to accomplish its mission.
Major Users, ISPs and Backbone Providers: The vast majority of
the
business community (outside of the registries and registrars who
are
most directly affected by ICANN's policies) has chosen not to
participate in the ICANN process. There have been, of course,
some
notable exceptions among a few corporations and trade
organizations,
but these are a minority. ICANN is very grateful to those
organizations that provided the funding that was so critical to
ICANN's early survival, but outside of those registries and
registrars
who are contractually committed, broad participation by those
commercial entities that most depend on a reliable Internet has
not
been forthcoming.
During the past few years, the Internet industry and its trade
associations have faced enormous challenges, including a
recessionary economy that has left many companies struggling for
survival. So it is understandable that the very industries that
have invested hundreds of billions of dollars in the infrastructure
of the global Internet (not
to mention the broader global business community that relies so
heavily on the Internet for commercial activities) has devoted
shockingly little time to participating in ICANN - shocking,
given
that failures in the name and address allocation systems could
inevitably have serious adverse effects on their businesses and,
through them, on every person and entity relying on the Internet.
As a result, the ICANN policymaking process is impoverished by
the
absence of most of the entities with the greatest direct interest
in
DNS stability and those whom its decisions will most directly
impact, and by the consequent overrepresentation of advocates for
one special
interest or another. While this lack of participation by those
who
critically depend on the successful fulfillment of ICANN's mission
may be explainable, it puts enormous pressure on what is supposed
to be a
consensus development body to come up with responsible policies
when
major stakeholders are silent.
This is also true for other private sector institutions, ranging
from academia to NGOs. There has been some isolated participation
by a few
from these communities, but this participation has focused far
too
much on process and procedure, impeding ICANN's ability to reach
timely decisions on important substantive issues. The simple fact
is
that a private sector process cannot effectively function if major
and
important elements of the private sector do not participate
productively in that process.
National Governments: Perhaps the above points are self-evident.
What
may not be quite so obvious is my conclusion, based on all our
experience to date, that active national government participation
in
ICANN is critical to its success.
Indeed, in the final analysis, national governments are perhaps
the
most irreplaceable supporters of ICANN, in the sense that -
notwithstanding the efforts or desires of other stakeholders the
backing of governments is necessary if private sector coordination
of
the Internet's naming and address allocation systems is to be
feasible. If governments choose to take direct responsibility for
the management of the name and address systems of the Internet,
they have
the power to do so. And even if they do not make that choice,
given
the importance of the global resource that ICANN has been
established to coordinate, it is unrealistic to think that
governments will simply
sit by and allow ICANN's processes to work without their careful
attention and review.
Today, the Governmental Advisory Committee is the only formal
mechanism for governmental input into ICANN. Despite significant
effort by many of its members, it has been only a minimally
acceptable
vehicle, partly because of a lack of adequate commitments by the
world's governments and partly because of the Internet community's
own
ambivalent attitudes (reflected in the attitude of ICANN, which is
a
composite of that community) towards government involvement. In
addition, while all governments are invited to participate, the
existence of the GAC has not generated the scope of governmental
participation and commitment that is necessary for ICANN's
long-term
success.
I recognize that proposing an increased role for governments in
ICANN is a significant departure from the original conception of
ICANN as a
purely private sector body, but I am convinced an increased
governmental role is essential if ICANN is to carry out its
mission.
Appropriate national government participation would contribute
greatly to the success of ICANN in at least two ways. First, it
could provide the public interest accountability that all agree
should be a part of
any global ICANN-like organization. Second, it would increase the
likelihood that governments would more effectively encourage the
participation of their national citizens and entities that is
critical
for ICANN's success.
If one thing is clear from the past three years, it is that a
purely private entity that must depend on the voluntary
cooperation of many
other entities is not likely to be able to coordinate anything
globally without significant governmental support. Indeed, each
of
ICANN's accomplishments to date have all depended, in one way or
another, on government support, particularly from the United
States.
With respect to the legacy registry/registrar provider for the
com/net/org TLDs, NSI (now VeriSign), US government help was
critical
to obtaining ICANN's first registry agreements. All the other
agreements that ICANN has achieved have depended, ultimately, on
the
willingness of the US government to make it clear (to its direct
contractors and all others) that it was not receptive to changes
in
the authoritative root zone file that were not managed through
the
ICANN process. Especially as to those registries that see ICANN as
a
threat to their independence, and are unwilling (despite all the
rational arguments and history to the contrary) to accept
voluntarily
the existence and authority of a global coordinating entity, the
influence of national governments can be critical to the creation
of a
complete, well-balanced and effective ICANN.
National government participation, in my view, is also essential
to
end the Sisyphean effort of searching for a workable public
accountability mechanism for ICANN. Three years of effort have
proven
that a global online election of ICANN Board members by an
entirely
unknown and self-selected membership is not a workable solution
to
this problem. While virtually everyone seems to agree that ICANN
should have Board-level representation of the broad public interest
of the global Internet community, there has been no consensus
around the
best method of achieving that representation. The problems are
manifold, and not unique to ICANN. The world lacks a global
voting
pool, or even a consistent way to verify human identity; the notion
of
a special-purpose, no-cost, self-selected "membership" arising
from
thin air has quite reasonably generated strong fears of capture,
fraud
and abuse. Purely electronic online voting has been proposed in a
number of different circumstances throughout the world, and
continues to find more skeptics than supporters among the experts.
It is simply
unrealistic to expect ICANN - thinly-staffed, underfunded,
technically-oriented ICANN - to be able to achieve what no other
global institution has: a global electorate expressing its will
through stable representative institutions.
For three years, this issue has dominated the ICANN agenda,
occupied a
considerable portion of very limited resources, and despite all
this
effort has still not produced a acceptable plan. Indeed, I would
argue
that even if we had found a workable process, this approach was
not
likely to be the most effective way to provide the accountability
that
all agree is necessary. At best, a global election process is a
gamble; as we have seen, it is entirely possible that irrelevant
factors other than the stability and security of the DNS may
motivate
a very large segment of any conceivable electorate.
Although governments vary around the world, for better or worse
they
are the most evolved and best legitimated representatives of
their
populations - that is, of the public interest. As such, their
greater participation in general, and in particular their
collective selection of outstanding non-governmental individuals to
fill a certain portion
of ICANN Trustee seats, could better fill the need for public
accountability without the serious practical and resource problems
of
global elections in which only a relatively few self-selected
voters
are likely to participate.
As this recitation demonstrates, ICANN must have the active
participation of those critical to ICANN's effectiveness in
accomplishing its assigned responsibilities. Without that
participation, it makes little difference whether ICANN is
transparent, whether it has appropriate appeal and
reconsideration
procedures, whether ordinary users have a voice, or whether the
Board meetings are public or private. If the ICANN effort is to
succeed, we
must refocus on what is necessary before worrying about what is
desirable. The active participation of those groups identified
above is essential to ICANN's success - and as I have suggested,
even its
viability.
2. Too Much Process. ICANN was born with a particular and intense
focus on process and representation. Undue focus on process to
the
exclusion of substance and effectiveness is the second major
problem
facing ICANN.
In many ways, ICANN's creation was a political exercise, working
from the outside in: what structure is required to secure the
participation of this group or that group? The result was an entity
in which most of
the groups seen to be essential at the time were willing to
participate, but not necessarily in a way or within a structure
that
was designed to be effective. The driving notion at the time of
ICANN's creation was consensus; it is clear to me that the
driving notion today, with the renewed focus precipitated by the
events of
9/11, must be effectiveness. Like any institution with
responsibility
for key infrastructure, ICANN must be able to act when needed.
This is not to say that process, participation or representation
are
irrelevant or undesirable. They are highly relevant, but they must
be
viewed as means to achieve ICANN's goals, not ends in themselves.
ICANN's primary focus must be effectiveness, in the broad meaning
of
that term, in carrying out its mission. If ICANN is not
effective,
what advantage does it have over a purely governmental solution?
And process - while necessary to appropriately identify and
accommodate
differences across a wide variety of views and motivations - must
surely also be shaped so that it does not seriously impede
effectiveness and progress. Process that prevents effectiveness is
a
failure.
The intense focus on process at the time of ICANN's creation was
in part driven by a reasonable desire among some to shield the
Internet from hasty, unsophisticated or foolish decisions by
ICANN, a new and
untested institution. However, that impulse, coupled with a
widespread
failure to understand ICANN's inherently limited scope and lack
of
coercive authority, caused the creation of ever-more procedural
loops
and layers at the expense of overall Internet-speed
effectiveness. There were even attempts to cause ICANN to
implement the thousands
upon thousands of pages of administrative and regulatory
procedures
that apply to US government agencies - a move that is totally
inconsistent with the reason for creating a private sector
organization in the first place.
This focus on process was also produced by what in hindsight was
oversensitivity to the possible involvement of governments and
governmental bodies in ICANN. The fact is that the Internet, and
therefore management and coordination of the naming and
addressing
functions of the Internet, are critically important to
governments,
because they are critically important to their citizens and
businesses. It is naïve to assume that governments will not be
heavily interested and involved in global policymaking for these
areas. In the current ICANN structure, however, government
involvement is limited to
the advisory function of the Governmental Advisory Committee. The
disconnect between this theoretical limitation, and the actual
power
and influence of governmental bodies on the management of such a
critical global resource, has been increasingly evident in the
tension
between the GAC and other parts of the ICANN structure.
This deliberately limited role of governments in ICANN inevitably
fueled demands for other and different accountability structures.
Since ICANN would eventually "control" an important global
resource,
the argument went, it must be accountable to those affected by
its
decisions. These include, at least abstractly and in the view of
some,
every person and entity in the world. Thus, we have seen calls
for
global elections by all interested individuals, and demands for
Board
representation and other indicia of status by various groups and
affected entities.
One of the reasons why ICANN has not yet generated the necessary
support and involvement of critical stakeholders is that many
participants in the ICANN process have devoted very significant
attention to various non-core issues that should not, in my
opinion, receive such overwhelming priority. The effect of these
distractions
has been ICANN's appearing to many as a collection of squabbling
interests, tied up in an elaborately complicated organizational
chart. The single largest distraction from what should have been
the central
ICANN focus has been the many competing notions of an At Large
membership.
Some - understandably but very mistakenly in my view - perceive
this as a necessary effort to generate legitimacy for a
non-governmental
organization like ICANN. They believe that because ICANN is not
itself
a governmental organization, it should build its own
government-like institutional foundations on a global scale. The
argument goes that, since ICANN makes decisions that can be
construed as public policy, the public needs a voice, and that can
best come through world-wide
online elections. Perhaps, but when it comes right down to it,
governments or bodies appointed with government involvement can,
it
seems to me, certainly stake a better claim to truly reflect the
public interest than a few thousands of self-selected voters
scattered
around the world.
I am now persuaded, after considerable reflection, that this
concept
was flawed from the beginning. The notion is noble but deeply
unrealistic, and likely to generate more harm than good. We now
have
three years of very hard effort by a wide variety of people to
arrive
at some workable consensus solution - and there still is none. If
a
blue-ribbon committee - headed ably by a former Prime Minister of
Sweden and United Nations Representative to Bosnia, and populated
by
highly respected and hardworking members - cannot generate a
community
consensus on this subject, it is likely there is no consensus to
be
found.
A very significant portion of the total resources devoted to
ICANN
over the last three years has been spent trying to solve the
tension
between the desire for more government-like representation and
accountability, on the one hand, and a workable, effective and
stable ICANN on the other. It is now time to recognize that
effectiveness in the management and coordination of name and
addressing policies is the
primary objective of ICANN, and that process and representational
values must be served in ways that are compatible with the
primary
objective. To do otherwise is self-defeating; if ICANN is not
effective, it will fail, and all the process and organizational
structure in the world will not save it. A multi-national
governmental substitute for ICANN will not be likely to provide the
kind of process
that some believe is essential for ICANN.
For all these reasons, I have come to the conclusion that the
concept of At Large membership elections from a self-selected pool
of unknown
voters is not just flawed, but fatally flawed, and that continued
devotion of ICANN's very finite energy and resources down this
path
will very likely prevent the creation of an effective and viable
institution. We must find another, more effective path for
appropriate
input into the ICANN process by the general user community that
will
accomplish the key purpose underlying the At Large concept - to
ensure that the broad public interest is effectively reflected and
protected
in the ICANN consensus development process.
I cannot emphasize this point strongly enough: I believe strongly
in ICANN's core values of openness and participation. An ICANN
that is
insulated from input and involvement by individuals across the
global
diversity of the Internet would be a failed ICANN. Though some
will doubtless try to characterize it otherwise, my conclusion
about the unworkability of At Large membership elections is NOT a
criticism of
the concept of participation by individuals. On the contrary, I
believe that a reform of ICANN must result in greater openness,
wider
diversity, and clearer, more meaningful avenues for individual
and
organizational participation.
The endless disputes over the feasibility and desirability of
online elections represent a significant example of how much of
the finite amount of ICANN energy available from a largely
volunteer cadre has
been drained on topics that are almost orthogonal to its key
mission,
but it is not the only one. The reconsideration process is
another,
where precious staff and Board time have been devoted to what are
often clearly frivolous requests. The incipient Independent
Review
Panel has all the hallmarks of adding to this waste. For sure,
ICANN
requires an appropriate attention to process, and there must be
adequate procedures to channel and protect the integrity of that
process, particularly across as diverse a community as the ICANN
process seeks to attract. But in my judgment, the current ICANN
attention to process has gone overboard.
It is time to get our priorities straight, and to reform ICANN's
structure and procedures so that they all assist, rather than
impede,
the achievement of its core mission.
3. Too Little Funding. Finally, the third major problem is
inadequate funding. ICANN began its existence with no guaranteed
funding from any
source - governments or private entities. Indeed, it survived its
initial days only because of loans from public-spirited
businesses
(and the great good fortune that it was launched during the boom,
not
the bust, part of the global business cycle). It survives today on
a
heavily negotiated revenue stream generated from a small number
of very interested intermediaries - who also have major influence
in
establishing the ICANN budget. Perhaps it is not surprising that
ICANN
has been seriously underfunded from its creation.
I believe ICANN is underfunded for the following reasons:
* There is a significant shortfall each year even within current
budgets, because - without agreements in place - ccTLDs do not
bear their appropriate share of the burden. There has been a
$400-500,000 shortfall each year, a number that seems likely to
increase absent a dramatic change in ccTLD attitudes. In
addition, the RIRs, in the absence of any agreements with
ICANN, have yet to contribute (although those funds have been
put in escrow awaiting the completion of the necessary
agreements).
* ICANN has accommodated that shortfall only through not hiring
to
authorized levels, and at the expense of building reserves. The
former means that work is not done effectively; the ICANN
process is dangerously understaffed, and has always been
understaffed. The latter is extremely risky financially, as it
would be for any organization, allowing for no unexpected
expenditures including, for example, litigation expenses.
Experience has taught us that, although it cannot be planned
for precisely, litigation in this area is inevitable, and this
is likely to increase as the complexity of ICANN's tasks
increases.
* Even more importantly, existing budgets would be completely
inadequate even if fully funded. ICANN has little or no backup
of key individuals, making the organization extremely
vulnerable to the loss of those key people. This could lead to
serious instabilities in certain circumstances. Beyond that,
there are too few staff to do a proper job - even while many
current staff are already working unsustainable long hours. A
corollary is that clearly there are too few staff to shoulder
additional responsibilities, such as security, contract
monitoring and compliance, contracting out for network
monitoring services, coordinating IDN policy, etc. And ICANN
has no funds to pay for unanticipated expenses, to engage in
the kind of public communication process that an organization
like ICANN should undertake, or to undertake the costs of root
server operations - just to list a few of the tasks that many
believe an effective ICANN would undertake.
To be effective, ICANN has to have enough of the right kinds of
people
(and support services) to do the tasks required. Because it has
not
had sufficient active participation from critical entities, and
because the conceptual goal has been to fund ICANN at only the
minimal level necessary, it has not had the funds to hire the right
number of people with the right talents. The inevitable result is
that services
cannot aspire to desirable levels and much is postponed or
undone.
This is not to denigrate the efforts of what I regard as an
outstanding ICANN staff - they are all overworked and underhelped
-
the service and support they do provide is enormously impressive
under
the circumstances. But ICANN today cannot do everything it should
do
or in a timely manner.
Perhaps even more importantly, the ICANN process as presently
funded
will never be able to fulfill its intended coordination and
consensus
building tasks, its IANA and other technical tasks, its security
responsibilities, its legal coordination and contract monitoring
tasks, and its management tasks. Furthermore, costs are
increasing
even to pursue its current activities. Overall, the ICANN process
is
understaffed by at least 10-12 fulltime employees, and possibly
more -
depending on what it is expected to accomplish. A fully funded
ICANN
probably requires an operating budget of 300-500% of its current
budget level, plus funding for significant one-time expenditures
if
funding of root name server operators and the establishment of
appropriate reserves are included.
This level of needed funding requires a very different kind of
funding
structure from the one that exists today. My conclusion is that
the funding sources of ICANN must be broadened, and overall
funding must
significantly increase. Today, ICANN depends entirely for its
funding
on the cooperation of those entities who generate revenues from
servicing the names and address space, who essentially serve as
intermediaries between ICANN and the name registrants that are
the
ultimate source of those funds. This is a limited number of
entities,
and thus leaves ICANN overly vulnerable. In addition, it means
that the other participants that are critical for ICANN's success
do not
have an immediate or direct stake in the ICANN budget. All of the
participants in the ICANN process that have the ability to pay a
share
of ICANN funding should do so. With "skin in the game," these
participants will feel a more immediate and direct connection to
the
success of the ICANN process. And this includes governments.
MISSION IMPOSSIBLE?
Without participation by necessary stakeholders, without the
proper
focus on progress and effectiveness over process, and without the
funding necessary to carry out its mission effectively, it is
simply
unrealistic to assume that ICANN will be able to complete the
transition to fully independent private sector administration of
the
DNS and related policy issues. One might then reasonably ask "So
what?" Why not just continue with the status quo?
For this to be a feasible alternative, the status quo must be
sustainable, reflecting as it does an incomplete transition. In
my
opinion, the status quo is not sustainable.
First of all, for the reasons described above, ICANN does not have
the
necessary resources even to continue at the current level of
operations. This is especially true if those inadequate resources
continue to be diverted to matters (like At Large elections) that
are
really not central to ICANN's mission. Today's funding model is
neither adequate nor sustainable.
Second, the current role of the US Government is not consistent
with
long-term global stability. ICANN has attracted considerable
international participation to date, but this gratifying response
has
been founded on a belief that it would shortly result in the
transition of the DNS away from US Government control to an
international policy process, represented by ICANN. ICANN itself
has
been successfully internationalized; there are now only six US
citizens on ICANN's 19-member board. That board (and many in the
ICANN community) is increasingly restive with continued dependency
on unique
US government involvement, and if that is seen as an indefinite
fact
of life, international participation in ICANN will inevitably
diminish. Thus, without a realistic prospect of a successful
transition - and that prospect, in my view, is not realistic with
an
ICANN as it is currently structured and operates - international
support for ICANN will fade. If ICANN comes to be seen (as is
starting to happen in some quarters) as simply a tool of the US
Government, it will no longer have any hope of accomplishing its
original mission. At
that point, at least some (and I believe many) of the current
ICANN
participants (Board, staff and volunteers) may well choose not to
continue in what is, after all, a highly draining and thankless
task.
Third, and potentially most critical, a weak ICANN makes some of
the
Internet's essential infrastructure needlessly vulnerable to
external
threats - fragmentation of the name space, alternate roots,
non-interoperable internationalized domain names, anticompetitive
exercises of market power, and even security threats. Use of
alternate
roots now occurs within tolerable bounds because the community as
a
whole understands the necessity of a single unique name space,
and therefore a single root, and because it prefers to work
within the
ICANN process. A permanently weak ICANN would likely change that
situation, and would certainly encourage even more aggressive
efforts
by entrepreneurs, powerful commercial interests, and perhaps some
governments to put self-centered, short-term advantage over
global
cooperation, universal interconnectivity, and long-term stability.
The
introduction of internationalized characters into the DNS is a
very
difficult issue and in itself could lead to fragmentation of the
Internet with alternate, centrally-controlled roots being
established
in furtherance of real or trumped up nationalistic concerns. As
was clearly shown at ICANN's Security Meeting last November, the
DNS is
today very robust and resilient. Security is taken very seriously,
but ICANN's ability to implement needed improvements (for example,
at the root name server level) is jeopardized by lack of funding
and lack of full participation by critical partners. All of these
are examples of
the kinds of threats that a weak ICANN will find very difficult
to
resist.
Simply put, an ineffective ICANN virtually invites the
fragmentation
of the Internet by those with parochial commercial, cultural, or
political interests into zones that cannot reliably communicate
with
each other - an outcome that would be profoundly negative for the
Internet and would seriously retard its continued growth as a
global medium to support critical commercial and social goals, and
a medium
for communication and expression.
THE NECESSARY REFORM AGENDA
This is a bleak picture, but I believe it is realistic. I do not
have
any historical baggage; I was not there at the creation. I have
nothing to protect from the beginning. But I do have the
responsibility for trying to manage ICANN, and I am accountable
for its actions during my tenure. I am also responsible for making
sure
that the Board and all ICANN stakeholders have a clear picture of
ICANN's successes and failures, and of its future prospects.
Today, its legitimate future prospects are, in my judgment,
non-existent, unless we engage in meaningful reform of ICANN's
structure and operations. Either we need a renewed commitment to
ICANN's original mission, accompanied by a clear focus on the
specific
steps that need to be taken to put ICANN in a position to
accomplish
that mission, or we need to consider whether ICANN should seek to
withdraw in favor of a different global coordination approach.
Just because it is a bleak picture, however, does not mean that
there is nothing we can do to make ICANN work. ICANN's original
mission was
and is both worthwhile and intelligent and, if it can be carried
out
effectively, would redound to the benefit of the entire global
Internet community. We must, however, step up to the reality that
major reform is necessary to make that happen. The problems I
have outlined cannot be solved by tinkering with one aspect of
ICANN or
another, trying to eat the elephant one bite at a time. They
require a
fresh approach.
The reforms I propose will require new thinking and a new
mindset.
They will not appeal to those whose thinking is limited to
self-interest in a narrow sense. They will be embraced, I hope,
by
those who see their self-interest within the broader context of
what
is good for the community as a whole. In what I propose, many will
see
themselves as both "winners" and in some limited sense as
"losers."
But the overall mission and an effective ICANN will be a clear
winner. What is needed today is to reform ICANN, and to do so from
the inside out, beginning with the core mission and crafting a
structure that can
be effective to achieve it, not just one that has the broadest
popularity.
With that as the goal, what is essential to ICANN's
effectiveness?
First, it is intended to manage a global resource, so it must have
a
structure that is consistent with that objective. That means
ICANN
must have an effective, geographically diverse international
managing
body. As has been noted by many members of the community, ICANN's
mission is a public trust. It should therefore be managed by a
Board
of Trustees.
1. The Board of Trustees. ICANN needs an international Board of
Trustees composed of serious, competent people. The ICANN mission
is a
serious responsibility, substituting for international
governmental management of a critical global resource. It requires
high-quality,
dedicated people who are widely perceived by key stakeholders as
competent to guide this public trust. To date, it has been
assumed
that we could find enough such people, beholden to the public
trust and not to special interests, to volunteer for this mission,
and in
large part ICANN has been fortunate that this has so far been the
case. But it is risky to assume this will always be the case,
especially given the vagaries of election processes that can be
captured by special interests.
Thus, we have to have more affirmative ways of seeking out the kind
of
Trustees that are needed. I would propose that 10 of a total of
15
Trustees should be selected At Large. A certain portion of these
At Large Trustees (I would recommend five of the 10) should be
selected
in some way by national governments, in their capacity as stewards
of
the public interest. This would accomplish two objectives: (1) it
would serve the goal of public accountability, and (2) it would
heighten the level of interest and participation by national
governments in ICANN. Governmentally-selected Trustees would be
expected to bring on the Board of Trustees the perspective of the
broad public interest, and are more likely to be effective
advocates
for it, and less likely to be narrow partisans of particular
interests. Compared with other methods of supplying a
publicly-accountable presence on the Board, this solution
conceptually would also be orders of magnitude simpler as an
administrative matter,
and considerably less costly.
I suggest that the five governmentally-selected At Large Trustees
should represent the ICANN five geographic regions. The details
of
that selection process should be left to the governments, although
it
could be imagined that these selections could be made either by
regional governmental organizations or, alternatively, by the
ICANN Governmental Advisory Committee. To avoid conflicts of
interest and anxieties about primary loyalties, I also propose to
retain ICANN's current rule disqualifying governmental employees
with policymaking responsibilities. In other words, I would have
governments choose a
set of non-governmental Trustees to represent the broad public
interest. As representatives of the five ICANN geographic regions,
the
At Large Trustees would advance the goals of both public
accountability and geographic diversity.
The remaining five At Large Trustees should be selected through
an
open and consultative Nominating Committee process. The NomCom
should be composed of both Trustee and non-Trustee members. Its
task would be to identify highly qualified, respected and
knowledgeable leaders with
the essential skill sets and experience, and of diverse
geographical
and functional backgrounds, who are not necessarily or primarily
representatives of interest groups or entities.
Because the ICANN structure should feature direct input to
Trustee
deliberations from those most knowledgeable about the technical
and
policy issues that will come before them, I suggest that the
remaining five Board of Trustee seats should be filled ex officio.
These five Ex
Officio Trustees should include the CEO, the three Chairs of the
Policy Councils described below, and the Chair of the Technical
Advisory Committee. In addition, the Chair of the Government
Advisory
Committee and a person designated by the Internet Architecture
Board
should each be a non-voting ex officio member of the Board, to
ensure
close coordination with those critical bodies.
The current Board, I believe, is somewhat larger than desirable,
and
thus I would reduce the new Board of Trustees to 15 people. Since
the
current terms of the four remaining original directors expire
later
this year, at the same time as the current At Large directors, the
new
Board of Trustees could be smaller than the current Board simply
by
not filling four seats. Terms should be staggered to ensure that
only
1/3 of the Board terms expire in any given year. However,
continuity
is very desirable, and I would propose that At Large Trustees be
allowed to serve up to two consecutive three-year terms, subject
to
renomination and reappointment at the end of the first three-year
term.
Obviously, this proposed Board of Trustees, while still
representative
of the ICANN stakeholder communities, is largely not the product
of elections. This is because the principal objective is to
produce an
effective Board of Trustees, not to allocate seats to interest
groups
or constituencies, or to replicate online the vast array of
governmental institutions needed to assure fair elections. Of
course, it will be critical that all portions of the community feel
that their
interests are understood and given due consideration by the Board
of
Trustees, but that does not mean that the selection process must
inevitably be electoral, in the sense of governmental elections
based
on universal suffrage. As my suggestions for the Policy Councils
described below make clear, a reformed ICANN must be a broadly
participatory body, and it must be organized to facilitate
bottom-up
discussions and ideas. But it must also be something that actually
is
workable, so those discussions and ideas can be translated into
actions when needed. To me, this means that the selection of
Trustees
should be based on individual credentials and skills and the
willingness and ability to contribute, and not on personal
popularity,
interest group agendas, or the ability to recruit a small but
sufficient number of self-selecting voters.
2. Staffing and Funding. Even a very active, engaged Board will not
be intimately involved in day to day activities. And there are many
such
activities, ranging from the IANA functions to technical services
to
contract administration to public information and education, in
addition to policy development and general administration. An
effective ICANN, like any other business entity, would first
catalogue
the tasks that are necessary or desirable, calculate the cost of
hiring the people and providing the resources necessary to
carrying
out those tasks in a timely and effective way, and then generate
a funding structure that provides the necessary funds to meet
those
needs. In other words, funding should be driven by needs, not by
the
desires of individual participants. While there is certainly merit
in
generating input from all affected entities, it is unworkable to
provide everyone subject to ICANN policy processes with an
effective
veto on the funding necessary to carry out the ICANN mission.
The current funding process is yet another derivative from the
notion
that, as a purely private entity, ICANN should depend on the
consent
of those subject to its policy control. This had its conceptual
deficiencies at the time ICANN was first created, and practice
has proved those concerns valid. Clearly, not all those who
should be
involved in the ICANN process have had an interest in fully
funding
ICANN operations.
Thus, the Board of Trustees and ICANN staff should be responsible
for producing the budget, with a fully transparent process for
input from
the ICANN community. The accountability that was the goal of the
original process can be provided by an open budget development
and
explanation process, and by the participation of the At Large
Trustees
in those decisions.
In order to both broaden the funding base, and generate the level
of
funds needed, ICANN should combine core funding (generated from
governments and those entities that enter into agreements with
ICANN) and fee-based funding (generated from those other entities
that either participate in the ICANN policy development process or
utilize various
ICANN services).
3. Policy Development Structure. It is unnecessary for all Trustees
to be intimately knowledgeable about the technical aspects of the
issues
they will address. After all, they are not writing code or
creating protocols, but rather are charged with making policy and
management decisions. They do, however, need to have access to,
and input from,
technically qualified people and entities.
The current ICANN concept is based on the notion of "bottom-up"
policy
development, with the Supporting Organizations responsible for
the
development of policy and the Board theoretically just the
implementing device for those policies. In hindsight, the notion
of
truly "bottom-up" consensus decision-making simply has not proven
workable, partly because the process is too exposed to capture by
special interests and partly because ICANN relies entirely on
volunteers to do all the work. Furthermore, those who are affected
by policy decisions should have a clear role in generating the
record on
which those policy decisions are based and in providing
thoughtful
advice to the Board of Trustees.
This analysis leads me to suggest the replacement of the current
Supporting Organizations with several Policy Councils. These
would
include an Address and Numbering Policy Council, a Generic TLD
Names Policy Council, and a Geographic TLD Names Policy Council.
In order
for them to be most effective, each of these Councils should be
supported by the appropriate staff, and should be managed by a
Steering Committee made up of some ex officio seats (for
representatives of various categories of entities) and some
persons
nominated through the NomCom process described above, and confirmed
by
the Board of Trustees. In addition, the Governmental Advisory
Committee would continue, and a new Technical Advisory Committee
would
be created. The current Root Server System Advisory Committee
would continue as the Root Name Server Operations Committee.
Finally, the
newly formed Security Committee would continue to have
responsibility
for advice and coordination in its critical area.
In the interest of creating both a broader base of funding and
encouraging full and active participation by critical
stakeholders,
full participation in the Policy Councils and Advisory Committees
should be linked where appropriate to participation in ICANN
funding. For example, only those registries and registrars that
have agreements with ICANN should be eligible for full membership
in a Policy Council,
including having representatives sit on the Steering Committees.
It
may also be appropriate for similar conditions to apply to other
participants in the Policy Councils as well. In addition, we
should explicitly and permanently abandon the notion that every
individual with an interest in DNS policy has some "right" to
equally weighted
participation in ICANN, no matter what the impact on ICANN's
effectiveness. This conclusion is driven by a focus on the core
ICANN
mission of effective management of global name and address
policies.
The general public should have a right to an effective notice and
comment process, to give input before major decisions are made, and
to
observe the policy-making process, but we have seen that
unlimited
"rights" to full and equal participation by every individual who
finds
this area interesting are not consistent with an effective ICANN.
Thus, while membership in the Policy Councils should be tilted
toward expert talent and directly affected stakeholders, each
Council should
be open in some fashion to the participation and contributions of
interested individuals and organizations.
To achieve that, I propose a reformulation of the constituency
concept. In order to help generate participation, facilitate
meaningful deliberation, and structure input, the currently
existing
DNSO constituencies would be invited to reconfigure themselves
and continue as self-organized, cross-Council Forums within
ICANN. The
Forums could then participate in each of the Councils, offering
input, developing and evaluating proposals, and advocating on
behalf of their
members, as they see fit. For example, the ISP Forum would be a
channel for its members to formulate and give input about gTLD,
ccTLD,
and addressing policy issues, and would be a venue for input to
the Nominating Committee. The Forums would be expected to
re-orient away from debates over procedure and toward
deliberations on substantive
DNS policy matters. As it currently the case, some Forums would be
by
definition limited to members defined by the existence of a
contractual relationship with ICANN (i.e., the gTLD registries,
ccTLD registries, and gTLD registrars), while others would be more
open and
defined by function (i.e., ISPs, business, non-commercial, and
intellectual property constituencies). New Forums could be created
as
well; by eliminating the current concept of mathematically equal
representation for each Forum on the Names Council, ICANN could
more
readily develop and implement well-defined criteria for recognition
of
new self-organized Forums (for example, we might imagine Forums
for university and academic networks, individuals, small business
users,
backbone providers, etc.) without encountering resistance from
existing Forums due to a feared dilution of influence.
Let me say a few words about how I think the concept of an At
Large
organization fits into this reformed ICANN structure. The At
Large Study Committee's Final Report contains a range of
well-developed
suggestions and good thinking about how an At Large organization
could
be structured to help ICANN increase meaningful substantive
participation from individual Internet users around the world.
Working from the current ICANN terminology, the ALSC labelled this
an At Large Supporting Organization. I fully agree with the ALSC
that ICANN would
benefit greatly from an At Large organization that could conduct
outreach, foster deliberation, and attract new ideas and voices to
the
ICANN process. I believe that a reformed ICANN should include
this kind of At Large entity, designed to connect individuals in
a very
open and direct way to the ICANN process. In further dialogue with
the
ALSC and the community, I hope to explore how their concept of an
At
Large organization can best fit into a reformed ICANN.
4. Transparency and Process. As already mentioned, ICANN is today
being strangled by process. Process has been allowed to become
the
predominant value in ICANN decision-making. The DNS management
system that Jon Postel operated so effectively in the past had no
definitive
obligation to particular processes, and it certainly was not
transparent - but it worked! We cannot recreate Jon Postel or his
processes, and indeed they would probably not work well today. But
to
achieve a reformed ICANN, we do need to start from the inside out
-
with the goal of effectiveness - rather than from the outside in.
Once
we identify a workable structure, process and transparency can be
achieved in a manner compatible with that primary objective.
This does not suggest a secretive and opaque organization. In fact,
an
effective ICANN must be very transparent, and certainly will need
to have available open processes to ensure that all relevant
inputs are
considered and that policy decisions in fact contribute to the
objective of a stable and effective DNS. Central to the ICANN
experiment - and integral to its successes thus far - have been
core
values of openness and broad participation. I believe strongly in
those values, and aim to strengthen them in a reformed ICANN.
ICANN
can and should do much better in achieving transparency, enabling
meaningful participation, and reaching out to involve the global
diversity of the Internet. Likewise, I believe strongly that
ICANN
needs an intelligent framework of meaningful checks and balances,
but
I believe we can do much better than the existing ICANN
structure.
There are certain key principles that I suggest are critical to a
reformed (and successful) ICANN: (1) the Board of Trustees must
be
able to make policy decisions, not simply ratify or reject those
proposed by subordinate bodies; (2) the Trustees must have the
ability
to deliberate in private; and (3) with a properly funded and
independent Ombudsman in place, there is neither a need or
justification for some independent review mechanism process that
creates a "super-Board" for some purposes. This implies that:
A. The Policy Councils should clearly be identified as advisory
bodies, and their advice to the Board of Trustees should be given
strong weight based on its persuasive merits, but not presumptive
validity. Experience shows that the DNSO, the only Supporting
Organization with more than four members, has been only
marginally effective in generating policy decisions, or even in
giving policy advice. In part, this results from a lack of
full-time staff, which places the entire burden of policy
development on the hardworking volunteers who must try to advance
policy proposals through the DNSO's complex and noisy crowd of
working groups, constituencies, and the Names Council. In a
reformed ICANN, the Policy Councils should be appropriately
staffed. But in part the characteristic gridlock in the DNSO is a
function of the inevitable difficulty of consensus development
among parties with self-interested but conflicting goals. This
difficulty has been aggravated by the notion of presumptive
validity, which has freed the Supporting Organizations from the
discipline of having to develop persuasively supported
recommendations. I do not subscribe to the proposition that a
lack of consensus means that there should be no action; this may
be the case on any given issue, but it certainly is not a
universal truth. To be effective, the ICANN Board of Trustees has
to be clearly empowered to make decisions even if there is no
clear consensus, to the extent they see it necessary to carry out
the ICANN mission.
This does not mean that the ICANN Board of Trustees should be
able simply to ignore advice from its Policy Councils. For
starters, the composition of the Board of Trustees, with its Ex
Officio Trustees including the Chairs (or their designees) of
each Policy Council, suggests that is not very likely in any
event. The Board of Trustees should be required to carefully
consider any recommendations from its Policy Councils, and to
clearly set forth its reasons in the event it chooses to not
accept those recommendations. The Board of Trustees should be
required to give timely advance public notice of all matters it
considers, and to publish in a timely manner full and complete
minutes of its meetings. In other words, the Board of Trustees
should act appropriately to a body entrusted with a global
responsibility - openly and transparently, but also effectively.
B. The very expensive and time-consuming quarterly meetings held
at locations around the globe are neither necessary nor
desirable. The current Board has already reduced the number of
such meetings to three for this year, and I believe that there
should only be two such meetings each year. Of course, the Board
of Trustees, to be effective, must meet more often than two or
even four times a year, as the ICANN Board currently does, with
most meetings telephonic. In addition, the Trustees must be able
to discuss matters in private, as the current Board does today -
by telephone, by personal discussions, by email and otherwise. In
fact, the only Board meetings that are public today are the
quarterly meetings, and the picture of the ICANN Board up on a
dais in a public auditorium contributes nothing to the goal of
effective management of DNS policy.
These geographically scattered Board meetings have had some value
to the local Internet community, frequently increasing its
profile in the broader community in a beneficial way, and thus I
would not eliminate them entirely, although it would be nice to
find ways to accomplish that end without the substantial cost of
the entire traveling road show. The direct costs to ICANN of
these meetings are significant; the indirect costs to all the
participants are enormous; and it is not clear that the benefits
balance off the costs. On balance, I would do these twice a year.
They may well need to be structured differently, having a flavor
of ICANN conferences, rather than ICANN meetings, perhaps with
predominant themes (similar to last year's successful security
theme at the November meeting). Outreach can also be strengthened
by groups of Trustees and staff participating in more regional
meetings or holding mini-ICANN briefings and input sessions
around the world. It seems perfectly reasonable to specify that a
group of ICANN Trustees will hold at least one open session in
each geographic region each year, ideally at an existing major
Internet meeting or conference.
C. Finally, the current panoply of artificial accountability
mechanisms should be replaced with a Manager of Public
Participation (to ensure effective mechanisms for public
awareness and comments on ICANN matters) and an Ombudsman
function that is fully staffed and funded to respond to
complaints and requests for reconsideration. This function would
replace the current reconsideration process and the still to be
created Independent Review Panel.
There should be a reconsideration process, but I believe that all
final decisions must rest with the ICANN Board of Trustees. A
reconsideration process is certainly appropriate for staff
decisions; after all, in a properly funded and staffed ICANN, the
staff will carry out all day-to-day operations, and thus it is
appropriate that there be some formal mechanism for those
affected by staff actions to ask the Board of Trustees to review
those specific actions. In addition, there seems no objection,
and some potential benefit, to allow affected parties to ask the
Board of Trustees to reconsider a particular Board decision.
After all, the reconsideration request can speak directly to the
rationale for the action as articulated by the Board of Trustees,
and it is certainly possible that a second look may produce a
different decision.
The Ombudsman process can allow for a fast track process to short
circuit any reconsideration requests that are clearly frivolous.
Conversely, an Ombudsman could request a stay of further activity
relevant to any reconsideration request where there may be merit
and continuing activity could cause irreparable or serious harm
if the request were upheld.
There is no justification, however, and no necessity, for any
process that would allow some other body, such as the nascent
Independent Review Panel, made up of non-Trustees, to override a
Board of Trustees decision. There is no assurance that body would
always act appropriately, and thus it is likely we would
eventually hear calls to review the IRP decisions in some way.
The Board of Trustees will obviously be subject to relevant legal
constraints, but apart from that, for ICANN to function
effectively there should be a clear and final decisional
authority. That should be the Board of Trustees.
CONCLUSION
For all the reasons described above, if we stay on our current
course
the ICANN experiment is likely to fail. But properly reformed, I
am
convinced it can succeed.
The ICANN process depends on volunteers to do its work, and those
volunteers are driven by a goal - an effective private sector
policy development body that coordinates an important global
resource. Once
it becomes clear that this goal is unattainable, those volunteers
will
lose their incentive and disappear. Funding is adequate only for
the most limited efforts in spite of extraordinary staff
dedication, and many important issues are delayed or inadequately
pursued. Many have criticized the quality and quantity of ICANN's
output (at times with
some justification, at times unfairly) but in truth it is a small
miracle that there have been no truly major disasters. Much has
been
accomplished with few resources, but there is much left undone or
delayed for lack of people to work on all the problems.
There are many difficult and troublesome issues that require
attention, in addition to those described above, including data
escrow
practices, name transfer policies, and new TLD evaluation. These
are
not getting done adequately or at all, or are being done behind
schedule, because there simply are too few human and financial
resources trying to accomplish too much. We do not have the
resources to enter into the optimal arrangements with root server
operators, and
to absorb the capital and operating costs of those operations.
There
could be no At Large elections without outside major funding,
because
there is no internal funding for that job, and even with external
funding there would be a serious drain on ICANN's
thinly-stretched staff resources. Many of those with the
strongest commitment to a
private sector and international approach have become - or give
strong
indications of becoming - less and less involved as they perceive
progress increasingly strangled by the coils of process.
As the lack of an achievable and worthwhile goal becomes more
apparent, people will simply stop trying, and the ICANN
experiment
will collapse. There will be no incentive for new sources of energy
to
emerge, since there will be no point to it. Equally importantly,
the
governments of the world will conclude (as some may already be
thinking) that the private sector effort has failed and thus will
seek
another, more heavy-handed solution. And the private sector, that
depends so much on the stable operation of this critical
resource, will swallow hard and accept a completely governmental
solution if
that is the only solution available to guarantee the stable
operation
of the Internet.
Therefore, those of us who believe in a predominantly private
solution must reform ICANN into a true public-private partnership
if we want it
to succeed. We must do this if we are to succeed in capturing the
agility and strength of private sector management with the ability
of governments to represent the public interest. This is a real
change in
the form of the original ICANN concept, but not in the substance
of
its mission. It is grounded in the reality of our three years of
actual experience. The original ICANN was conceived by many as an
experiment based on theory and hope; the new, reformed ICANN must
be
an effective mechanism for global coordination based on practical
and
workable approaches informed by real life experience.
Attached to this report is my suggestion as to how ICANN could be
reformed to become a truly effective public-private partnership
that
can carry out its global coordination responsibilities. I welcome
the
dialogue that I hope it will generate.
M. Stuart Lynn
_________________________________________________________________
A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM OF ICANN
The following summarizes how ICANN could be reformed to both be
an
effective global coordination body and meet legitimate goals of
transparency and accountability. This outline assumes that the
necessary reforms require more of a public-private partnership
than
was originally envisioned three years ago, that public
accountability
needs to be assured in a more practical way than in the current
structure, and that there needs to be a broader and stronger
funding
base than exists today.
This outline sets forth one approach to solving these problems,
and reforming ICANN into a more efficient, more effective entity,
while
retaining appropriate public input and accountability. It is
intended
to begin a dialogue within the ICANN community about the changes
required if ICANN is ever to accomplish its mission. It is
offered
with the caveat that we do not have time for an extended debate;
ICANN will, in my opinion, either be reformed or irrelevant within
the next
several months.
I. STRUCTURE
A. 15 member Board of Trustees
1. Ten At Large Trustees
a. Five (one from each ICANN geographic region) nominated by
governments (process to be determined) and confirmed by the Board
of Trustees
b. Five nominated by open nominating process and confirmed by the
Board of Trustees
(i) Nominating Committee made up of: (a) non-voting Chair,
appointed by ICANN CEO after wide consultation; (b) three
Trustees whose terms are not expiring; and (c) four other persons
selected by the Board of Trustees, after wide consultation.
(ii) Nominations process open to all suggestions and inputs,
widely publicized, with adequate time to do thorough work. The
Nominating Committee is expected to consult with a broad range of
the ICANN communities for input to its deliberations.
(iii) To assure open communications and substantive input from
all major stakeholders, there will be at least the following
non-voting liaisons to the Nominating Committee: designees or
representatives of IAB, IP address registries, domain name
registries and registrars, root name server operators, and the
immediately preceding chair of the Nominating Committee.
(iv) Nominating Committee makes nominations based on well-defined
criteria, clearly stated in advance for each position:
outstanding professional accomplishment, technical understanding,
record of leadership, reputation for good judgment, record of
public service, independence and willingness to commit time and
effort; all with due regard for geographic diversity and
differentiated experience objectives.
(v) When making nominations to a particular Council, the
Nominating Committee will consult widely with the most affected
stakeholder communities. For example, in making nominations for
the Address and Numbering Steering Group, the Nominating
Committee will consult with the IAB, RIR Boards and staff, and
ISPs.
2. Five Ex Officio Trustees
a. CEO
b. Chairs (or designees) of Policy Councils (Address and
Numbering Policy Council, Generic TLD Names Policy Council,
Geographic TLD Names Policy Council) and Technical Advisory
Committee
3. Designee of the Internet Architecture Board and Chair of
Governmental Advisory Committee serve as non-voting liaisons to
Board of Trustees
4. All Trustees (except ex officio) to serve staggered three-year
terms; maximum service two terms
B. Three Policy Councils and Two Standing Advisory Committees
[The Policy Councils would be responsible for discussion about,
and development of proposals concerning, issues falling within
their area of expertise. Each Council would have a Steering
Group, but would be open to and encourage participation by
interested stakeholders, directly and through organized Forums
(see D below). The Advisory Committees would provide advice to
the ICANN Board of Trustees from their particular perspective.
The Policy Councils and Advisory Committees would each have
dedicated staff and access to the ICANN resources necessary to
allow them to function effectively. In addition to publication on
the ICANN website, Council recommendations would be circulated to
each of the other Policy Councils, the Technical and Governmental
Advisory Committees, the Security Committee and the Ombudsman
(who would be responsible for soliciting, receiving and
organizing public comments related to each such recommendation)
for their review and reaction prior to action by the Board of
Trustees. Council recommendations would be entitled to great
weight before the Board of Trustees, and the Board would be
required to explain any decision not to accept the recommendation
of a Council, but the Board of Trustees would have the discretion
to accept or reject all or any part of a Council recommendation
with an appropriate explanation.]
1. Address and Numbering Policy Council
a. Open to organizations that utilize ICANN to perform protocol
number assignment and/or allocation of IP addresses, and other
organizations interested in issues relating to those issues
b. Managed by Steering Group of seven members appointed by the
Board of Trustees - four ex officio [designee of the IETF Chair
and designees of RIRs that have formal agreements with ICANN],
and three other persons nominated through NomCom process and
confirmed by the Board. Upon recognition of a new RIR, it would
be entitled to name an ex officio member of the Steering Group,
which will increase in size to accommodate that addition. At any
time where the Steering Group consists of an even number of
people, the Chair will vote only to break ties.
c. Consider funding mechanism for those Council participants (not
including IETF) that do not have agreements with ICANN, perhaps
tiered to size and ability to pay
d. Chair elected by Steering Group, and holds ex officio seat on
ICANN Board of Trustees
[The ANPC would essentially combine the functions of the current
PSO and ASO into a single body, with appropriate staff support
and a single Steering Group. The ANPC would have responsibility
for advising the Board on the very limited range of policy issues
relating to IP address allocation, and any policy or operational
issues that areise in connection with ICANN's performance of the
IANA protocol numbering functions.]
2. Generic TLD Names Policy Council
a. Made up of organizations interested in name policy issues
related to gTLDs
b. Managed by Steering Group of eleven members appointed by the
Board of Trustees - six ex officio [one representative of gTLD
registries and one representative of gTLD registrars (each chosen
by those respective entities that have agreements with ICANN);
one representative of large commercial users, one representative
of small commercial users, one representative of non-commercial
users, and one representative of individual users (each chosen by
those entities in each category that are full participants in the
Policy Council or through NomCom process)], and five other
persons nominated through NomCom process and confirmed by Board)
c. Consider funding mechanism for those Council participants that
do not have agreements with ICANN, perhaps tiered to size and
ability to pay. Consider whether ex officio user representatives
should be chosen from among those participating in ICANN funding.
d. Chair elected by Steering Group, and holds ex officio seat on
ICANN Board of Trustees
[The GNPC would replace the current DNSO, again with appropriate
staff and with a Steering Group partly representing stakeholder
groups and partially selected by the Board of Trustees.]
3. Geographic TLD Names Policy Council
a. Made up of ccTLD organizations and other organizations
interested in policy issues related to this topic
b. Managed by Steering Group of nine members appointed by the
Board of Trustees - five ex officio [one representative of ccTLD
registries from each ICANN region, chosen from among those that
have existing agreements with ICANN], and four other persons
nominated through NomCom process and confirmed by Board
c. Consider funding mechanism for those participants that do not
have agreements with ICANN, perhaps tiered to recognize size and
ability to pay.
d. Chair elected by Steering Group, and holds ex officio seat on
ICANN Board of Trustees
[The ccNPC would be a new entity, intended to provide both policy
advice to the Board of Trustees where needed and to serve as a
service and policy advisory body to the 243 ccTLDs. It would have
appropriate staff support, and a Steering Group made up of both
ccTLD representatives and other persons with relevant knowledge
or experience that could contribute to these objectives.]
4. Governmental Advisory Committee
a. Made up of representatives of national governments,
multinational treaty organizations and distinct economies that
contribute to ICANN funding
b. Funding mechanism tiered to recognize size and ability to pay,
but only those contributing to ICANN (plus developing countries
whose contribution is waived because of inability to pay) could
be full voting participants; non-contributors could have observer
status
c. Responsible for providing advice to ICANN Board concerning
issues of governmental concern; input provided by Chair's
participation on ICANN Board of Trustees, and by Annual Report of
GAC to ICANN Board setting forth areas or issues that GAC
suggests require priority attention by ICANN
d. Chair elected by voting members, and holds ex officio seat on
ICANN Board of Trustees
[The GAC should continue to be a forum for governments to discuss
DNS policy issues, but should have appropriate staff support, and
full membership should require a funding contribution per some
tiered schedule (requiring little or no contribution from less
developed nations). The GAC Chair would serve as an ex officio
liaison to the ICANN Board of Trustees.]
5. Technical Advisory Committee
a. Made up of individuals with direct experience with or
responsibility for technical issues relating to ICANN's
activities
b. Committee would consist of seven members, four ex officio [one
designee of IAB, one designee of RIRs, one designee of root name
server operators and one designee from among the domain name
registries/registrars] and three other persons selected through
the NomCom process (which could be drawn from representatives of
various other groups, such ETSI, ITU, W3C, etc).
c. The TAC will advise the ICANN Board and staff on technical and
operational issues relating to ICANN's activities. Unlike the
Policy Councils, the TAC's role will be purely advisory, without
the obligation to develop global policies. It will offer
technical and operational advice when asked, but will not be
expected to undertake independent policy development on its own
initiative.
d. Chair elected by Committee, and holds ex officio seat on ICANN
Board of Trustees
[The TAC will advise the ICANN Board and staff on the technical
aspects of ICANN's operational responsibilities. For example, the
TAC would be the body to provide advice on testing the use of
shared addresses for the root name servers, or for testing the
ability to deploy internationalized TLDs in the root zone file.]
C. Security Committee
1. Made up of no more than 20 persons appointed by the Board of
Trustees with appropriate background experience and expertise,
including an ex officio participant from the GAC
2. Initial Chair appointed by Board; subsequent Chairs elected by
members
3. Responsible for coordinating ICANN activities related to all
aspects of security of the Internet's naming, numbering, and
address allocation systems
D. Root Name Server Operations Committee
1. Continuation of current Root Server System Advisory Committee,
consisting of each root name server operator plus experts invited
by the Committee
2. Chair appointed by Board of Trustees. Chair (or his/her
designee) sits ex officio on the Technical Advisory Committee and
Security Committee.
3. Responsible for coordinating ICANN activities related to the
operation, functioning, and evolution of the DNS root name server
system.
E. Forums
[In order to help generate participation, facilitate meaningful
deliberation, and structure input, I propose a reformulation of
the existing constituency concept. The currently existing DNSO
constituencies would be invited to continue as self-organized,
cross-Council Forums within ICANN. The Forums could then
participate in each of the Councils, offering input, developing
and evaluating proposals, and advocating on behalf of their
members, as they see fit. For example, the ISP Forum would be a
channel for its members to formulate and give input about gTLD,
ccTLD, and addressing policy issues, and would be a venue for
input to the Nominating Committee. The Forums would be expected
to re-orient away from debates over procedure and toward
deliberations on substantive DNS policy matters. As it currently
the case, some Forums would by definition be limited to members
defined by the existence of a contractual relationship with ICANN
(e.g., the gTLD registries, ccTLD registries, and gTLD
registrars), while others would be more open and defined by
function (e.g., the ISPs, business, non-commercial, and
intellectual property constituencies). New Forums could be
created as well. For example, an At Large organization based on
regional entities, as proposed by the At Large Study Committee,
could be organized for individuals. By eliminating the current
concept of mathematically equal representation for each
constituency on the DNSO Names Council, ICANN could more readily
develop and implement well-defined minimal criteria for
recognition of new self-organized Forums (for example, we might
imagine Forums for universities and academic networks,
individuals, small business users, backbone providers, etc.)
without encountering resistance from existing Forums due to a
feared dilution of influence. This would significantly reduce the
barriers to participation in policy discussions and deliberations
by groups with common interests and objectives.]
II. FUNDING
[This structure is designed to broaden and regularize the ICANN
funding structure. It differentiates between core funding -
funding
for those tasks that are integral to the ICANN mission and benefit
the
global Internet user community generally - and fee-based funding
-
reimbursement for the fully allocated costs of providing various
services to entities that do not participate in the core funding
process. Funding could be bundled into agreements (so that
entities
with which ICANN had an agreement would pay a single annual amount
to cover both core funding support and all service requirements) or
could be collected in various ways from entities that do not have
agreements with ICANN. For example, since it would conflict with
ICANN's mission
to refuse IANA or other necessary services, those ccTLDs that
choose not to enter into agreements with ICANN should pay a
service fee for IANA and any other services they utilize that
includes an allocation
for overhead and a share of the core funding requirements. In
addition, consideration should be given to creating some form of
participation fee for those entities that do not have agreements
with
ICANN but do fully participate in the policy development process
by
those entities (e.g., large commercial users, etc.).]
A. Funding Requirements: Funding requirements are divided into
two parts
1. Core Funding Requirements: covers "public good" costs,
including funding the root name server operators on a contracted
basis, and all associated overhead costs. This includes funding
for * Management and Administration * Office of the Ombudsman *
Outreach and Public Information * Support for Board of Trustees *
Staff support for Board, Policy Councils and Standing Committees
* Policy Development * Planning * Conferences * Funding for Root
Name Server Operators
2. Service Funding Requirements: includes funding for IANA
services, gTLD licensing, contract monitoring, compliance;
derived from fees for services
B. Recovery
1. Core Funding is recovered from all entities with which ICANN
has agreements (registries and registrars), from governments (see
section on GAC), and possibly from others that participate in
Policy Councils (except the IETF). Core funding costs are
allocated according to some appropriate metric, such as GDP for
participating governments and revenues for other entities
a. Funding is tiered (similar to current mode of allocating fair
shares to ccTLDs)
2. Service Fee Funding is recovered through charging fees for
services. These may either be bundled (into agreements for those
with agreements with ICANN) or unbundled (i.e., charged on a fee
for service basis).
3. Budget is developed by President/CEO with input from Policy
Councils and Advisory Committees, and approval by Board of
Trustees.
C. Summary of Principles
1. Bundled Fees
a. Services to entities with whom ICANN has a signed agreement
should be bundled into the agreement; i.e., funding commitments
under agreements would include all ICANN services
2. Unbundled Fees
a. Fee schedules would be created for all services offered to
those entities that do not have agreements with ICANN that cover
the costs associated with delivery of those services, including
an appropriate share of overhead allocation.
3. Tiering Concept
a. Where feasible, tiering concepts should be used in
establishing core funding levels, service fees, etc (similar to
what is currently used for ccTLDs). An appropriate metric for
proportionality should be used.
b. Services to TLDs in the lowest layer should be free to the
extent practicable
4. Pass-Through Funding
a. ICANN's practice should be to contract out for services where
this makes sense, such as for root name server operations.
5. Protocol Numbering Services
a. No fees will be charged to the IETF for the IANA protocol
numbering functions.
D. Levels of Funding
[The following estimates are based on broad assumptions about
efficient and effective operation. While they rest to some extent
on experience, the only certainty from that is that the current
funding structure is woefully inadequate to provide for the
services and other responsibilities contemplated for ICANN. Thus,
these estimates should be considered to be order of magnitude,
not precise estimates.]
1. "Public Good" and Overhead (~US$8-10 million)
2. Funding of Root Name Server Operations At Current Levels
(~US$10 million)
3. Funding to Support IANA services and other service functions
(~US$2-3 million)
4. Funding for establishment of reserves, built up over three
years (~ US$10 million)
III. TRANSPARENCY AND PROCESS
A. Ombudsman
1. Person of unassailable credentials appointed by Board of
Trustees
2. Responsible for receiving and processing complaints, requests
for reconsideration or objections to ICANN staff action, and to
bring any recommendations directly to the Board. Able to solicit
all necessary information and data needed to evaluate and make
recommendations relating to any complaints, disputes, and
requests for reconsideration.
3. Provided with support staff and other resources necessary to
carry out responsibilities effectively
4. Direct access to the Board to communicate findings and
recommendations when required; authority to post reports on ICANN
website as appropriate.
B. Manager of Public Participation
1. Would collect and report to the Board and the community on any
public comments or complaints received dealing with matters put
out for public comment or actions taken by the Board of Trustees,
staff or subsidiary bodies.
2. Responsible for managing all ICANN public forums, public
e-mail lists, etc. Provided necessary electronic access to
publicize findings and recommendations, all of which will be
available to the public
3. Provided with support staff and other resources necessary to
carry out responsibilities effectively
C. Continued Obligation to Be Transparent with Respect to all
Actions and Decisions
1. Notice and comment obligations for all Board decisions,
proposed policy advice and other actions by Policy Steering
Committees, and other relevant events
2. Requirement for prompt posting of minutes of all meetings of
Board and Steering Groups
___________________________________________________________________
___
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