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BND, CIA und Kosevettermichel

Statt "Internet im Bayernland" titelte die SZ den Leitartikel am 14.05
"Geheimdienst im Niemandsland". Dr. Waldemar Markwardt, Bad Wiessee,
schrieb u.a. dazu auf der der SZ-Laesterbriefseite am 29.05. unter
"Geheimdienst fuer verdiente Parteigenossen":

"Dem Buerger wird (nicht) vermittelt, dass Geheimdienste ein Teil unserer
freiheitlichen rechtsstaatlichen Ordnung sind...vor allem solides
Fachwissen gefragt ist. Statt dessen nutzen die Parteien die Geheimdienste,
speziell den BND, als personelles Versorgungsfeld fuer ihre Parteigaenger,
die man - streng nach Proporz - auf hochdotierte Dienstposten setzt. Die
sog. Entscheidungsebene, die die jeweiligen Praesidenten zu beraten hat,
ist weitgehend bar jeglichen geheimdienstlichen Fachwissens."

Soweit zur Lage InduLa.
Nun zu den USA.
>Subject: McGehee zu Indien
>Date: Wed, 3 Jun 1998 00:04:27 -0000
>From: Ralph McGehee <rmcgehee@igc.org>
>To: infowar@infowar.com
>Subject: Defending the CIA
>                Defending the CIA re India
>   The CIA's counterproliferation personnel responsible for monitoring the
>India's nuclear sites may not have had the all-source material that would
>have helped alert them to the tests.
>   Indications of the probability of the tests were in the election
>platform of the recently elected government proclaiming its intention to
>make India a nuclear power -- were the analysts told this? At least one
>open source the newspaper Chardi Kala International three days before the
>tests wrote: "Preparations for an Indian nuclear test have been further
>confirmed...who report all kinds of feverish nighttime activity in the
>vicinity of Pokharan in Rajasthan state..."  Were the counterproliferation
>personnel made aware on a timely bases of the outcome of contracts between
>the U.S. and Indian officials?  Was the intelligence product of Indian
>agents passed quickly to the analysts? Were the analysts allowed to task
>those agents?
>   In my day the product from agents was passed from the Directorate of
>Operations to the Directorate of Intelligence after considerable
>time and obfuscation of the source and source access. Did the
>counterproliferation analysts possess the authority to generate instant
>agent requirements based on their satellit observations? Were the analysts
>able to determine the probability of reliability of any information based
>on the source access? Did the analysts have access to the search machines
>of the Internet?
>   I pose these questions to make the point that the United States needs
>and all-source analytical division to review all the available material
>make specific intelligence reports and monitoring recommendations.
>   We have entered a new world of information availability yet it seems
>that the elements of the CIA are determined to return to the past with
>agent recruitment's, more covert operations, etc.  The Chairman of the
>House Intelligence Committee, Representative Peter Goss, proclaimed that
>the failure re India's nuclear blasts exposes the need for more money,
>agents, and more operations. This observation ignores the reality that
>during the Cold War the major target was the USSR and in that case the CIA
>failed to predict the downfall of that entity. More was not better, more
>apparently was a prescription for failure. The same might be said for the
>Vietnam war and many other situations.
>   I suggest a tightly-constructed all-source center manned at the top by
>those possessing the highest clearances and proven analytical ability,
>where all information flows in for evaluation, instant requirements sent
>out, and a constant interchange between the working analysts, and other
>elements of the intelligence community.
>   I further suggest that the all-source center utilize open sources.We
>have in the Agency's history of mistakes made by refusing to use open
>sources -- the writings of Mao and Ho (and captured VC documents) the
>writings and audio tapes of Ayatollah Khomeni; and, in an earlier period,
>the book of Adolph Hitler.
>   On the bureaucratic and political front there is the considerable
>problem of what to do with current personnel and procedures. One solution
>might be to create the All-Source Center and as it succeeds,let the less
>productive elements wither away.
>   Instant communications, Internet, with the ability to catalog and
>for multi-sources, and other technological advances have created a new
>reality. Shall intelligence stay in the horse and buggy era or move into
>the 21st Century?
>Ralph McGehee

So daemlich kann doch nicht mal ein bayerischer Richter sein. Wenn doch,
dann sollten wir den Laden hier zu machen, die Auslaender nach Hause
schicken, die Staedte aufloesen und wieder auf die Baeume klettern.
                       (muenchner Webmistress zum Prozess gegen Felix Somm)