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Re: [icann-eu] Re: [ICANN-EU] ccTLDs to ask for BoD seats?
- To: icann-europe@fitug.de
- Subject: Re: [icann-eu] Re: [ICANN-EU] ccTLDs to ask for BoD seats?
- From: t byfield <tbyfield@panix.com>
- Date: Thu, 23 Nov 2000 18:58:31 -0500
- Comment: This message comes from the icann-europe mailing list.
- In-Reply-To: <5.0.2.1.0.20001123223801.00ac5890@pop.wanadoo.fr>; from jefsey@wanadoo.fr on Thu, Nov 23, 2000 at 10:38:12PM +0100
- Mail-Followup-To: t byfield <tbyfield@panix.com>, icann-europe@fitug.de
- References: <5.0.2.1.0.20001123223801.00ac5890@pop.wanadoo.fr>
- Sender: owner-icann-europe@fitug.de
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jefsey@wanadoo.fr (Thu 11/23/00 at 10:38 PM +0100):
> IMHO the priority should be to work on the stability of the net
> both technically and politically: through a shared responsibility
> of the root servers and in a better representation of the TLDs.
> This may result in a redistribution of the SOs and of their
> Directors: it does not concerns the @large. But as @large
> our demands is for a better stability and a better acceptation
> of new services and concepts.
jefsey, a few thoughts--
the ALM and the ccTLDs are both partially formed bodies, although
partially formed in different ways. the ALM is entirely dependent
on ICANN, and in the second berkman session in MDR we saw a taste
of things to come when mclaughlin described the self-organization
effort as an attempted 'hijack.' the ccTLDs are far more advanced,
obviously, but still dependent on ICANN insofar as the form of the
group's constitution depends on the flexibility of ICANN to nego-
tiate an acceptable structure. in both cases, i'm skeptical that
ICANN will bend and adapt in constructive ways. so i think it may
be premature to say that a redistribution of SO directors doesn't
involve the ALM: i have no doubt whatsoever that any redistribu-
tion of boardmembers will be constructed as a zero-sum game that
pits the CCs against the ALM, because the existing SOs will view
any shifts in the board structure as a zero-sum prospect: if the
CCs or the ALM gain, it will be at their expense.
that assumes that the CCs work 'within' the ICANN process. but the
most constructive possibility that came out of MDR, it seems to me,
was the possibility that the CCs might work *outside* the ICANN
process. i don't necessarily want to see that as an end in itself,
but it's the first viable threat to ICANN's growing hegemony. that
hegemony stems almost entirely from pseudo-control of the root. the
threat that *the* root might become *a* root, one among more than
one, is about the only thing that might force ICANN to negotiate in
good faith. its treatment of the ALM is a long study, very clearly
imo, in negotiating in *bad* faith. and insofar as the dominant
participants in any ALM self-organization process remain those who
negotiated the 'cairo compromise,' the interim spokespersons for
the ALM have little or no incentive to acknowledge that fact, or to
acknowledge their own strategic failures. in effect, they will likely
continue to run in circles at ICANN's bidding.
but i'd like to ask you a question about what you mean by 'the sta-
bility of the net both technically and politically.' within that
analytical framework of the 'technical' and the 'political,' what
would you say the new gTLDs are, or how would you speak about them?
cheers,
t
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