[icann-eu] Summary

[Thomas Roessler <roessler@does-not-exist.org>]

Since the "last call", there have been lots of arguments floating
around on this list.  I'll try to summarize them by issue, and try
to find out on what points we have consensus or at least rough
consensus.

When commenting on my conclusions and remarks, please keep in mind
that I'm _not_ primarly looking at the desired outcome of the study,
but at the outer limits ICANN should better not pass.   Please don't
hesitate to correct me if I got something wrong.

- Board structure.

  There are basically two approaches: Some suggest that the study's
  scope be extended to include, for instance, the DNSO which Barbara
  Simons considers to be the "most broken part of ICANN".  Jefsey
  Morfin suggested that the open question "is from 0 to 19 @large
  directors".

  Wolfgang Kleinwächter warned that the call for a Great Unified
  Study could let us end up nowhere.  I'm inclined to agree with
  him, and Barbara also seems to find a study acceptable which is
  focused on improving the process to elect/select the At Large
  Directors.

  From re-reading all the messages, it seems to me that the demand
  which is closest to consensus on this list is this:
  
  -> Abandon the clean-sheet approach.
  -> Stick with the current board structure (9 + 9 + 1) a priori.
  -> Concentrate on methods for the selection of the 9 at large
     directors (don't start shouting, election vs selection comes
     next).

  The argument behind this is that the study committee is chartered
  to find a solution which would create community consensus.
  There's no point in trying to find community consensus on a
  reduction of the number of At Large directors, since such
  consensus won't occur.  Studying this question in detail is, thus,
  a waste of time and money.

- Selection vs. election vs. ...

  There was ample discussion on the original wording of the
  comments, which I repeat for your reference: 
  
  	>> The recent At Large elections have produced the strong
	public expectation that the At Large directors will be
	elected, and that at least five of them continue to be
	elected directly. Not satisfying this expectation would lead
	to strong dissent, and endanger the consensus-finding
	mission of the Study Committee. <<

  Please note that this is not just about the procedure used for
  counting the voices - for in-depth coverage of the
  direct-vs-indirect issue, please look at the CDT study, which is
  available online.  (I don't have the URL at hand, but it's easy to
  find from www.cdt.org.) Please also note that we can concentrate
  on the fundamental question - pseudo-indirect systems like the
  American one aren't actually interesting here.
  
  So, the questions we should try to answer are these:

  -> Could we imagine consensus on a model in which the other board
     members appoint some or all of the at large directors?  I think
     I can safely answer this question with "no".

  -> Could we imagine consensus on a model in which all 9 at large
     directors are appointed by some council (which would in turn be
     elected in some way)?  I am under the impression that the
     consensus answer to this question is "no".

  -> Could we imagine consensus on a model which does not fulfill
     the following characteristics of the latest elections?
     
     * Members can nominate candidates.
     * Members directly vote for at least one candidate per region.
     
     I suppose we can safely answer this question with "no".

  -> Could we imagine consensus on a model like the one Roberto
     Gaetano suggested?  That is, use an improved version of the
     latest elections for five of the at large seats, and some kind
     of indirect election for the remaining four.

     Some of us apparently can.  Others, such as Jeanette Hofmann
     and Ted Byfield, are strongly opposed.  Still others (Barbara
     Simons) argue tactically, and say that this idea, once
     introduced, could be abused in order to justify the selection
     of the remaining four seats by the rest of the board.  I'm
     inclined to disagree with Barbara on this question, since the
     model she proposes is out of bounds eo ispo, but then again...
     
  As a conclusion, I do believe that the last option should be
  examined by the study.  But I also think that we may savely claim
  that the other three models don't need to be examined in depth by
  the study committee, since consensus on them is just impossible.
  
  Of course, working out the details of any such model, and
  analyzing t he latest elections, are one of the most important
  topics of the study.

- The Study Committee.

  There has been quite some discussion on who should and should not
  go into the study committee.  The current staff paper suggests one
  sitting board member, and mentions experience, which implies that
  no of the newly-elected directors matches this description.
  
  Suggestions we had so far included these:
  
  -> Appoint _two_ sitting board members who can balance each other,
     one of them being an elected one. Some mentioned that this
     option would still permit for a Kraaijenbrink-Katoh ticket,
     which looks like a horror scenario for some, and would
     certainly draw criticism.  (Froomkins even called the
     Kraaijenbrink option a "slap in our face".)
     
  -> Don't include any sitting board members at all, and ask a
     former member of the board to participate.  Greg Crew was
     mentioned by Wolfgang Kleinwächter.
     
     Alexander Svensson mentioned that this option would not include
     a reasonable liaison between the board and the committee, and
     that including a sitting director may actually be favorable.

  -> Include a former director and a candidate from the latest
     elections.  Individuals mentioned were (in alphabetical order)
     Jeanette Hofmann, Lawrence Lessig, and Barbara Simons.  There
     are probably others who may be suitable.

  I don't see any consensus in this question, except - maybe - on
  the feeling that any of the "board squatters" would not be
  acceptable as a member of the study committee.  However, we should
  be aware of the fact that accepting the experience requirement and
  excluding the "board squatters" from the set of acceptable
  liaisons would imply that we'd call for one of the SO directors to
  serve on the study committee.  Some may find this undesirable.
  
  One possible way out of this mine field may be the following
  approach: Appoint a former director in order to communicate the
  necessary experience with ICANN's history, and appoint one of the
  newly-elected at large directors to communicate experience with
  the election process, and serve as a liaison to the board.


-- 
Thomas Roessler                         <roessler@does-not-exist.org>