Over the years, two of the top reasons for making it difficult to report
positively in an attest engagement involving automated procedures is the
lack of documentation that that proves "today," "it" was done "yesterday,"
and the inability to "today" trace specific transactions through all
stages of the process they underwent, "yesterday."
I don't see this getting any easier...but that's my opinion.
I dont think there is any problem in that. The basic problem is to make
sure that the ballot cannot be traced to a voter (like real ballots) while
making sure everything is reported as it happened. A non reversible
algorithm like MP5 permits the fist thing. Synchronous reporting registered
by trusted third parties permit the second one. The problem is not the
voting mechanism but the trust. The way to build a secure trust is to split
among different parties controlling one another. The solution we took was
to make voters the main trustees, watchdogs could be fakes, PC Members
could be crooks as long as they were not a gang. In real votes in most of
the countries the observervers/watchdogs are representatives of the
candidates. In e-vote they can be programs of the candidates. This is a
fairly secure system. But it does make anyone to make money: here is THE
problem :-)