Re: [members-meeting] Re: [icann-eu] Summary

[Karl Auerbach <karl@CaveBear.com>]

> >Don't forget that when one goes to indirect elections one foresakes the
> >ability to take advantage of the laws of California (and many, many other
> >jurisdictions) that give valuable and useful rights to the electors
...
> I have severe ethical problems with the fact that the basic principles and 
> structure of a supposed "international organization" are modeled on the 
> specifics of a local law.

While I don't disagree with the principle of what you are saying, there is
the pragmatic issue that as the world exists today an entity such as ICANN
needs to exist somewhere, and there are few, if any such "somewhere"s that
are truely international.  My guess is that if we awaited a treaty process
the results would be a) distant in time, b) essentially run by governments
with no direct public involvement, and c) larded with side agreements
resulting from inter-nation quid-pro-quos.

It was strongly urged by some people, such as Tamar Frankel, that ICANN
ought to have sought its home in some jusridiction, such as Delaware, that
might have been amenible to the creation of a special statutory situation
for the entity.

> To be pragmatic, and accepting the will of the majority who sees this 
> short-sighted ancillary benefits as "incredibly valuable", may I ask you to 
> what extent do we risk to lose them in case of a mixed system (5 direct + 4 
> indirect). IANAL, but it seems to me that the moment you have even just 1 
> Director elected directly, you qualify for being a membership organization.

That's an intriging question - my own sense is that any weakening of the
right to the franchise, for example by having some seats directly elected
and some indirectly, will be used by those who don't want the at-large to
have any role whatsoever.  I am afraid of losing the rights of the
at-large a nibble at a time.

As for the "even one elected person triggers the stautory rights" point -
it is a valid one.  But to my mind, when it comes to fuzzy situations, a
judge will look to the relative number of elected directors to determine
whether the at large ought to have a particular right in a particular
specific matter.  If there are only a token number of elected directors
than one might expect an equally token grant of rights to the electors.  
This is an inchoate concern, but if the history of ICANN has shown us
anything it is that those who don't want the at-large are both imaginative
and work hard to obtain their goals.

		--karl--