Re: [atlarge-discuss] POLLING COMMITTEE: Reporting Audited Results

["J-F C. (Jefsey) Morfin" <jefsey@club-internet.fr>]

At 21:58 03/06/03, Walter Schmidt wrote:
> By stripping the name from the votes, giving them a "number," and not
> maintaining a name=number table, you have a complex transaction.
This is totally wrong. This table is the key of the security of the system. 
This is what you do not want to see. Let do it again:

- the table was created by me - acting as the missing automated program. 
Should have been created by a program using the mailing list and giving 
every member a random VID.
- that table (VID + mail + names) has been sent to the Members of the 
Polling Committee. From then on I could not temper it witout it being seen. 
I was no more than an acting program.
- to make sure the Polling Committee could not unite and temper the vote, 
the VID list has been encrypted and sent to the Watchdogs before the vote. 
After the vote they received the password. So no one could say could have 
attempted vote stuffing. And the PC could not add vote either.
- to make help Members checking we publish the list of the voters - what I 
will not do again as it has probably limited the numbers of opponents 
fearing bickering.

The only possible flaw PC members possibility to add votes. This risk is 
reduced in several ways:
- the files keep track of the bounces.
- any investigation committee would see it immediately incomparing mail ID 
and Voters e-mail
- the VID and the names have been published (this is why we published names).

IMHO the system should work without Polling Committee involvement and 
watchdogs. Only as a pure GNU ballot box with automated count. This way 
there would not be any risk of manipulation.

jfc






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