US crypto products dominate global market == national security

[Thomas Roessler <roessler@guug.de>]

Siehe Punkt 3.

----- Forwarded message from Donald Ramsbottom <donald@ramsbottom.co.uk> -----

Date: Wed, 28 Jul 1999 08:58:58 +0100
To: ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk
From: Donald Ramsbottom <donald@ramsbottom.co.uk>
Subject: SAFE

In the latest of reports on SAFE, Congress has made the following findings
of "Fact":

>The Congress finds the following:                                      
>
>    (1) Information security technology, encryption, is--                  
>
>       (A) fundamental to secure the flow of intelligence information to   
>   national policy makers;                                                 
>       (B) critical to the President and national command authority of the 
>   United States;                                                          
>       (C) necessary to the Secretary of State for the development and     
>   execution of the foreign policy of the United States;                   
>       (D) essential to the Secretary of Defense's responsibilities to     
>   ensure the effectiveness of the Armed Forces of the United States;      
>       (E) invaluable to the protection of the citizens of the United      
>   States from fraud, theft, drug trafficking, child pornography;          
>   kidnapping, and money laundering; and                                   
>       (F) basic to the protection of the nation's critical                
>   infrastructures, including electrical grids, banking and financial      
>   systems, telecommunications, water supplies, and transportation.        
>       (2) The goal of any encryption legislation should be to enhance and 
>   promote the global market strength of United States encryption          
>   manufacturers, while guaranteeing that national security and public     
>   safety obligations of the Government can still be accomplished.         
>       (3) It is essential to the national security interests of the United
>   States that United States encryption products dominate the global       
>   market.                                                                 
>       (4) Widespread use of unregulated encryption products poses a       
>   significant threat to the national security interests of the United     
>   States.                                                                 
>       (5) Leaving the national security and public safety responsibilities
>   of the Government to the marketplace alone is not consistent with the   
>   obligations of the Government to protect the public safety and to defend
>   the Nation.                                                             
>       (6) In order for the United States position in the global market to 
>   benefit the national security interests of the United States, it is     
>   imperative that the export of encryption products be subject to a       
>   dynamic and constructive export control regime.                         
>       (7) Export of commercial items are best managed through a regulatory
>   structure which has flexibility to address constantly changing market   
>   conditions.                                                             
>       (8) Managing sensitive dual-use technologies, such as encryption    
>   products, is challenging in any regulatory environment due to the       
>   difficulty in balancing competing interests in national security, public
>   safety, privacy, fair competition within the industry, and the dynamic  
>   nature of the technology.                                               
>
>       (9) There is a widespread perception that the executive branch has  
>   not adequately balanced the equal and competing interests of national   
>   security, public safety, privacy, and industry.                         
>       (10) There is a perception that the current encryption export       
>   control policy has done more to disadvantage United States business     
>   interests than to promote and protect national security and public      
>   safety interests.                                                       
>       (11) A balance can and must be achieved between industry interests, 
>   national security, law enforcement requirements, and privacy needs.     
>       (12) A court order process should be required for access to         
>   plaintext, where and when available, and criminal and civil penalties   
>   should be imposed for misuse of decryption information.                 
>    (13) Timely access to plaintext capability is--                        
>
>    (A) necessary to thwarting potential terrorist activities;             
>
>    (B) extremely useful in the collection of foreign intelligence;        
>
>    (C) indispensable to force protection requirements;                    
>
>    (D) critical to the investigation and prosecution of criminals; and    
>
>    (E) both technically and economically possible.                        
>
>       (14) The United States Government should encourage the development  
>   of those products that would provide a capability allowing law          
>   enforcement (Federal, State, and local), with a court order only, to    
>   gain timely access to the plaintext of either stored data or data in    
>   transit.                                                                
>       (15) Unless law enforcement has the benefit of such market          
>   encouragement, drug traffickers, spies, child pornographers, pedophiles,
>   kidnappers, terrorists, mobsters, weapons proliferators, fraud schemers,
>   and other criminals will be able to use encryption software to protect  
>   their criminal activity and hinder the criminal justice system.         
>       (16) An effective regulatory approach to manage the proliferation of
>   encryption products which have dual-use capabilities must be maintained 
>   and greater confidence in the ability of the executive branch to        
>   preserve and promote the competitive advantage of the United States     
>   encryption industry in the global market must be provided.  

In short, the US puts aside its usual market approach to these matters and
is prepared to forgo hard cash. The reason clauses F3,F6. The rest is really
flannel.

Donald Ramsbottom LL.B, BA (Hons).

RAMSBOTTOM & Co. Solicitors

Internet Law & Global Cryptology Law Specialists




----- End forwarded message -----