Re: [icann-eu] Re: [ICANN-EU] ccTLDs to ask for BoD seats?

["Roberto Gaetano" <roberto_gaetano@hotmail.com>]

Vittorio Bertola wrote:
>On Thu, 23 Nov 2000 18:58:31 -0500, you wrote:
>
> >threat that *the* root might become *a* root, one among more than
> >one, is about the only thing that might force ICANN to negotiate in
> >good faith.
>
>I agree. This is why I think it would really be strategically important to
>form some sort of alliance with the ccTLDs, rather than accepting to 
>compete
>with them for the remaining four seats.

I think that ICANN may be really tempted to kill two birds with one stone by 
sharing the residual seats between at-large and ccTLDs.
But in the end, it will be a *very bad idea* in terms of public relation, 
and implications on its own future.

First of all, we still have the official positions of Twomey and Wilkinson 
(AU+EU GAC reps) that reconsideration of the AtLarge Board seats may push 
the governments to reconsider their current position.
Those who have participated to the ICANN adventure since (and even before) 
its inception know that the hipothesis of shaping the Internet coordination 
body as a treaty organization was more than a remote possibility: if 
"public" input via at-large is reduced, the governments will be tempted to 
interpret themselves as the way to provide "public" input to the otherwise 
industry-ruled Internet coordination body.
The current shape is the product of a compromise. If some key elements of 
this compromise are rediscussed, the whole agreement may be in danger.

Secondly, it will appear in a very clear way that the Internet will be 
managed via wild-west type of ruling. If they accept the blackmail from the 
ccTLDs, why should Verisign comply with the rules, and not ask for a seat on 
the Board threatening ICANN with the same reasonment?
What authority will ICANN have if it will be so prone to accept compromises 
with whoever shouts louder? And if ICANN has no authority, why should not a 
different solution be sought?

In other words, ICANN knows that to cede to the pressure of the ccTLDs will 
mean its disappearance. Which may well be the preferred solution by some, 
but maybe not by the majority of the ccTLDs.
The "nuclear option", quoting de Blanc, may well in itself fire back: if the 
root will no longer be unique, what will prevent some alt.roots to include a 
different operator for some ccTLDs? And if the new operator will manage the 
ccTLD (well, will manage the altTLD who happens to have the same string of 
an existing ccTLD) in a more "commercially aggressive" way, the (original) 
ccTLD will go out of business.

IMHO, the situation is exactly the reverse as it looks: the real danger for 
ICANN is to accept the blackmail, and the real danger for some ccTLDs is to 
use the "nuclear option".

Rergards
Roberto


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